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Abstract
The thesis is about household income taxation and consists of three essays.
Chapter 1 investigates the implications of the design of income tax schedules for the
distribution of household income and work incentives from the cross-national perspec-
tive. Using microsimulation techniques, we evaluate the distributional effects of replacing
existing graduated rate schedules in Western European countries with flat tax schemes.
Our simulations show that in specific circumstances a revenue neutral flat tax reform can
increase income equality and improve work incentives; in most cases, however, there is an
equity-efficiency trade-off. We show that the specific flat tax design and the welfare state
regime play a key role.
Chapter 2 estimates the determinants and extent of income tax compliance in a novel
way, using income survey data linked with tax records at the individual level for Estonia. I
model jointly two processes contributing to discrepancies in employment income between
these data sources – tax evasion and (survey) measurement error. The results indicate
a number of socio-demographic and labour market characteristics which are associated
with non-compliance. Overall, about 12% of wages and salaries are underreported, which
is very substantial for a major income source subject to third party reporting and tax
withholding.
Chapter 3 follows on Chapter 2, extending the scope of analysis from employees to the
self-employed. It uses the same data source but an alternative method by Pissarides and
Weber (1989), where the scale of income underreporting is inferred from the comparison
of income and expenditure patterns across different population groups. Results confirm
substantial underreporting of earnings by private employees and indicate large underre-
porting by the self-employed on the basis of register income, while a much smaller scale
of non-compliance is detected for the self-employed and no underreporting for private
employees using survey incomes.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Modern societies rely to a large extent on taxation: from providing resources for public
goods and services to shaping the allocation of economic resources and achieving distri-
butional goals. The design of a tax system and how it affects individual behaviour are
therefore of central importance for the society.
The thesis is about household income taxation and consists of three self-contained
essays in empirical economics. The first essay, Chapter 1, is concerned with the design of
personal income tax – contrasting a graduated rate tax schedule with a schedule featuring
a single positive tax rate (the so-called flat tax) – and explores its implications for the
distribution of household income and work incentives. The other two essays, Chapter
2 and Chapter 3, deal with tax compliance and measure to what extent incomes are
correctly reported by individuals for tax purposes as well as in the survey context. All
three studies draw on survey micro-data at the household and individual level, the first
chapter in a cross-national setting, the second and the third focusing on a single country
(Estonia) and utilising a combined dataset linking survey and administrative information.
The starting point for Chapter 1 is the observation how prevalent flat income taxes
became in the Central and Eastern European countries following their transitions from
planned to market economies. Within a dozen years, since the mid-1990s, more than ten
countries in the region introduced a flat income tax, while Western European countries
maintained graduated rate taxes with a brief exception of Iceland. Several more countries
joined in the late 2000s though some have also returned to a graduated rate tax since
then.
A number of empirical studies have assessed the effects of flat tax reforms, typically in
the form of ex ante evaluation for a single country, and suggested that such reforms could
improve work incentives and increase labour supply but would lead to greater relative
income gains for better off households and, therefore, larger income inequalities. Chapter
1 argues that such findings could be highly dependent on the particular design (tax
parameters) chosen for the flat tax and do not need to hold universally. Indeed, theoretical
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work by Davies and Hoy (2002) has established that there is a continuous set of parameter
combinations, which can ensure a budgetary neutral move from a graduated rate schedule
to a flat tax scheme, featuring a single marginal rate above a tax-free threshold. Even more
importantly, they show that the inequality of post-tax income distribution is decreasing
in the flat tax rate and in the tax threshold (for budget-neutral combinations) and there
exists a unique combination of flat tax parameters, which can maintain the same level of
inequality as with the graduated rate tax. Particular ‘break-even’ values of parameters
would be dependent on a chosen inequality measure, though some additional theoretical
regularities have been pointed out by Chiu (2007).
Chapter 1 takes the theoretical predictions into practice by studying the feasibility
of flat tax reforms in a comparative setting from the distributional perspective. More
specifically, we ask whether existing graduated rate schemes in Western Europe can be
replaced with flat taxes without major negative distributional consequences – as generally
expected – and to what extent it is possible to limit the perceived trade-off between equity
and work incentives? To answer these questions, we assess the effect of various hypothet-
ical flat tax reforms on the household income distribution using fiscal microsimulation
techniques (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006; O’Donoghue, 2014; Figari et al., 2015). The
microsimulation method allows modelling changes in the variable of interest for highly het-
erogenous individuals, taking into account their characteristics and possible interactions.
To obtain consistent and comparable results across countries, we use the EU tax-benefit
model EUROMOD (Sutherland and Figari, 2013), which is unique for its multi-country
coverage. The model simulates disposable income for nationally representative samples of
households under different tax-benefit scenarios and allows us to quantify the first-order
effects of tax reforms on the household distribution and work incentives.
Our results generally confirm the equity-efficiency trade-off arising from flat tax re-
forms though also identify some exceptions. In particular, the Southern European coun-
tries are more likely candidates for such reforms. Chapter 1 extends previous empirical
literature in two ways: first, by undertaking a systematic approach to assess the rela-
tionship between inequality and flat tax parameters, taking guidance from the theoretical
2
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insights; and second, by providing an indication of variability and robustness of results
on the basis of cross-country evidence.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 approach income taxation from a different angle, by concen-
trating on the question how compliant people are with tax rules – a highly relevant issue
to understand the efficacy of tax design. Given its concealed nature, tax non-compliance
raises non-trivial challenges for its measurement and it is extremely difficult to provide
hard evidence on its scale and incidence. This prompted Slemrod and Weber (2012) to
make a call for new innovative empirical strategies to bring greater credibility to the ap-
plied work on tax compliance, despite numerous studies attempting to estimate the extent
and patterns of tax non-compliance in the past. This is what both chapters aim to achieve
by utilising a unique dataset, which links income survey data with tax records for Estonia,
to estimate the extent and determinants of individual compliance behaviour. Estonia was
the first country to introduce a flat income tax in Eastern Europe. Apart from historic
curiosities, this also provides an advantage for the empirical estimation strategy as it al-
lows us to set aside an important but highly endogenous factor – variation in marginal tax
rates – and focus on various other household characteristics in a cross-sectional sample.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are related and study the underreporting of employment
income by contrasting information from multiple sources at the individual level, but dif-
fer for their econometric approach and the sample of interest (employees vs all workers).
Chapter 2 proposes a novel econometric method to model income reporting to the tax
authority and in the household survey jointly, in both cases allowing the observed val-
ues to differ from their underlying true values. The identification strategy is based on
the assumption that public sector employees have no opportunities to hide their (pub-
lic) employment income but are comparable to private sector employees in other respects.
Chapter 2 connects the strands of literature on tax evasion and survey measurement error.
In fact, linked datasets of a similar nature have been previously used in several measure-
ment error studies (e.g. Kapteyn and Ypma, 2007) but assuming all register incomes to
be truthfully reported. Research on tax compliance, on the other hand, is only starting
to discover the potential of such information sources.
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Chapter 3, in turn, extends and applies the well-known method of Pissarides and We-
ber (1989) that contrasts household incomes with expenditures. The method assumes
that expenditures are accurately reported (in the survey) and have a robust relationship
with household incomes. Unusual income-expenditure gaps therefore imply income un-
derreporting. The downside of the method is a less efficient estimation strategy, focused
on the aggregate level of non-compliance and offering fewer insights on factors or char-
acteristics associated with non-compliance. Compared to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 extends
the analysis to the self-employed, who are commonly assumed to be much less compliant
than employees due to the lack of a third-party reporting mechanism. Whereas nearly
all previous studies using this method have assumed that employees are fully compliant,
I relax the assumption for private sector employees in line with Chapter 2. Furthermore,
the method has been previously applied mainly to household survey data, implicitly as-
suming that household reporting behaviour is similar for tax and survey purposes, while
the linked dataset allows me to test this explicitly in Chapter 3.
Findings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 consistently point to substantial underreport-
ing of salaries and wages to the tax authority among private sector employees and the
aggregate estimates are similar, despite the methodological differences. This challenges
the common view in the literature that at most a very marginal proportion of taxes on
employment income is evaded. Chapter 3 shows in addition that self-employment income
is underreported to an even greater extent, which is in line with other studies. The re-
sults contribute to an extension of scarce empirical evidence outside the US and especially
among the post-socialist countries.
Information on the prevalence and patterns of non-compliance helps us to understand
better its nature and circumstances, which lead to income underreporting and can point
to solutions to counterbalance such developments, among others, improving the targeting
of tax audits. Tax avoidance and tax evasion have recently come under a very strong spot-
light as governments seek ways to bolster public finances and increasingly recognise the
financial and political cost associated with non-compliant individuals and corporations.
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Chapter 1
Effects of flat tax reforms in Western
Europe∗
∗The essay is joint work with Andreas Peichl, at the time a PhD student at the University of Cologne,
and part of it is based on work carried out during his research visit to the European Centre for Analysis
in the Social Sciences (ECASS) at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University
of Essex, supported by the Access to Research Infrastructures action under the EU Improving Human
Potential Programme. The essay has been published as Paulus and Peichl (2009) ‘Effects of flat tax
reforms in Western Europe’, Journal of Policy Modeling 31: 620-636. The chapter is based on the
published version, further extended with additional discussion and results.
CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction†
One of the most striking economic policy developments of recent years has been the large
number of countries adopting a flat personal income tax, i.e. broadly speaking a tax
with a single positive marginal rate (with or without a tax-free threshold). Although
the seminal proposal by Hall and Rabushka (1983, 1985) triggered a lively academic and
political debate, before the mid-1990s only a few countries and territories had actually
implemented a flat tax, most prominently Hong Kong and the Channel Islands. Since
1994, however, after its introduction in Estonia, many countries have followed suit. At
the beginning of 2009, there were nearly thirty countries worldwide with flat tax systems,
about half of which were situated in Eastern Europe. Whilst the implementation of such
reforms is currently under discussion in several other countries, including many in Western
Europe (see, e.g. Keen et al., 2008; Nicodeme, 2007), Iceland has been the only country
in the region to adopt a flat tax. Considering the recent success of the flat tax in Eastern
Europe, questions arise about whether there is scope for such a policy reform in Western
Europe as well.
Potential gains associated with the flat tax include the simplification of tax filing, with
proponents dreaming of a tax return fitting on a postcard (Hall and Rabushka, 1985) or
a beer coaster (Kirchhof, 2003), which may well lower the costs of tax compliance and
administration. By eliminating tax exemptions, distortions in the tax base are reduced.
†We use EUROMOD version C13. EUROMOD is continually being improved and updated and the
results presented here represent the best available at the time of writing. We are indebted to all past
and current members of the EUROMOD consortium for the construction and development of EURO-
MOD. This version of EUROMOD relies on micro-data from twelve different sources for fifteen countries.
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) User Data Base made available
by Eurostat; the Austrian version of the EU-SILC made available by Statistik Austria; the Panel Sur-
vey on Belgian Households (PSBH) made available by the University of Lie`ge and the University of
Antwerp; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Finland; the public use version
of the German Socio Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) made available by the German Institute for Eco-
nomic Research (DIW), Berlin; the Greek Household Budget Survey by the National Statistical Service
of Greece; the Socio-Economic Panel for Luxembourg (PSELL-2) made available by CEPS/INSTEAD;
the Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SEP) made available by Statistics Netherlands through the media-
tion of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research-Scientific Statistical Agency, and the Family
Expenditure Survey (FES), made available by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) through the
Data Archive. Material from the FES is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. Neither the ONS
nor the Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here.
An equivalent disclaimer applies for all other data sources and their respective providers.
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Also, flat taxes are believed to improve labour supply incentives and reduce tax evasion.
The argument for improved compliance is perhaps weaker in developed countries, but it
is often central to this kind of reform in developing and transition countries. These argu-
ments point towards possible efficiency gains, in terms of more productive use of resources
and increased employment, and potentially higher tax revenues and social welfare. On
the other hand, the impact of flat taxes on the distribution of the tax burden may repre-
sent a serious drawback and could be the main reason limiting their spread in developed
countries with a well established middle class.
However, in the discussion of the flat tax “a notable and troubling feature [...] is that
it has been marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by analysis and evidence” (Keen
et al., 2008, p. 713). For instance, only a few empirical studies have considered previous
reforms in detail. The most attention has been paid to the Russian flat tax reform of 2001
and there is some evidence that it was associated with increased (voluntary) compliance
(Gorodnichenko et al., 2009). It was also followed by significant real growth in personal
income tax revenue, but there was no strong evidence that this was caused by the reform
itself or by improved law enforcement, nor could any positive labour supply responses
be identified (Ivanova et al., 2005). In another example, the 2004 reform in Slovakia,
income tax revenues declined, however, in the longer term the reform is expected to bring
efficiency gains from reduced distortions in the economy and improved incentives to work
(Brook and Leibfritz, 2005; Moore, 2005). Furthermore, Saavedra et al. (2007) make a
general claim on the basis of cross-country regression models that the flat tax reforms on
average affect compliance positively but do not have a significant impact on revenues.
Given that flat taxes have not yet been implemented in Western countries, the potential
effects of flat tax reforms in these countries have mainly been studied using simulation
models. There have been several previous studies, usually focusing on a single country
(see, e.g. Aaberge et al., 2000; Adam and Browne, 2006; Caminada and Goudswaard,
2001; Gonza´lez-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas, 2006; Kuismanen, 2000). Overall findings
indicate that introducing a flat tax would redistribute in favour of high income households
and enhance labour supply (incentives). However, we argue that this could be the outcome
9
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of specific parametric reforms rather than a universal feature of the flat tax. This is
supported by the findings of Fuest et al. (2008) for Germany and Jacobs et al. (2007) for
the Netherlands which show that a flat tax with a high basic allowance and a high rate
has less harmful distributional effects than a flat tax with a low rate. However, only the
low flat rate led to positive, albeit small, labour supply effects.
The aim of the chapter is to analyse the feasibility of the flat tax policy option for
Western Europe, focusing on the distributional aspects which are likely to be more im-
portant than in Eastern Europe. We contribute to the existing empirical literature on flat
tax reforms in two ways: first, by addressing explicitly the parameterisation of flat tax
reforms, and second, by undertaking a comparative analysis of various flat tax designs
for selected Western European countries. Davies and Hoy (2002) show that in the case
of revenue neutral flat tax reforms there are two sets of critical parameter values: a lower
bound of the flat tax rate below which income inequality is always higher compared to
a given graduated rate tax, and an upper bound above which inequality is always lower.
We rely on these theoretical insights to construct different hypothetical flat tax reform
scenarios for which we analyse the distributional and incentive effects. We use EURO-
MOD, a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the EU countries, to compare the results
across countries in a common framework. We also study the effects on polarisation, which
can be used as an indicator of the strength of the middle class. We ask whether different
combinations of flat tax rates and tax-free thresholds always have positive incentive ef-
fects and an adverse effect on the middle class. We concentrate on the short-term static
effects assuming that these decide the political feasibility of a tax reform although there
are possibly important long-term effects as well.1
Our analysis shows that in some cases a revenue neutral flat tax reform can increase
income equality and improve work incentives, more often, however, there is an equity-
1People judge future gains and losses asymmetrically (see, e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Starting
from a reference point and given the same variation in absolute values, there is a bigger impact of losses
than of gains (loss aversion). Furthermore, people prefer the status quo over uncertain outcomes in the
future (“status-quo-bias”, see Kahneman et al., 1991). Therefore, short-term losses can have a much
stronger impact than (uncertain) future gains. Hence, the short-term effects presented here could be
decisive.
10
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efficiency tradeoff. We show that the selection of flat tax parameters and the specific
welfare state regime play a key role for the results. Overall, our analysis contributes to
explaining why flat taxes have not been politically successful in Western Europe so far and
suggests that their implementation is more likely in Mediterranean welfare states with a
rather small middle-class and high income polarisation.
The rest of Chapter 1 is organised as follows: Section 1.2 provides a discussion on
the flat tax design. Section 1.3 describes EUROMOD and our reform scenarios. Section
1.4 illustrates the distributional effects in terms of inequality, polarisation, winners and
losers and labour supply incentive effects. Section 1.5 concludes and discusses the policy
implications of our analysis.
1.2 Flat tax design
A flat (income) tax implies that some sort of proportionality is embedded in the income tax
system, i.e. incomes are taxed at the same (flat) rate independent of their level. Its design,
however, can be very different. Most countries with a flat tax system apply different rates
to personal and corporate income, although a common rate has become more popular,
and usually, the tax rate does not vary for components of personal income. Tax systems
which tax only capital income at a flat rate and levy a progressive rate schedule on labour
income (e.g., those in Scandinavian countries) are usually not considered as flat but as
dual income tax systems (see, e.g. OECD, 2006). For the tax base one can differentiate
between concepts which allow tax concessions (allowances, credits, deductions) and those
which do not. Strictly speaking, only a flat rate tax without any tax relief is a ‘pure’ flat
tax as in this case the share of tax payments to income is constant for the whole income
range. Such a proportional income tax has only been applied in Georgia and Bulgaria. In
all other cases, the tax incidence on incomes is progressive as a single marginal tax rate
is combined (at least) with a basic allowance. This is also the concept we focus on in this
chapter. A further step towards overall flat tax incidence would be integrating income
tax with other taxes and benefits, resulting in a negative income tax at low-income levels
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(see, e.g. Atkinson, 1995; de Jager et al., 1996).
An important aspect which has rarely been addressed in previous studies is the setting
of tax system parameters for the ex ante analysis of hypothetical tax reforms. In our case
we are interested in the relationship between flat tax parameters (flat tax rate and basic
allowance) and distributional effects. Davies and Hoy (2002) show theoretically that the
inequality of after-tax distribution of income is monotonically declining in the flat tax
rate and the associated level of basic allowance which generates the same tax yield.2
Furthermore, for revenue neutral tax reforms, which replace a graduated rate tax with a
flat rate tax, they prove the existence of critical flat tax rates such that compared to the
(existing) graduated rate tax after-tax income inequality is:
(i) higher (for any inequality index) with any flat tax rate equal to or below a lower
bound,
(ii) lower (for any inequality index) with any flat tax rate equal to or above an upper
bound,
(iii) the same for a given inequality index at a specific flat tax rate between the two
boundaries.
These regularities apply to any inequality measure satisfying the Pigou-Dalton prin-
ciple of transfers and under the assumption that behaviour is not affected by tax system
changes. The lower bound corresponds to the flat tax rate which provides a revenue
neutral solution if the basic allowance is kept at the same level as for the graduated rate
tax. The upper bound corresponds to the flat tax rate which ensures that a person with
the highest income pays the same tax under each scheme. In comparison to the gradu-
ated rate schedule, the lower and upper bound should lie between the lowest and highest
graduated tax rate.
We rely on these theoretical insights to design our flat tax reform scenarios. However,
these theoretical regularities are only approximations for empirical estimation because
2Note that as a flat tax schedule has only two parameters – marginal tax rate and basic allowance –
it is possible to choose only one freely when imposing revenue neutrality.
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existing tax systems are further complicated by the presence of other tax deductions and
allowances. Some systems do not even have a (well-defined) basic allowance to start
with. Moreover, the definition of revenue neutrality is not straightforward. If revenue
neutrality is only limited to income taxes then it might not preserve the mean of the
disposable income distribution, as there are often instruments whose eligibility or amount
depend on net income after taxes (e.g., means-tested non-taxable benefits) and, therefore,
might change their value when tax systems are modified. Furthermore, the premise of ex-
ante revenue neutrality (i.e. without behavioural responses) is a rather strong assumption
but it is necessary to follow the framework of Davies and Hoy (2002).
1.3 Flat tax simulations
1.3.1 EUROMOD: model and database
We use the microsimulation technique to simulate taxes, benefits and disposable income
under different policy scenarios at the household level, on the basis of household micro-
data from nationally representative income surveys. Simulation analysis allows conducting
a controlled experiment by changing the tax-benefit parameters of interest while holding
everything else – i.e. household population and their characteristics – constant. Therefore,
the researcher does not have to deal with endogeneity problems when identifying the effects
of the policy reform under consideration.
Simulations are carried out using EUROMOD, a static tax-benefit model for the EU
countries, which was designed for comparative analysis. Through a common framework,
which has a greater flexibility than typical national models to accommodate a range of
different tax-benefit systems, it allows the comparison of countries in a consistent way.
EUROMOD was originally built in the late 1990s, by a consortium of research institutions
from each EU15 country with a good knowledge and expertise in their respective national
tax-benefit system, and has been regularly updated since then. The tax-benefit systems
included in the model have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics as
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well as national tax-benefit models (where available)3, and the robustness checked through
numerous applications (see, e.g. Bargain, 2007).
The model can simulate most direct taxes and benefits except those based on previous
contributions as this information is usually not available from the cross-sectional survey
data used as input datasets. Information on these instruments is taken directly from
the original data sources (if available). EUROMOD assumes full benefit take-up and
tax compliance, focusing on the intended effects of tax-benefit systems. Although tax
compliance is an important aspect of flat tax reforms, we do not consider this here and
limit our analysis to the first-order static effects.
The main stages of the simulations are the following. First, household micro-data
containing information about households composition, socio-demographic characteristics
and gross market incomes are read into the model. The model then constructs corre-
sponding assessment units for each tax and benefit instrument, ascertains which units are
eligible for that instrument and determines the amount of benefit or tax liability for each
member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes and benefits in question are simulated, dis-
posable income for each household is calculated. Disposable income includes all monetary
incomes, except capital gains and irregular incomes. Aggregating household data allows
for an analysis at the population (or at some intermediate) level. For further information
on EUROMOD, see Sutherland (2001, 2007).
Our analysis is based on the 2003 tax-benefit systems, which is the most recent wave
available in EUROMOD for the EU-15 (at the time of writing) but limited to ten coun-
tries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Luxem-
bourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (SP) and the United Kingdom
(UK), excluding Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy and Sweden. The input datasets for
these countries are summarised in Table 1.A.1 in Appendix 1.A. These are based on var-
ious household income or budget surveys (e.g. ECHP, GSOEP, FES), which have been
transformed into a suitable format for the model. Where the original data source only
3For detailed information on the modelling and validation of each tax-benefit system, see EUROMOD
Country Reports at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod.
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provides the net values of (market) incomes components, their corresponding gross values
have also been imputed.4 (Such net-to-gross conversions are typically done by reversing
the tax rules.) The full samples of original surveys are retained, so that EUROMOD
input datasets remain nationally representative. The sample sizes vary across countries
from less than 2,500 to more than 11,000 households. All monetary variables are updated
to the 2003 year using country-specific uprating factors, as the income reference period
varies from 1999 to 2003.
1.3.2 Existing tax systems and reform scenarios
In relation to the widely used welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) and
Ferrera (1996) our selection of countries provides at least one example for each welfare
type: Continental (AT, BE, GE, LU, NL), Nordic (FI), Anglo-Saxon (UK) and Southern
(GR, PT, SP). Indeed, the existing income tax systems in these countries are quite varied.
As of 2003, all have graduated rate schedules with a number of tax brackets ranging from
3 (UK) to 16 (Luxembourg) and the highest marginal tax rate from 38% (Luxembourg) to
around 55% (Finland, state and local rate combined). All schedules are piecewise linear
except that of Germany which has a unique continuous function for tax rates at a range
of income levels. All countries provide a general tax concession: seven countries in the
form of a basic allowance, often integrated into the tax schedule (as a 0% bracket), the
Netherlands and Portugal apply tax credits and Austria uses both elements. About half of
the countries tax capital income together with other income while the rest tax it separately
by applying a flat rate (of 15-30%). The countries also differ with respect to the unit of
assessment. Again, half of them allow only individual taxation, four countries apply either
optional or compulsory joint taxation, and one (Belgium) provides limited income sharing
for married couples. Table 1.A.2 in Appendix 1.A summarises these characteristics.
In our flat tax reform simulations we modify the current income tax rules (i.e. the
baseline) by replacing all existing personal income tax deductions, allowances and credits
with a single personal allowance and the existing graduated rate schedule with a flat rate.
4Data transformations for each dataset are described in Data Requirement Documents (DRD).
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We only keep refundable tax credits on the basis that these are equivalent to benefits.5
In countries where capital income is currently taxed at a separate rate, we abolish this
separate rate and include capital income in the flat tax base.
We re-calculate household disposable income after modifying tax parameters, while
other policy parameters in the model (e.g. benefit rules) as well as household characteris-
tics are kept constant. The estimated differences in household disposable income between
the baseline and our counterfactual scenarios show the first-order (the so-called morning-
after) effects of the flat tax reforms. We do not attempt to model possible behavioural
reactions of individuals in the labour market or potential efficiency gains from increased
employment, but do assess changes in effective marginal tax rates to reflect how much
people’s financial work incentives are affected. This means that market incomes and em-
ployment statuses in the reform scenarios are the same as in the baseline. Such static
calculations are not necessarily restrictive for the purpose of estimating welfare changes,
which can be approximated with income changes under certain conditions (especially when
changes are small), consistent with the existence of behavioural responses (Bourguignon
and Spadaro, 2006). On the other hand, when behavioural changes are expected to be
very large, it may raise difficulties for estimating them correctly as resulting predictions
could be outside currently observed patterns of labour supply for a large proportion of
the sample. Large predicted changes (increases) in labour supply also highlight the role
of labour demand as demand-side restrictions could limit the extent to which changes in
supply lead to employment changes. Furthermore, as noted earlier, we draw on Davies
and Hoy (2002) theoretical framework, which itself assumes that behaviour is unchanged.
Altogether, our reform scenarios have the potential to broaden the tax base, simplify
the systems (due to fewer specific deductions) and make them more transparent. We do
not attempt to harmonise tax bases across countries and we limit ourselves to personal
income taxes, i.e. without modifying existing social insurance contribution schemes (SIC)
or corporate income taxes (see, e.g. Agliardi and Agliardi, 2009). One could also carry
5Examples include the lone parent tax credit in Austria, the tax credit for families with school children
in Greece, working mother tax credit in Spain and working tax credit and child tax credit in the UK.
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out an exercise of simply flattening tax rate schedules without adjusting the tax base (see,
e.g. Schwarz and Gustafsson, 1991), but this would result in higher revenue neutral flat
tax rates due to retained exceptions, therefore, limiting gains for labour supply incentives.
We simulate the following three flat income tax scenarios for each country:
• S1: a revenue neutral flat rate with a basic allowance in the existing (or equivalent)
amount,
• S2: a 10 percentage points higher flat rate compared to the first scenario and an
increased tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality,
• S3: a 20 percentage points higher flat rate compared to the first scenario and further
increased tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality.
All scenarios are revenue neutral with the total income tax revenue within ±0.1%
limits of its baseline value. In terms of the Davies and Hoy (2002) approach, our first
scenario should approximately correspond to the lower bound. Because of additional
complexities discussed in Section 1.2 exact lower and upper bounds cannot be identified
in a straightforward manner in practice. The ten and 20 percentage point higher tax rate
under the second and the third scenario are chosen to provide a wide range of tax rates
and cover roughly the existing brackets in order to explore the distributional effects in
the likely range of the upper bound.
Figure 1.1 plots the flat tax rate under each scenario and the lowest and highest
(positive) tax rate of the existing tax rate schedules. Because of revenue neutrality the
tax allowance is not independent of the tax rate (see Table 1.A.3 in Appendix 1.A for
corresponding values). There is notable variation in the flat tax rate under the first
scenario (from 11.6 to 33.9 percent). This variation results from the combination of the
underlying pre-tax income distribution and average effective tax burden under the existing
system. This also affects the other two scenarios. However, it turns out that for most
countries the range of flat tax rates under the three scenarios is sufficient to roughly
match the range of existing tax rates. A notable exception is the Netherlands with a
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very wide range of graduated tax rates due to the integrated schedule of social insurance
contributions and income tax (in the baseline). As expected, flat tax rates under the first
scenario are above the lowest rates in the existing schedules with only Portugal having a
slightly lower rate, which is possibly due to the elimination of additional tax allowances.
Flat tax rates under the third scenario are around the previous highest marginal rates for
six countries and below that for the rest.
[FIGURE 1.1 HERE]
1.4 Simulation results
A key aim of our analysis is to explore whether different combinations of tax rates and
allowances always have positive incentive effects and an adverse effect on the middle class.
We compare the results across countries, first focusing on the measures summarising the
changes in the income distribution (e.g., inequality and polarisation). Next we consider
redistributive effects in the form of the share of winners and losers. Finally, we analyse
how effective marginal tax rates change.6
1.4.1 Inequality and polarisation
We compute distributional measures based on equivalised household disposable incomes.7
Figure 1.2 presents income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient for each sce-
nario (the underlying values for the Gini coefficient and additionally for the Generalised
Entropy measures are provided in Table 1.A.5 in Appendix 1.A). Already distinct dif-
ferences between the countries in terms of disposable income inequality are noticeable in
the baseline scenario and to some extent can be explained by the distribution of gross
6We limit the presentation of results in this chapter to the most important findings. More detailed
results can be found in an earlier version of the paper (see Paulus and Peichl, 2008).
7We use the modified OECD equivalence scale which weights the household head with a factor of
1, household members aged 14 and older with 0.5, and under 14 with 0.3. The household net income
is divided by the sum of the individual weights of each member (=equivalence factor) to compute the
equivalent household income.
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incomes. Two groups can be distinguished: inequality is rather high in Southern Euro-
pean countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and the UK, and rather low in Continental
Europe (Austria, Germany and the Benelux countries) and Finland.
[FIGURE 1.2 HERE]
Introducing a revenue neutral flat tax increases inequality unambiguously under the
first scenario (S1). In the second scenario (S2) inequality decreases relative to the baseline
for Finland and the UK (depending on the inequality measure for the latter) and in
the third scenario (S3) remains higher compared to the baseline only in Austria and
Luxembourg. These differences between countries can be partly explained by different
existing tax systems and the resulting distribution of tax payments. For instance, the
effective average tax rate varies less across deciles in countries like Belgium, Finland and
the UK, where inequality decreases.
The scenarios can be ranked according to the level of inequality as I(S1) > I(S2) >
(S3), and this ordering is stable when using different inequality indices (see Table 1.A.5).
The fact that inequality levels in the third scenario are below or close to those in the
baseline scenario show that corresponding flat tax rates are in the vicinity of the upper
boundary.8 However, recalling from Figure 1.1 that flat tax rates under the third scenario
are in several countries very close to the existing highest statutory rates, the political
feasibility of this scenario appears low.
An alternative way to compare the feasibility of introducing a flat tax reform in these
countries from the distributional perspective is to consider flat tax rates required to achieve
not only revenue neutrality but also to keep the inequality level constant (see Table 1.A.4
in Appendix 1.A). As suggested by Davies and Hoy (2002), such double-neutral flat tax
rates are uniquely defined but specific to inequality measures (unlike the lower and the
upper bound). Furthermore, Chiu (2007) theoretical analysis shows that double-neutral
flat tax rates are increasing in the parameter α for the Generalised Entropy measures,
GE(α), and this is indeed clearly the case for four countries (GR, NL, SP, UK). In
8Inequality in the third scenario is lower for those countries where the flat tax rate for this scenario is
close or exceeds previous highest rate (GR, UK, GE, BE, FI), except LU, and additionally for PT.
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another three countries (BE, FI, LU) it does not hold but this appears to be at least
partly related to a few highly unusual observations, i.e. very low incomes (even negative)
and very high incomes. For Austria, Germany and Portugal, the double-neutral tax rates
for these inequality indices are very similar and produce no clear ranking among them.
On the whole, the range of double-neutral flat tax rates across countries is quite stable
for different inequality measures: from 27-28% to 45-52%. The continental countries
(LU, BE, GE, AT) feature the highest double-neutral tax rate, while Portugal and the
UK the lowest (as well as Finland with the GE(2) measure). There is a clear negative
correlation between the baseline level of inequality and the double-neutral flat tax rate:
the higher the initial level of inequality, the lower the tax rate. This holds for all four
inequality measures considered here. Overall, distributional concerns would seem limiting
the scope for flat tax reforms as most of distribution-neutral flat tax rates are rather high
by historical standards.9
To assess the importance of the middle class we calculate the polarisation index of
Schmidt (2004).10 Highly polarised income distribution implies a small middle class and
a large gap between rich and poor. Like inequality, polarisation is high in the Southern
European countries and the UK and low in Continental Europe and Finland, and it is
decreasing over the scenarios (see Figure 1.3). Interestingly though, there is a relationship
between the extent to which the baseline and alternative scenarios differ and the initial
level of polarisation (with the exception of Finland and the UK): the lower the initial level
of polarisation, the more pronounced are differences between the baseline and the flat tax
scenarios.
[FIGURE 1.3 HERE]
9Lithuania used to have the highest tax rate (33%) among flat tax countries (see Nicodeme, 2007),
before gradually lowering the rate down to 15% in 2006-2009.
10Schmidt (2004) creates a polarisation index which in analogy to the Gini index (Lorenz curve) is
based on a polarisation curve for better comparability of the results and their interpretations. Generally
speaking, polarisation is the occurrence of two antipodes. A rising income polarisation describes the
phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting in an increasing gap between rich and poor. The
proportion of middle income households is declining while the shares of the poor and the rich are both
rising.
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This pattern can be explained as follows: when introducing a flat tax, people around
the median income face higher tax burdens, whereas low and especially high income
households have higher after-tax incomes. The opposite effects on low and middle income
households increase the homogeneity within the bottom half of the income distribution.
The gains at the top of the distribution increase the heterogeneity between the bottom
and the upper half. Both effects lead to higher polarisation. However, if polarisation is
already high, the turning-point between gainers and losers occurs higher up in the income
distribution. Therefore, fewer people at the top will gain and at the same time more
people above the median will lose. This will decrease the homogeneity within the upper
group as well as polarisation, counteracting the two polarisation increasing effects. The
size of each effect depends on the marginal tax rate and the basic allowance. Therefore, it
is a priori unclear if polarisation increases, decreases or remains constant. In our analysis,
polarisation is increasing in the first scenarios for all countries (i.e. the first two effects
dominate), but it remains practically constant for Greece and Portugal in the second
scenario and for three more countries in the third scenario (i.e. the effects balance each
other), while Finland and the UK show reduction in these scenarios (i.e. the third effect
dominates).
1.4.2 Gainers and losers
The introduction of a revenue neutral tax reform always yields gainers and losers as
different groups of taxpayers are affected in a different way by tax schedule flattening and
tax base broadening. Figure 1.4 summarises gainers and losers11 by presenting their share
of the population. In the first scenario, there are significantly more losers than winners
in every country. Belgium, Finland, Germany and the UK have about the same share of
winners and losers in the second scenario; Germany and the UK along with Greece and
Portugal also have the most people with unchanged income. In the third scenario, only
Austria and Luxembourg still have more losers; Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal
11Individuals from households whose disposable income does not change more than 10 euros per month
in either direction are regarded as unchanged.
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have roughly the same share of those gaining and losing and most people in Greece still
remain in the no-change category. Overall, the fraction of winners is increasing over
scenarios for most countries (except for Austria, Germany and Greece). In all scenarios,
the highest share appears in Belgium and Finland. If disposable income is chosen as the
only criterion for an election decision, only the third flat tax scenario would be supported
by a majority in most countries.
[FIGURE 1.4 HERE]
In the first scenario with the lowest flat tax rates the gains are solely concentrated
in the top 1–2 deciles (extending also to the 7th and 8th decile in Belgium).12 When
increasing the marginal tax rate and basic allowance, low income households start gaining,
but fewer high income households gain. Nonetheless, the very top of the distribution still
gains in every scenario. The gains in mean disposable income increase (decrease) with
flat tax parameters (i.e. marginal tax rate and basic allowance) for low (high) income
households. In other words, the lower (higher) the flat tax parameters the higher (lower)
are the gains for high income households. In most countries the relative losses in terms of
disposable income are high (sometimes even highest) for middle income households in all
scenarios. Given that these groups play usually an important role in the political process
of a mature welfare state, these effects might explain why a flat tax is not very popular
in Western Europe.
1.4.3 Work incentives: effective marginal tax rates
We now turn our attention to the effects of flat tax reforms on the effective marginal
tax rates (EMTR) to gauge potential efficiency effects in the labour market. EMTRs
reflect financial incentives to work more by quantifying how much of an additional unit
of income is lost due to increased taxes or withdrawn (means-tested) benefits. Therefore,
changes in effective marginal tax rates are also suggestive of distortions (i.e. substitution
12See Paulus and Peichl (2008) for the effect on mean disposable income by deciles. The range of
changes is somewhat higher for the first (from -9.7% to +12.1%) and the third scenario (-13.1% to 8.0%)
compared with the second scenario (-5.5% to 6.2%).
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effects) in the labour supply caused by the tax-benefit system. If policy changes affect
work incentive indicators little then it is likely that the changes in labour supply are also
small.13
We calculate EMTRs for the working age population (those aged 18-64) with positive
employment or self-employment income, increasing earnings of each individual in the
household in turn by 3% while the change in all benefits and taxes (including social
insurance contributions) is observed at the household level: EMTRi = 1−∆Yj/di, where
di is the increment of gross earnings for individual i and Yj disposable income of household
j to which this individual belongs.
The average EMTRs differ distinctively in the baseline scenario across countries (see
Figure 1.5). This can be attributed to several factors such as, for example, the overall
size of the government (and therefore the demand for public funds), the general tax mix
(e.g., the importance of direct taxes and contributions compared to indirect taxes) as well
as economic differences between the countries. Mediterranean countries with the lowest
average EMTRs have rather low income levels as well as the lowest relative levels of income
taxation and social insurance contributions, resulting in high inequality and polarisation
of the income distribution. Finland and the UK which have higher EMTRs on average
attribute much more importance to the income tax whereas social insurance contributions
are relatively low. These social insurance contributions, however, play an important role
in financing the Continental European welfare states where social insurance contributions
are as high as income taxes and average EMTRs are highest (except for Luxembourg).
[FIGURE 1.5 HERE]
Effective marginal tax rates on average increase with (statutory) flat tax rates, al-
though revenue is kept constant and, therefore, the scenarios can be ranked in the fol-
lowing way: EMTR(S1) < EMTR(S2) < EMTR(S3). Flat tax rates required to
attain revenue neutrality with existing personal allowances (first scenario) lower average
EMTRs and improve labour supply incentives in all countries. Results for revenue neutral
13More precisely, the expected labour supply reactions of individuals would depend on their effective
tax rates and labour supply elasticities.
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flat rates necessary to keep the inequality levels close to their baseline values (second and
third scenario) depend on the country, but the very fact that there are countries where
incentives on average improve even with high flat tax rates (e.g., in Mediterranean and
most Continental countries) is still remarkable. This can be explained on the one hand by
the fact that even in the third scenario most of the flat tax rates are below the existing top
marginal rates. On the other hand, higher basic allowance (compared to the status-quo)
increases the share of people with zero tax liability.
Changes in the effective marginal tax rates are explored in further detail in Table 1.A.6
and Table 1.A.7 (Appendix 1.A). Table 1.A.6 shows the distribution of EMTRs, based on
various percentile values. The first flat tax scenario (S1) makes generally the distribution
of EMTRs more even (see Austria and Portugal, in particular) and the opposite charac-
terises the third scenario (S3), which leads to more unequal and polarised distribution of
work incentives (see e.g. Finland, Germany, Spain). Belgium and the UK stand out for
the highest top EMTRs (95th percentile) – these are due to low-earners receiving means-
tested benefits, and hence also little affected by alternative tax schedules. Note that the
percentile values can refer to very different people if there is substantial re-ranking due
to the reforms.
The ranking of individuals is preserved in Table 1.A.7, which provides median EMTRs
by earnings decile group.14 We see that EMTRs in the baseline are generally increasing
in earnings, except at the very top part of the earnings distribution in countries where
there is an upper limit on social insurance contributions or lower SIC rates at the top
(Austria, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg). Compared to other countries, the profiles
for existing systems are flatter in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK. Under the flat
tax scenarios, the corresponding profiles become visibly piece-wise linear and as such
are generally much different from the baselines. (The two exceptions are S2 for Greece
and S1 for the UK, which are relatively close to the baseline.) The upper end is again
affected by caps on social insurance contributions and now being additionally visible for
14That is dividing the working age population (with positive earnings) into ten equal groups based on
the ranking of their (gross) earnings.
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the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. EMTRs for the bottom earnings decile groups differ
between the reform scenarios reflecting the generosity of the tax allowance (i.e. the level
at which EMTRs suddenly increase): the larger the tax allowance, the more earners face
a zero (or a very low) effective marginal tax rate. Depending on the level of the flat
tax allowance, EMTRs either increase for lower decile groups compared to the baseline
where incomes become taxable (e.g. Austria), or decrease when the new tax threshold
is high enough to exempt them completely (especially notable for Belgium and the UK),
so that their tax liability falls despite the higher (statutory) flat tax rate. Therefore,
lower earnings decile groups tend to gain with higher flat tax rate combinations. In the
case of Portugal and Greece (scenario 3), the threshold is so high that EMTRs increase
only from the 8th earnings decile group onwards. For the same reason, there are several
cases where the change in the group median EMTR exceeds substantially the difference
in flat tax rates between those scenarios (e.g. for the middle decile groups in Finland,
Luxembourg, Spain and the UK). Large differences from the baseline also occur at the
very top of the earnings distribution under low flat tax rates (e.g. the Netherlands and
Portugal). Potential adjustments in labour supply behaviour are likely to be especially
difficult to predict for groups which face such a major shift in work incentive indicators.
1.5 Conclusion and policy implications
Flat income taxes have become increasingly popular in Eastern Europe. However, this
popularity has not yet reached the Western European countries, which have well-established
middle classes. Using EUROMOD we provide a microsimulation analysis of various flat
tax designs for selected Western European countries in a common framework. Our anal-
ysis shows that there are two mutually interdependent dimensions which are decisive for
the outcome of flat tax reforms and, therefore, for their political feasibility: first, the
flat tax design (i.e. parameters such as flat tax rate and tax-free threshold); and second,
the context of the reform (i.e. the underlying income distribution and the institutional
background). Table 1.1 summarises the results from our flat tax scenarios across countries.
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[TABLE 1.1 HERE]
Different groups of countries can be identified according to the welfare state typology
of Esping-Andersen (1990) and Ferrera (1996): in the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries inequality increases only in our first scenario. In the Southern European countries
inequality increases also in the second scenario, whereas for Continental countries in-
equality increases in all three scenarios. Incentives improve in all countries in the first
and second scenario (except for Finland and the UK) and additionally in the third sce-
nario for Mediterranean and Continental countries. In conclusion, low parameter values
that attain revenue neutrality also lower effective marginal tax rates and therefore im-
prove labour supply incentives.15 This, however, leads to more inequality and polarisation
as low rates benefit mainly those with high incomes at the expense of low and middle
income households. On the other hand, higher (revenue neutral) flat tax rates can keep
the inequality levels unchanged, but in general imply strong disincentive effects.
Exceptions to this equity and efficiency trade-off include all Mediterranean and some
Continental countries. A typical Mediterranean welfare state regime provides a rather low
level of social security (comparable to the Anglo-Saxon countries) based on low levels of
taxes and redistribution (see, e.g. European Commission, 2007). However, they also use
Bismarckian social insurance principles providing contributory benefits which entitlement
depends on the level of previously earned income (like in the Continental countries).
Furthermore, emphasis is put on the role of the family as being a major part of the social
care system. As a consequence of its design, the Mediterranean welfare state regime is
characterised by high inequality and polarisation of the income distribution, which imply
the lack of a well-established middle class. Therefore, the distributional effects of a flat
tax reform that burdens the middle class are less severe than in countries with a more
equal income distribution and the political feasibility of switching to a flat tax regime is
higher.
15Note that higher incentives do not necessarily lead to higher labour supply but depend on the re-
spective labour supply elasticities. However, recent studies for the Netherlands by Jacobs et al. (2007)
and Germany by Fuest et al. (2008) analyse flat tax reforms similar to our first two scenarios and, in
summary, they find an increase in labour supply (and inequality) with a low flat tax rate and allowance,
whereas minimising changes in inequality results in negligible labour supply effects.
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Note that our analysis focuses on revenue neutral flat tax reforms, while in practice
they are usually not designed as such. If we allowed for a loss of tax revenue, implications
for work incentives would be different and inequality would change as well. However,
the choice of any particular non revenue-neutral scenario would be arbitrary and reduce
the comparability of results across countries and with the existing tax systems. Revenue
neutrality is also a necessary condition to follow the Davies and Hoy (2002) framework.
We also limit ourselves to personal income tax, while acknowledging that this is only
part of the tax mix. In particular, we have kept social security contributions unchanged,
which represent an additional tax on labour. Moreover, we do not consider effects on
investment and capital accumulation, human capital or compliance. When interpreting
our results, one has to be aware of the fact that we consider static effects only. Flat taxes
are also supposed to have positive dynamic efficiency and growth effects (see, e.g. Cassou
and Lansing, 2004; Stokey and Rebelo, 1995), which might make increasing inequality
acceptable. However, the short-term distributional effects analysed in this chapter are
those most likely to be decisive for the political feasibility of a flat tax reform.
The policy implications of our analysis are the following. The effects of introducing a
flat tax depend crucially on the details of the reform and the country under observation.
In specific circumstances, there can be scope for a more equitable income distribution and
the simultaneous improvement in work incentives. This is more likely for countries with
highly polarised income distributions (e.g., the Mediterranean countries). The pattern
that emerges suggests that (revenue-neutral) flat tax reforms will always increase the tax
burden of the middle class and this is important from a political economy perspective. A
strong and politically powerful middle class is a typical characteristic of many Western
European countries and the adverse short-term distributional effects imply rather low
chances that the flat tax will appeal to these countries. This may also raise doubts
about the long-term persistence of the existing flat tax systems in Eastern Europe if
middle classes become stronger: the median voter may want to change the present system
because in comparison to a graduated tax rate structure it benefits the upper income
brackets but burdens the middle of the income distribution. Furthermore, Keen et al.
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(2008) have pointed out that the new governments in Eastern Europe may have used
(low) flat tax rates as a signal for regime shift towards more market-oriented policies.
Therefore, if such a reputation does not need to be acquired (e.g., in Western Europe), a
flat tax might be also less appealing.
In summary, implementing a flat tax in Western Europe represents a major challenge
in terms of convincing a majority of the population that an immediate redistribution in
favour of the highest income deciles is an acceptable means to achieve (uncertain) future
economic gains. However, a further movement towards lower (marginal) tax rates with
broader tax bases in the form of dual income tax systems (where capital income is taxed
at a flat rate and non-capital income at a progressive rate) may be more likely to be
observed. This, however, could eventually lead to tax systems moving closer to linearity,
albeit without an actual flat tax schedule.
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Figure 1.1: Simulated flat tax rates and existing lowest and highest marginal rate, %
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Figure 1.2: Income inequality by the Gini coefficient
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Figure 1.3: Polarisation by the Schmidt index
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Figure 1.4: Share of gainers (at the top) and losers (at the bottom), %
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Figure 1.5: Mean effective marginal tax rates, %
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Table 1.1: Summary of simulation results
Country Inequality Polarisation Labour supply
incentives
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Continental AT + + + + + + + + –
BE + + ∼ + + + + + –
GE + + ∼ + + + + + +
LU + + + + + + + + +
NL + + ∼ + + ∼ + + +
Nordic FI + – – + – – + – –
Anglo-Saxon UK + – – + – – + – –
Southern GR + + – + ∼ – ∼ ∼ +
PT + + – + ∼ ∼ + + +
SP + + ∼ + + ∼ + + ∼
Note: the symbols have the following meaning: ±: increase (decrease) ∼: no change (or ambiguous
results). Scenario S1: low flat tax rate and basic allowance, S2/S3: medium/high parameters; all scenarios
produce the same income tax revenue as in the baseline.
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Appendix 1.A Supplementary tables
Table 1.A.1: EUROMOD input datasets (version C13)
Country Dataset No of
house-
holds
Date of
collection
Reference time
period for in-
comes
AT Austrian version of EU-SILC 4,521 2004 annual 2003
BE Panel Survey on Belgian House-
holds
2,975 2002 annual 2001
FI Income distribution survey 10,736 2001 annual 2001
GE German Socio-Economic Panel 11,303 2002 annual 2001
GR Household Budget Survey 6,555 2004/5 annual 2003/4
LU PSELL-2 2,431 2001 annual 2000
NL Sociaal-economisch panelonder-
zoek
4,329 2000 annual 1999
PT European Community House-
hold Panel
4,588 2001 annual 2000
SP European Community House-
hold Panel
5,048 2000 annual 1999
UK Family Expenditure Survey 6,634 2000/1 month in 2000/1
Table 1.A.2: Income tax systems, 2003
Country No of
brack-
ets
Lowest
(pos) rate
Highest rate Form of the
main tax relief
Capital taxa-
tion
Tax unit
AT 4 21% 50% 0% tax bracket,
tax credit
flat tax (25%) individual
BE 5 25% 50% tax allowance optional flat
tax (15%)
some sharing
FI 5 state 12%,
local 15%
state 35%,
local 19.75%
0% tax bracket
(state), tax al-
lowance (local)
flat tax (29%) individual
GE 4 19.9% 48.5% 0% tax bracket integrated optional joint
GR 3 15% 40% 0% tax bracket integrated individual
LU 16 8% 38% 0% tax bracket integrated joint
NL 4 1.7% 52% tax credit flat tax (30%) individual
PT 6 12% 40% tax credit flat tax (20%) joint
SP 5 15% 45% tax allowance integrated optional joint
UK 3 10% 40% tax allowance one bracket re-
duced
individual
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Table 1.A.3: Flat tax rates (FTR) and (yearly) basic allowances (FTA)
Country Scenario 1 (S1) Scenario 2 (S2) Scenario 3 (S3)
FTR FTA FTR FTA FTR FTA
AT 21.7% 3,640 31.7% 9,780 41.7% 13,750
BE 31.6% 5,570 41.6% 10,210 51.6% 13,470
FI 33.9% 5,800 43.9% 9,640 53.9% 12,590
GE 27.0% 7,235 37.0% 14,573 47.0% 19,612
GR 21.4% 8,400 31.4% 12,250 41.4% 15,213
LU 16.6% 9,750 26.6% 21,586 36.6% 29,236
NL 18.1% 9,000 28.1% 16,332 38.1% 21,120
PT 11.6% 1,770 21.6% 6,963 31.6% 11,064
SP 17.7% 3,400 27.7% 9,355 37.7% 13,535
UK 22.5% 4,615 32.5% 10,000 42.5% 13,765
Notes: S1-low flat tax rate and basic allowance, S2/S3-medium/high parameters; all scenarios produce
the same income tax revenue as in the baseline. Basic allowance is shown in pounds for the UK and in
euros for other countries.
Table 1.A.4: Revenue and inequality-neutral flat tax rates by inequality measure, %
Country Gini GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)
AT 44.4 45.5 44.7 45.2
BE 50.0 48.4 45.4 40.7
FI 34.2 33.5 32.4 27.0
GE 44.8 45.2 45.2 45.7
GR 37.5 36.9 38.2 38.7
LU 52.2 50.2 47.9 45.7
NL 35.3 35.1 38.6 42.3
PT 28.6 28.7 28.7 28.3
SP 38.7 38.8 39.5 40.9
UK 29.9 30.6 32.5 35.3
Notes: GE(α) denotes Generalised Entropy inequality measure.
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Table 1.A.5: Income inequality and polarisation in the baseline and the flat tax scenarios
Gini GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) PS
AT base 0.239 0.095 0.102 0.131 0.228
S1 0.277 0.127 0.143 0.211 0.259
S2 0.257 0.110 0.122 0.172 0.242
S3 0.243 0.099 0.106 0.141 0.231
BE base 0.246 0.108 0.116 0.196 0.231
S1 0.281 0.128 0.142 0.237 0.270
S2 0.262 0.112 0.121 0.189 0.251
S3 0.247 0.101 0.105 0.150 0.237
FI base 0.269 0.127 0.175 0.587 0.243
S1 0.278 0.134 0.186 0.618 0.251
S2 0.251 0.112 0.151 0.452 0.224
S3 0.231 0.096 0.122 0.315 0.206
GE base 0.268 0.119 0.120 0.141 0.261
S1 0.289 0.137 0.144 0.183 0.277
S2 0.275 0.125 0.128 0.156 0.267
S3 0.265 0.117 0.117 0.136 0.262
GR base 0.322 0.191 0.175 0.209 0.305
S1 0.336 0.205 0.198 0.258 0.310
S2 0.326 0.195 0.183 0.228 0.306
S3 0.321 0.189 0.173 0.205 0.304
LU base 0.243 0.094 0.099 0.117 0.242
S1 0.283 0.127 0.139 0.178 0.275
S2 0.264 0.110 0.119 0.149 0.258
S3 0.252 0.101 0.107 0.129 0.249
NL base 0.247 0.103 0.102 0.119 0.245
S1 0.274 0.126 0.132 0.174 0.265
S2 0.258 0.113 0.116 0.148 0.251
S3 0.248 0.105 0.105 0.128 0.244
PT base 0.361 0.211 0.229 0.313 0.321
S1 0.393 0.250 0.282 0.416 0.335
S2 0.367 0.218 0.240 0.337 0.322
S3 0.356 0.206 0.220 0.292 0.323
SP base 0.311 0.177 0.167 0.210 0.293
S1 0.348 0.216 0.216 0.315 0.319
S2 0.325 0.191 0.188 0.260 0.302
S3 0.312 0.178 0.169 0.221 0.295
UK base 0.307 0.153 0.166 0.235 0.298
S1 0.321 0.167 0.189 0.302 0.302
S2 0.303 0.151 0.166 0.248 0.293
S3 0.292 0.140 0.149 0.206 0.289
Notes: GE(α) denotes Generalised Entropy inequality measure and PS the Schmidt polarisation index.
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Table 1.A.6: Effective marginal tax rates (%): percentiles and the mean
p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 mean
AT base 0.0 17.5 37.7 41.0 47.8 49.5 53.4 40.2
S1 21.6 21.6 35.0 35.4 35.8 35.8 41.9 35.6
S2 0.0 17.5 33.4 43.6 44.0 44.0 49.3 39.5
S3 0.0 17.5 18.1 51.7 52.2 52.2 56.7 42.5
BE base 32.6 43.9 49.9 51.0 55.3 58.6 100.0 59.9
S1 31.6 39.2 39.2 40.5 40.5 50.6 100.0 50.8
S2 13.1 41.6 48.1 49.2 49.2 53.1 100.0 55.6
S3 13.1 13.1 56.9 57.9 57.9 61.1 100.0 60.4
FI base 0.0 4.6 29.0 43.4 46.7 51.9 56.9 38.1
S1 0.0 4.6 38.4 39.6 39.6 39.6 44.6 35.6
S2 0.0 4.6 45.9 49.2 49.2 49.2 50.6 40.2
S3 0.0 4.6 9.4 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 44.4
GE base 1.8 19.3 36.4 50.0 54.0 59.5 64.4 45.2
S1 0.8 3.5 28.5 46.0 49.0 52.6 64.6 39.7
S2 0.0 1.8 21.0 49.9 59.0 60.0 65.7 42.9
S3 0.0 1.8 21.0 49.6 68.8 70.6 70.6 44.9
GR base 0.0 0.0 14.4 19.4 39.8 41.4 43.6 21.9
S1 0.0 0.0 16.0 21.4 34.1 36.7 36.7 22.0
S2 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.4 33.3 42.5 44.7 21.9
S3 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.4 41.4 50.9 50.9 21.6
LU base 11.7 13.9 22.6 35.5 44.6 46.5 47.8 34.8
S1 11.7 18.0 26.8 26.9 28.7 28.7 37.1 27.8
S2 11.7 11.7 13.9 35.9 36.0 37.6 44.4 31.3
S3 11.7 11.7 13.9 38.5 45.2 46.6 50.4 32.7
NL base 1.7 25.4 35.0 45.4 46.3 52.0 55.5 38.5
S1 1.7 18.1 22.9 33.3 51.6 51.6 61.7 32.8
S2 1.7 24.2 28.1 32.3 57.8 58.5 60.6 35.8
S3 1.7 24.2 33.3 39.0 42.4 65.5 65.5 37.6
PT base 7.8 11.0 11.0 23.0 35.0 45.0 45.0 25.7
S1 11.0 11.0 21.3 21.3 23.2 31.6 31.6 23.9
S2 10.6 11.0 11.0 21.6 30.2 49.4 49.4 25.1
S3 0.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 39.1 39.1 67.2 22.7
SP base 0.0 0.0 18.4 28.8 32.6 37.0 37.0 24.1
S1 0.0 17.6 17.6 22.9 22.9 22.9 22.9 19.4
S2 0.0 0.0 27.6 27.6 32.2 32.2 32.2 23.8
S3 0.0 0.0 6.3 37.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 24.1
UK base 17.8 23.0 31.4 31.4 37.0 58.0 70.0 35.3
S1 22.5 23.5 30.5 31.9 33.5 67.5 70.5 34.2
S2 4.6 9.4 33.5 41.9 43.5 48.0 78.9 38.7
S3 0.0 9.4 11.0 49.2 51.9 53.5 68.8 40.2
Notes: pX denotes the Xth percentile.
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Table 1.A.7: Median effective marginal tax rates (%) by earnings decile group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AT base 0.0 18.1 38.3 40.0 40.4 42.1 41.0 48.1 49.2 42.6
S1 21.6 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 22.0
S2 0.0 18.1 43.6 44.0 44.0 43.6 43.6 43.6 43.6 31.9
S3 0.0 18.1 18.1 51.9 52.2 51.9 51.9 51.9 51.9 41.9
BE base 39.4 48.1 55.3 55.8 51.0 51.0 50.8 51.0 54.2 55.2
S1 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5
S2 13.1 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2
S3 13.1 15.9 57.9 57.9 57.9 57.9 57.9 57.9 57.9 57.9
FI base 4.6 18.6 26.2 39.0 40.4 45.4 45.7 45.7 50.4 51.6
S1 4.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6
S2 4.6 4.6 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2
S3 4.6 4.6 4.6 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7
GE base 3.5 30.3 44.2 51.1 50.9 52.6 54.3 54.6 50.3 50.7
S1 1.8 20.1 43.5 52.6 49.5 48.8 47.7 47.1 40.4 28.5
S2 1.8 3.5 21.0 42.2 60.0 59.4 58.3 57.7 51.0 39.0
S3 1.8 3.5 21.0 21.0 63.7 69.9 68.8 68.2 61.5 49.6
GR base 0.0 0.4 16.0 16.3 16.2 19.4 30.0 41.2 40.0 40.0
S1 0.0 0.0 16.0 19.4 34.0 34.0 34.1 34.1 31.8 21.4
S2 0.0 0.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 19.4 42.5 42.5 40.5 31.4
S3 0.0 0.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.2 16.2 50.8 49.1 41.4
LU base 13.9 20.2 24.6 28.2 33.6 39.1 46.3 46.4 46.4 40.0
S1 11.7 28.7 28.7 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 18.0
S2 11.7 13.9 13.9 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 28.3
S3 11.7 13.9 13.9 13.9 13.9 45.2 45.2 45.2 45.2 38.5
NL base 35.0 35.0 25.4 46.3 46.3 46.3 45.4 45.4 44.2 52.0
S1 33.3 33.3 39.4 51.6 51.6 51.6 23.3 22.9 19.9 18.1
S2 33.3 33.3 24.2 51.6 58.5 58.5 32.8 32.3 29.7 28.1
S3 33.3 33.3 24.2 39.0 39.0 65.5 42.3 41.7 39.4 38.1
PT base 11.0 11.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 25.0 25.0 35.0 35.0 44.6
S1 11.0 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3
S2 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 20.0 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2
S3 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 39.1 39.1 39.1
SP base 0.0 6.3 20.4 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 32.6 32.6 37.0
S1 0.0 17.6 22.9 22.9 22.9 22.9 22.9 22.9 17.6 17.6
S2 0.0 0.0 6.3 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 27.6 27.6
S3 0.0 0.0 6.3 6.3 29.2 41.6 41.6 41.6 37.6 37.6
UK base 18.0 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 29.7 41.0
S1 22.5 33.5 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 23.5 23.5
S2 6.7 11.0 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.9 33.5 33.5
S3 0.0 11.0 9.4 11.0 51.9 51.9 51.9 51.9 43.5 43.5
Notes: decile groups are based on individual gross earnings of the working age population (with positive
earnings).
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Tax evasion and measurement error
CHAPTER 2
2.1 Introduction∗
Income tax evasion, i.e. a deliberate act of non-compliance with legal requirements to
disclose income (obtained by legal means) to tax authorities in order to reduce tax lia-
bility, undermines the intended effects of a tax by eroding the tax base and altering the
distribution of tax burden among individuals. It also affects labour supply (and demand)
behaviour by introducing an additional choice margin in the form of undeclared work as
opposed to declared work and, hence, can distort the allocation of economic resources.
Furthermore, it increases the costs for the society to enforce tax rules.1 On the other
hand, tax evasion may have not only negative consequences, e.g. (partly) undeclared
work could provide the only employment option for the most vulnerable. For this rea-
son and because enforcement is costly, it is neither optimal nor feasible to eliminate tax
evasion completely. However, to design optimal tax and enforcement rules one needs to
know who evades taxes, their reasons for doing so and the extent of non-compliance.
The main constraint for empirical research on tax evasion is, unsurprisingly, the lack
of suitable data, this being especially pronounced for developing countries. To study and
explain income tax evasion at the micro-level, one would essentially need a measure of
undeclared income for individuals. This kind of data are usually unreliable and very
difficult and/or expensive to obtain. There are two main sources: audited tax reports
and surveys from which the incidence and the degree of tax evasion can be inferred either
directly or indirectly. An alternative to the actual income data is to rely on laboratory
experiments. Each of these has its own advantages and disadvantages, which will be
explained in more detail in the next section.
As various data sources can complement each other, a combination of them has poten-
tial to provide more exhaustive information about non-compliance. In particular, com-
bining survey income data with tax records at the individual level offers new possibilities
∗The chapter uses the 2008 wave of Estonian Social Survey linked with administrative tax records and
made available by Statistics Estonia.
1As Shaw et al. (2010) emphasise, enforcement is a true resource cost to a society and it does not
produce any resource gains because any resulting increase in tax revenues is a transfer from private
citizens.
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to study tax evasion. Matching and linking such information is usually very restricted
due to privacy concerns and indeed, to the author’s knowledge, the only study so far
using such data to estimate tax evasion is by Baldini et al. (2009). They compare the
two income measures and assuming that people report their true income in the survey,
obtain a measure of non-reporting. However, the survey data can often contain notable
measurement errors (which they acknowledge but do not deal with in their analysis). In
fact, there have been several studies in the measurement error literature2, which assume
that administrative data are error-free and hence differences between survey income and
income from the tax records are due to survey measurement error alone, and analyse its
determinants, e.g. Bound and Krueger (1991) and Bollinger (1998).3 Later studies have
started to relax this assumption by considering matching errors (Kapteyn and Ypma,
2007; Meijer et al., 2012) or errors in register data (Abowd and Stinson, 2013), but have
not attempted to assess the scale and nature of error in administrative data, let alone tax
evasion as a possible source.
Chapter 2 provides estimates of the pattern and determinants of tax evasion based on
a unique dataset combining a household income survey and tax records for Estonia. The
main research questions are: (1) Which individual characteristics contribute to evading
taxes on wages and salaries? (2) What is the extent and distribution of undeclared
income? Unlike earlier studies attributing income discrepancies between different data
sources either to tax evasion or survey measurement error, here both reporting processes
are modelled in a joint framework. Focusing on employment income, the key assumption
made is that measurement error is unrelated to the sector where the individual works
while the same does not hold for tax compliance. Specifically, it is assumed that taxes
cannot be evaded in the public sector. This assumption provides some parallels with the
methodology pioneered by Pissarides and Weber (1989), where underreported income for
2See Bound et al. (2001) and Chen et al. (2011) for surveys of this literature (in economics).
3The linked administrative data (referred to as validation data in this literature) could also originate
from other sources. For example, Duncan and Hill (1985) and Bound et al. (1994) are based on linked
survey and employer reports. Apart from limited representativeness due to a small single firm sample
characterising these two examples, there is also an important conceptual difference for studying tax
compliance – the information what employers have reported in the validation study is not necessarily
identical with that reported to the tax authority.
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one population group (like self-employed) is inferred from a comparison with a reference
group (e.g. employed), which is assumed to have negligible non-compliance but to be
similar in other respects. In addition to different data strategy and econometric model,
the assumption used in this study is, arguably, less restrictive as it considers the possibility
that (private sector) employees engage in tax evasion as well. Furthermore, Pissarides and
Weber (1989) type of studies have assumed implicitly that the underreporting of income
in a survey corresponds to the underreporting of income to the tax authority, which is
not required here.
We use the Estonian Social Survey, which is the basis for the Estonian component of
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey, linked
to tax records for 2007. As the underlying data linkage has been carried out (legitimately)
without the requirement for consent by the survey respondents, this allows us to retain all
relevant sample and, more importantly, avoid potential selection biases, which can arise
from the consent decision (see e.g. Sakshaug and Kreuter, 2012). This is the main problem
for data linkages as they often require respondents’ agreement beforehand. For example,
previous evidence suggests that consenting can be correlated with income (Jenkins et al.,
2006) and as it is conceivable that the consent decision for linking tax records could be
influenced by the tax compliance behaviour as well, it is crucial to avoid such sample
restrictions.
The chapter extends the empirical tax evasion literature in several ways. First, it
proposes a novel econometric model to analyse tax evasion, taking into account potential
survey measurement error. As far as the author is aware of, this is the first such attempt.
Second, it provides new evidence on non-compliance in a post-socialist country, which
extends the rather limited empirical literature on countries other than the US. Third, it
studies specifically tax non-compliance related to wages and salaries which has received
less attention in the literature, for example, compared to self-employment income.
The estimates show that compliance is associated with a number of socio-demographic
and labour market characteristics. Overall, people in the bottom and the top part of
earnings distribution are found much less compliant. The results indicate substantial
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non-reporting of wages and salaries, mainly in the form of partial rather than full evasion.
This highlights that third party reporting and tax withholding, which this income source
is subject to, have limitations and suggests that tax audits might be less effective in
revealing true wages and salaries than previously thought.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of the relevant
tax compliance literature, focusing on previous theoretical and empirical findings on the
individual characteristics associated with tax evasion. Section 2.3 provides information
on the main aspects of the Estonian income taxes and their administration. Section
2.4 presents the econometric model used to estimate jointly tax compliance and survey
measurement error. Section 2.5 gives an overview of the data sources, their linkage and
summarises earnings information. Section 2.6 presents and discusses findings, in terms
of who is more likely to evade income taxes as well as the extent and pattern of non-
compliance, and tests the robustness of results through sensitivity checks. The last section
concludes with some policy implications and suggestions for further extensions.
2.2 Related literature
We first review previous work which has provided insights into the factors influencing in-
come tax compliance, both in the form of theoretical predictions and empirical evidence.
The focus here is on individuals rather than firms or the tax authority. For more com-
prehensive recent reviews, see Andreoni et al. (1998), Alm (1999), Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002), Sandmo (2005), Shaw et al. (2010), Alm (2012), Hashimzade et al. (2013), Pick-
hardt and Prinz (2014).
2.2.1 Theoretical work on tax evasion
The economic theory of tax evasion has evolved over the past 40 years starting with
the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), who provided a relatively simple
framework for analysis, but demonstrated the complexity of the subject as they could
provide clear predictions only in certain dimensions. Theoretical models have advanced
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significantly since then, however, as Alm (2012) points out, more complex approaches
tend to yield more ambiguous results. For this reason, we start from the standard model.
In the Allingham-Sandmo (A-S) paper, a risk-averse individual maximises expected
utility by choosing how much income to report to the tax authority. While non-compliance
reduces tax liability (levied at the proportional rate), the individual would have to pay
a fine (proportional to the non-reported income) if this was detected. This so-called
deterrence model predicts that evasion is decreasing in the probability of detection and
the penalty rate but gives ambiguous results in other aspects. The effect of an increase
in total income on the fraction of income reported depends on relative risk aversion: the
effect is positive (constant or negative) if relative risk aversion is increasing (constant
or decreasing). Assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, which has been generally
accepted since then, it can be further shown that the level of underreported income
increases with total income and that more risk-averse individuals would evade less (Cowell,
1990). An increase in the tax rate has an ambiguous effect on evasion.4 In a similar
model, Srinivasan (1973) analysed generic tax and penalty schedules with a risk-neutral
individual and showed that evasion decreases as the probability of detection increases.
The effect of an increase in total income on the proportion of income reported depends
now on the nature of the tax schedule and the probability of detection: it decreases with a
progressive tax if the probability of detection is independent of income, while it increases
with a proportional tax if the probability of detection is an increasing function of (total)
income.
While the A-S model has been criticised for various reasons, it has remained central in
economic analysis with much of the theoretical work maintaining a focus on the rational
agent making his decision on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. The main weakness
of the original model is that it seems to predict much lower compliance than the em-
pirical evidence suggests5 and various additional factors have been proposed to explain
4Yitzhaki (1974) pointed out that if instead the penalty is proportional to the evaded tax then,
surprisingly, a tax increase has a positive effect on compliance (if the individual has decreasing absolute
risk aversion).
5See Alm (1999) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for numeric illustrations.
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this, for example, the differences between actual and perceived probabilities of auditing,
third party reporting and non-pecuniary costs. The standard economic analysis of tax
compliance has also been criticised in other disciplines for overlooking legal issues, e.g.
Graetz and Wilde (1985), and for taking taxpayer’s motivation as given, e.g. Weigel et al.
(1987). Indeed, its focus is mainly on enforcement activities – as Alm (1999) stressed, a
person would only pay taxes because of the fear of detection and punishment with this
approach.
Further theoretical work starting with Andersen (1977) and Pencavel (1979) extended
the A-S framework with endogenous income where the individual decides jointly with
compliance his labour supply. The relationship between the key parameters and evasion,
however, becomes even less straightforward in this case. Nevertheless, one relevant insight
for our purposes is from Cowell (1985) who points out that one form of cheating involves
taking additional jobs. One strand of the subsequent literature focused on the interactions
with the tax authority6, which in general is outside the scope of interest here as they
offer little insights on individual characteristics relevant for compliance. Among a few
exceptions is a study by Erard and Feinstein (1994) who confirm with a game-theoretic
model that evasion (in general) increases with total income. There is also a useful hint
on firm characteristics: Kleven et al. (2009) show that in the presence of third-party
reporting, it is optimal for large firms to comply fully.
A relatively recent part of the literature considers more realistic behavioural elements
like various forms of non-expected utility and social interactions, though the focus often
remains on enforcement parameters. See Hashimzade et al. (2013) for a detailed dis-
cussion. This branch has considered additional factors such as different subjective costs
(feeling guilty or ashamed, stigma, damage to reputation), which can explain why there
seem to be fewer non-compliant people than the standard model predicts. While the
extent of evasion depends on the utility function in the A-S model, the condition for
compliance is determined solely by the audit risk, tax and penalty rate. Adding nonpe-
6Two main approaches rely on principal-agent and game-theoretic models. See Andreoni et al. (1998)
for a detailed discussion.
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cuniary costs to the utility function makes this condition more restrictive, as pointed out
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) themselves7 and later by Gordon (1989) and Sandmo
(2005). The decision to comply is then affected by the extent of disutility from cheating,
which naturally varies between individuals. However, these unobservable parameters are
difficult to test empirically.
In this chapter, we focus on the association between tax evasion and total income. As
explained above, the theory tends to suggest that evasion (in absolute amount) increases
with income, while it is inconclusive about the proportion of income evaded. This has
great political importance as, for example, if people with higher income were more likely
to evade taxes on larger proportions of their income, this would raise important questions
about the fairness of tax system. Given the nature of the dataset used (more in Section
2.5), we will not be able to test the effect of risk preferences and enforcement parameters
on compliance as these are not observed directly. The probability of auditing/detection
is likely to vary, for example, with industry (and occupation) and this we can control for
but we have no detailed information about the actual auditing strategy. Furthermore,
what is likely to be more important is the perceived probability of getting caught.
Due to the flat income tax in Estonia (more in Section 2.3), there is also very little
variation in the marginal effective tax rates in the cross-sectional data which does not
allow studying their effect on compliance. On the other hand, this can be also a useful
feature as it allows us to set aside a component which is generally difficult to identify due
to endogeneity.
The broad set of socio-demographic information available in our dataset allows us to
identify which personal characteristics are associated with tax compliance. While eco-
nomic theory remains rather vague in this context, one useful framework has been sug-
gested in the psychology literature by Weigel et al. (1987) where tax evasion behaviour
is influenced by social and psychological (or personal) factors. In both cases, they fur-
ther distinguish between two groups of factors: those instigating tax evasion behaviour
7This together with other extensions in their paper – endogenous probability of detection and a
dynamic case – seem surprisingly often overlooked in the later literature.
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and those that constrain it. Social norms are given as an example of social instigations,
while financial difficulties and perceived unfairness of tax laws and authorities are part
of personal instigations; access to cash receipts for a given occupation and tax enforce-
ment, among else, operate as social constraints, while the perceived risk of punishment
and attitudes towards evasion represent personal constraints. This provides some useful
guidelines for selecting specific variables in the econometric model.
2.2.2 Empirical work on tax evasion
We now turn to the empirical literature on tax evasion, retaining the focus on individual.
We limit our attention further to studies utilising individual-level income data, grouping
these by the type of data source used: audits, surveys and experiments.
Audited tax records
Audited tax returns are considered to offer the most reliable information on tax compliance
(Andreoni et al., 1998; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007). On the grounds of cost-efficiency, au-
dits are typically non-random as the cases are already selected based on some predictions
of which individuals are more susceptible of evasion, making it difficult if not impossible
to generalise findings to the wider population. To overcome this problem, there have been
also randomised audits carried out in some countries. These have been most extensive and
regular in the US in the form of the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)
in 1965-88 and the National Research Program (NRP) since 2001.8 The individual-level
data from these audits have been used in several papers, typically regressing the differ-
ence between reported income and actual income as established on the basis of an audit
against variables such as the marginal effective tax rate, total true income, presence and
proportion of particular income sources and the limited socio-demographic information
that is available from tax reports (e.g. age group, marital status, region). The first study
was by Clotfelter (1983) whose primary interest was the effect of marginal tax rates on
evasion. This has been followed with extensions including partial detection (Feinstein,
8For an overview of US studies, see Slemrod (2007).
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1991), the role of tax practitioners (Erard, 1993, 1997), non-filers (Erard and Ho, 2001)
and multi-mode evasion (Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005).
Despite similar sets of regressors, the findings have been surprisingly varied. For the
marginal tax rate, Clotfelter (1983) and Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) find a positive
effect on non-compliance, while Erard (1997) finds a negative effect (for reports where tax
practitioners were used). Feinstein (1991) provides mixed results with a positive effect for
each of the two years analysed separately (i.e. as in other studies) but a negative effect for
the pooled model. In Erard (1993), the effect of the marginal tax rate is also significant
and goes in either direction depending on a particular tax preparation mode.
Findings on the relationship between (true) income and evasion are also mixed. Clot-
felter (1983) found that underreporting increases with income9, which Feinstein (1991)
confirmed with single-year audits, while showing an insignificant (and opposite) effect
with the pooled model. Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) found a negative effect with
the whole sample yet a positive link emerged when the sample was split into three audit
classes. Evidence in Erard (1993, 1997) suggests an inverted U-shape for some paid-
prepared returns (and non-significant or a negative effect for others). It is even less clear
how evasion, measured as the proportion of income not reported, varies across the income
distribution. This has been shown in Johns and Slemrod (2010) who analysed the distri-
butional impact of non-compliance. They find that the proportion of total (true) income
not reported is larger for higher income groups (although peaking between the 90th and
95th percentile), while underreporting of wages and salaries in relative terms declines over
the same income groups, and amounts to only about 1% overall.
In terms of other personal characteristics there seems to be evidence that evasion
is higher among married people and lower for elderly (Clotfelter, 1983; Feinstein, 1991;
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005). The latter also find that the number of dependents
is positively related to non-compliance.
There are several shortcomings commonly acknowledged in the literature concerning
audited tax information: even thorough audits are unlikely to detect all income and mod-
9He used after-tax income, while later papers have relied on (adjusted) gross income.
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els accounting for imperfect detection have been suggested by Alexander and Feinstein
(1987) and Feinstein (1991); TCMP/NPR data typically exclude non-filers who have been
studied by Erard and Ho (2001) and non-compliance can also include unintentional re-
porting errors which have been considered by Alexander and Feinstein (1987) and Erard
(1997). One critical aspect from our point of view is the lack of socio-demographic vari-
ables, though some studies have addressed this by matching audit data with information
from other source, see e.g. Witte and Woodbury (1985) and Dubin and Wilde (1988),
though using aggregated rather than individual-level data. Furthermore, analyses based
on audited returns typically consider all taxable income together which come from very
different sources characterised by different opportunities for evasion and potentially dif-
ferent factors influencing compliance decisions. Evasion can also take place in the form of
underreporting income or overreporting deductions which have been distinguished only in
a few of studies (Feinstein, 1991; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005). Overall, US audits
have suggested very low evasion of incomes from wages/salaries, although this might be
underestimated as any undeclared payments could be concealed both by the individual
and the employer and, hence, very difficult to detect.
A study by Kleven et al. (2011) for Denmark is a rare one based on random audits
outside the US. They find that tax evasion has a statistically significant positive associ-
ation with being male, a homeowner, working in a small firm and working in sectors like
agriculture, construction and real estate. The strongest predictors are, however, variables
reflecting the presence and size of self-reported income, and once these are controlled for
only gender (and marital status, after changing the sign) remain statistically significant.
Surveys
Surveys can provide wide-ranging information. On the one hand, they can ask respondents
directly whether they have engaged in tax evasion activities of various forms, see e.g.
Kinsey (1992), Sheffrin and Triest (1992), Forest and Sheffrin (2002). There are also two
studies for Estonia which rely on such data to estimate individual determinants for tax
evasion/undeclared work (or its proxies). Kriz et al. (2008) use a survey by the Estonian
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Institute of Economic Research (Eesti Konjuktuuriinstituut, EKI) on the self-reported
receipt of undeclared earnings (i.e. the so-called envelope wages) together with two other
data sources: non-random tax audits and the Estonian Labour Force Survey (LFS). While
the first two sources contain explicit information on whether a person had evaded taxes,
the LFS could only provide a proxy in the form of self-reported work under a verbal
contract. Using logit models they find higher propensities for being a tax evader for those
working in small firms, in construction and agricultural sector; for part-time employees,
non-Estonians, men, young and elderly; for those with less education as well as regional
differences. Meriku¨ll and Staehr (2010) reach similar conclusions with their estimations
for all three Baltic States on the basis of the Working Life Barometer survey for 1998
and 2002. Using a logit model where the dependent variable indicates the self-reported
receipt of envelope wages, they confirm earlier findings for Estonia by showing a higher
likelihood of tax evasion for people with more than one job, a lower skilled job, working in
a smaller firm or expanding firm; and in the construction, trade and agricultural sector.
Both studies, however, have limitations due to a small number of cases of tax evasion
and/or limited sets of explanatory variables.
The main problem with self-reported data is that it is unclear how truthful respondents
are, given the sensitivity of the subject (Weigel et al., 1987; Elffers et al., 1991), even
more so when asked about the magnitude of evasion. Such measurement problems with
survey data prompted Slemrod and Weber (2012) to even conclude that the empirical
research in tax compliance is (largely) yet to experience a ‘credibility revolution’, and to
call for more creativity and attention to appropriate econometric techniques. Methods
determining the extent of tax non-compliance indirectly from survey data are, however,
a step in that direction. For example, several studies have followed the Pissarides and
Weber (1989) approach deriving such estimates from the comparison of income and (food)
expenditure by contrasting the self-employed with employees as the prevalence of tax
evasion is usually lower for the latter, see e.g. Schuetze (2002), Lyssiotou et al. (2004),
Engstro¨m and Holmlund (2009), Kukk and Staehr (2014) and Hurst et al. (2014). Feldman
and Slemrod (2007) take a similar approach but compare claimed tax deductions for
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different population sub-groups (using unaudited tax returns). However, these studies
have offered little insights to the determinants of tax evasion.
Combining survey data with administrative data sources may offer the most promising
route, though there are very few previous studies on tax compliance using survey data
linked with tax reports and even less with income information from both sources at the
individual level. Mork (1975) provides an early example where respondents (Norwegian
men) were asked about their income (in intervals). He compared income interval mid-
points in the survey with the average declared income for the same persons and found that
the ratio of register income to survey income was lower at higher income levels. Elffers
et al. (1987) analysed a sample of Dutch taxpayers whose tax returns had been carefully
audited (without their knowledge) and then asked to participate in a survey, relying on
a complex procedure to link the two data sources while preserving people’s anonymity.
Participants were asked in the survey whether they had underreported income or overre-
ported deductions, but not about the magnitude of misreporting. Their most important
finding is essentially zero correlation between assessed and admitted non-compliance.
Baldini et al. (2009) is apparently the only other study on tax compliance using in-
dividual income from linked survey and administrative data.10 They do acknowledge the
presence of measurement errors (potentially in either source) but do not attempt to ac-
count for these and attribute all differences between two income measures to tax evasion,
assuming that survey income represents true income. Their findings suggest that evasion
is higher (both in absolute and relative terms) for higher income groups, people with more
education and the self-employed. However, the analysis includes only a few explanatory
variables and the data have clear limitations in terms of a relatively small sample (about
1,000 observations), representativeness (as it refers to the residents of Modena in Italy)
and accuracy (a period mismatch between the two sources). Most importantly, their find-
ing of (average) register income exceeding (average) survey income at lower survey income
levels points to substantial measurement errors in the survey. Hence, an analysis based
10See Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005) and Benedek and Lelkes (2011) for examples of studies comparing
survey income with administrative records at aggregate levels without involving matching.
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on raw differences between two income measures can give a rather misleading picture of
evasion.
As discussed in the introduction, linked survey and administrative data are more
common in the survey measurement error literature where, in turn, potential misreporting
of earnings in tax records due to non-compliance is ignored.
Experiments
Another method is generating data through laboratory experiments, see Alm (1991) and
Alm and Jacobson (2007) for relevant reviews. Experiments have confirmed the role
of auditing and penalties (though evidence on the effect of marginal tax rates remains
mixed), provided useful guidance on various auditing strategies as well as highlighted
additional factors influencing compliance decisions. Similar to audited tax returns, only
a small number of socio-demographic variables have been examined: older people have
been found more compliant (Friedland et al., 1978; Baldry, 1987; Pudney et al., 2000) and
males less compliant (Spicer and Becker, 1980; Baldry, 1987; Pudney et al., 2000). There
is also evidence that the propensity to evade (Becker et al., 1987; Pudney et al., 2000)
increases with true income, but the results for the extent of underreporting are less clear
with Baldry (1987) showing a positive effect and Pudney et al. (2000) a negative effect
(conditional on evasion).
While experiments can provide unique insights into the behaviour underpinning tax
evasion and avoid usual problems with measurement error, the main challenge is its ability
to represent individuals’ behaviour in the real world and at the population level. Several
studies have found notable framing effects (Baldry, 1986; Webley and Halstead, 1986;
Schepanski and Kelsey, 1990), meaning that results can be sensitive to how the nature
or purpose of the experiment is perceived by the participants. Furthermore, experiments
are naturally limited as not all determinants can be (easily) tested in a laboratory set-
ting. For example, all job-related characteristics (e.g. occupation, industry, firm size) are
difficult if not possible to relate to the income generated in a lab session. The income dis-
tribution arising from a lab experiment is also hardly representative of the actual income
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distribution and the same applies to the estimates of non-compliance at the aggregate
level.
2.3 The institutional setting
Estonia is one of the three Baltic States in the northeastern part of Europe and one of the
smallest EU member states with a population of 1.3 million. The Estonian tax system
is fairly simple and linear; it was the first country in Europe to (re)introduce flat income
tax in 1994. The five largest tax instruments – personal and corporate income taxes,
social security contributions, VAT and excises – are all levied at the national level and
accounted for about 97% of total tax receipts in 2000-2012 (European Commission, 2014).
Property taxes are marginal and there are no wealth taxes. Apart from a modest increase
in the share of indirect taxes, the structure of taxes has been broadly stable since 2000.
Personal income tax is applied on comprehensive income, pooling all sources of income
including realised capital gains. The main deductions from taxable income are personal
allowance, child allowance, pension allowance, mortgage interest payments and education
related expenses.11 This leaves rather limited possibilities for overreporting tax deductions
and, hence, non-compliance can mainly take place in the form of underreporting income
to the tax authority. A single marginal tax rate (22% in 2007) is applied on the final
tax base.12 Nearly all social insurance contributions (SIC) are paid by employers and
consist of the social tax (33% of gross earnings since its introduction in 1994), which
funds pension and health care systems, and unemployment insurance contribution (0.3%
in 2007). Employees pay only contributions to the funded pension scheme (2% in 2007),
which is voluntary for older generations, and unemployment insurance contributions (at
twice the rate of employers). This means that the effective marginal tax rate varies very
11As of 2007, the personal allowance and the child allowance (per child starting from the second) were
both 1,534 EUR per year (24,000 EEK); the pension allowance was 2,301 EUR per year (36,000 EEK)
and the upper limit on deductible expenses was 3,196 EUR (50,000 EEK). All applied on individual basis,
except the child allowance which can be claimed by one of the parents. For comparison, average gross
annual salary was 8,694 EUR in 2007.
12Companies only pay corporate income tax on distributed earnings, while retained earnings are not
taxed. Dividends are only taxed once and not considered as taxable income for individuals.
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little between employees and cannot be an important determinant of non-compliance at
the individual level.
The fiscal year is the calendar year and tax reports must be submitted by the end of
March next year. Individual declarations are pre-populated with the information received
from employers as well as social insurance funds who administer taxable benefits (public
pensions, unemployment insurance benefit, parental benefit, sickness pay etc). Married
couples can choose to file a joint report, in which case all the income and allowances are
considered together. While this would be beneficial only for couples where one spouse
has unused allowances, for other couples the joint liability would be the same as the
sum of individual liabilities (but never higher). For employment income and taxable
benefits, income tax and SIC are withheld at source. As only the personal allowance and
the pension allowance can be applied on a monthly basis, individuals entitled to other
allowances and deductions need to file a report to benefit from them. The same applies
to those who have been employed only part of the year. Otherwise, as of 2007, residents
whose taxable income does not exceed the personal allowance13 or who have no additional
tax liability, i.e. final tax liability corresponds to the withholding tax, do not have to file
a tax report. A relatively simple personal income tax system places low compliance
burden on individuals and little professional assistance is required and used. As the tax
authority also offers free phone and email support service, the overall compliance costs
for individuals ought to be low.
Due to employers’ obligation to report salaries and wages (on a monthly basis), evading
taxes on employment income cannot take place without their knowledge and consent.
Furthermore, given how the (statutory) tax burden is shared between employees and
employers, this provides significant incentives for both sides to evade taxes. The employer
would gain from cost reductions, providing an advantage over law-abiding competitors,
though it is important to note that such incentives are unlikely to hold for the public sector
in Estonia. This is supported by the evidence from the Working Life Barometer survey in
13Also the pension allowance and the allowance applicable to the compensation for accident at work
or occupational disease, if applicable.
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the Baltic countries, according to which only 2% of the public sector employees in 2002
admit having received (sometimes) undeclared payments in cash, see Antila and Ylo¨stalo
(2003, p. 128). (The estimate covers wages and salaries from second jobs as well and,
hence, does not appear to refer strictly to income from the public sector employment.)
Along with potential gains from non-compliance, the employer must consider risks –
there is always the possibility that any current or previous employee might tip off the
tax authorities, which in Estonia is likely to result in the employer being fined and not
the employee. In this respect the risk of being exposed is significantly lower for the
self-employed and, arguably, for smaller companies.
The employee in turn might benefit from higher net earnings or having employment at
all. There are also significant disadvantages built into the system for those undertaking
fully undeclared work as they would not have health insurance coverage, their (expected)
future pension would be lower, especially when it comes to the funded scheme (the so-
called second pillar), and they would have difficulties getting a mortgage or a loan.14
Hence, a common practice for tax evasion is believed to entail declaring part of the earn-
ings, e.g. at the level of the legal minimum wage or slightly higher to raise less suspicion.
A similar practice is mentioned in Besim and Jenkins (2005) for North Cyprus. They
also suggest that by employing people through contracts with smaller firms, larger firms
can benefit from tax evasion without increasing the risk of exposure for themselves. They
also point out that as firms need to make unrecorded cash sales to pay their employees
undeclared income, the evasion of payroll taxes also results in part of value added taxes
and, possibly, corporate income tax being evaded.
Overall, it is not obvious whether it is the employee or the employer who has the
decisive role in evading income and payroll taxes. Unless one side has a much stronger
bargaining position, for example, if the employee has few or no job alternatives and the
employer is well aware of that, it is effectively a joint decision.
14Given the real estate boom in mid-2000s and a very large increase in mortgage loans to households,
this must have become a rather important incentive.
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2.4 Model
The general model structure is the following. Let yTi denote the true value of earnings
of individual i.15 Employed persons have positive earnings (yTi > 0) and non-employed
people have zero earnings (yTi = 0). Generally, true earnings are not directly observable
and instead each person states her earnings in the survey, ysi , which can differ from the
actual earnings due to intentional or unintentional misreporting (e.g. recall errors). Hence,
there could be individuals with zero true earnings among those reporting positive survey
income and such misreporting may have occurred, for example, because of confusing
reference time periods or not wanting to reveal the non-employment status. People also
choose how much of their actual earnings to declare to the tax authority, which we refer
to as register income and denote with yri . We can rule out negative taxable earnings and
assume that people do not declare more income to the tax authority than they actually
received.16 Employed individuals have then three choices: full compliance (yri = y
T
i ),
partial evasion (0 < yri < y
T
i ) or full evasion (y
r
i = 0), while non-employed persons always
declare zero earnings (yri = 0).
Our main interest is an estimate of income not reported to the tax authority, which
is the difference between true earnings and declared earnings, ei = y
T
i − yri , and non-
negative by assumption. This in turn requires a measure of true earnings and we seek to
obtain this from observed survey and register income, assuming both relate to true earn-
ings (and other personal characteristics), in a latent class framework. More specifically,
our modelling strategy involves specifying a structural model for true earnings, survey
earnings and declared earnings, and estimating it with a parametric method. As the
econometric model consists of three separate equations estimated simultaneously while
only two dependent variables are observed (yri , y
s
i ), we need further restrictions to identify
15We focus throughout on wages and salaries and use terms earnings and income interchangeably.
16It is possible to report negative self-employment income in Estonia (similar to many other countries)
as related expenses can be deducted from gross self-employment income, but the same does not apply to
wages and salaries. Over-reporting of earnings could happen in practice, although one might expect this
to be not very common. For example, Clotfelter (1983) shows evidence for the US that the proportion
of people understating their taxable income greatly exceeds the proportion of people overstating their
income.
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all model parameters. Given the discussion about incentives to evade in Section 2.3, our
key identifying assumption is that people working in the public sector are constrained in
their choice and cannot evade taxes, i.e. yri = y
T
i , while there are no systematic differences
between the public and private sector employees with respect to (true) earnings formation
and measurement error in the survey data. (In the empirical analysis, we are actually
able to relax the latter assumption by allowing some key parameters to differ between the
two sectors.) This means that for a part of the sample, i.e. public sector employees, we
observe true earnings as well and can therefore identify parameters for all three earnings
equations.
Focusing on the sample of people with reported (full-time) employment and hence
positive earnings in the survey (ysi > 0), we proceed by specifying the exact structure
for each earnings function.17 With probability p, an individual i in our sample is truly
employed and has log-normally distributed true earnings:
ln yTi = xiβ
T + εTi (2.1)
where xi are her characteristics determining the log income and ε
T
i ∼ N(0, σ2T ) is a
random term. With probability 1 − p, the employment status is misreported in the
survey and the person has actually no earnings (yTi = 0) – assuming this could happen
equally among those claiming to be working in the public sector and those in the private
sector. We constrain the probability to be fixed, though this could be relaxed by allowing
the probability to vary according to personal characteristics. We have chosen not to
complicate the model structure with this as it seems to concern relatively few cases. The
probability density of true earnings, conditional on having positive earnings, is:
f(yTi |xi, yTi > 0) =
1
σTyTi
φ
(
ln yTi − xiβT
σT
)
(2.2)
where 1/yTi is the Jacobian term and φ(.) is the probability density function of the stan-
17Note that we maintain a wider scope compared with several previous studies on measurement error
using linked data as their focus is typically limited to cases where positive earnings are reported in both
sources. See, for example, Bound and Krueger (1991) and Kapteyn and Ypma (2007).
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dard normal distribution.
To reflect multiple choices of compliance, we model declared earnings (yri ) as a fraction
of true income, using a two-limit Tobit model and a latent variable r∗i (‘the propensity to
comply’):
yri =

0 if yTi = 0 (no earnings)
0 if yTi > 0 and r
∗
i ≤ 0 (full evasion)
r∗i · yTi if yTi > 0 and 0 < r∗i < 1 (partial evasion)
yTi if y
T
i > 0 and r
∗
i ≥ 1 (no evasion)
(2.3)
where
r∗i = θ
ryTi + xiβ
r + εri if y
T
i > 0 (2.4)
and εri ∼ N(0, σ2r). Assuming εTi and εri to be independent, the probability density of
declared earnings, conditional on true earnings, is the following:
f(yri |xi, yTi ) =

Pr(yri = 0|yTi = 0) = 1
Pr(yri = 0|xi, yTi ) = Φ
(
− θryTi +xiβr
σr
)
∀yTi > 0
f(yri |xi, yTi ) = 1σryTi φ
(
yri /y
T
i −θryTi −xiβr
σr
)
∀yTi > 0
Pr(yri = y
T
i |xi, yTi ) = 1− Φ
(
1−θryTi −xiβr
σr
)
∀yTi > 0
(2.5)
We refer to this as the multiplicative model and additionally consider declared earnings
in an additive form, where θr and βr-s are interpreted in levels rather than the ratio of
declared earnings.18 The probability density function of declared earnings is very similar
in the two cases. As a characteristic of the Tobit model, both specifications combine
the extensive and intensive margin of decision making – whether to underreport incomes
18Specifically:
yri =

0 if yTi = 0 (no earnings)
0 if yTi > 0 and y
∗r
i ≤ 0 (full evasion)
y∗ri if y
T
i > 0 and 0 < y
∗r
i < y
T
i (partial evasion)
yTi if y
T
i > 0 and y
∗r
i ≥ yTi (compliance)
where
y∗ri = θ
ryTi + xiβ
r + εri if y
T
i > 0
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to the tax authority at all and, if so, to what extent. Modelling each choice margin
explicitly would provide more flexibility but also further complicate the model structure
and its identification. We have therefore opted for testing these two alternative Tobit
specifications instead.
The multiplicative model combines the overall compliance decision (i.e. extensive mar-
gin) with underreporting in relative terms and part of its structure is akin to the model of
fractional detection of income tax evasion in Feinstein (1991). The additive model com-
bines the compliance decision with underreporting in absolute terms. While both types
of model allow studying how compliance in relative terms varies across the income distri-
bution (i.e. one of our main research questions), a slight advantage of the multiplicative
model is that its parameter θr provides (some) direct insights into that. More specifically,
θr provides a clear indication of the effect of true earnings on the latent variable. (The
link with the censored variable is non-linear and depends on the values of other covariates
as well.) With the additive model, θr reflects both the level of true resources and their
effect on compliance, though it may capture more adequately the existence of a tax-free
threshold.19 The additive model could also reflect better the nature of compliance de-
cisions if there are fixed costs involved and non-compliance is not deemed worthwhile
unless the amount of evaded taxes is substantial enough. On the other hand, the cost
of compliance could be correlated with true earnings (for example, potential damage to
reputation may increase with true earnings) for which the multiplicative model would be
then more appropriate. Overall, it is difficult to establish a priori which specification is
more relevant and people’s actual behaviour could be more complex and involve elements
and εri ∼ N(0, σ2r). The probability density of declared earnings, conditional on true earnings:
f(yri |xi, yTi ) =

Pr(yri = 0|yTi = 0) = 1
Pr(yri = 0|xi, yTi ) = Φ
(
− θryTi +xiβrσr
)
∀yTi > 0
f(yri |xi, yTi ) = 1σr φ
(
yri−θryTi −xiβr
σr
)
∀yTi > 0
Pr(yri = y
T
i |xi, yTi ) = 1− Φ
(
(1−θr)yTi −xiβr
σr
)
∀yTi > 0
19However, the threshold applies only to the personal income tax while employer social contributions
are paid on all gross earnings (see Section 2.3). Furthermore, as we are focusing on full-time employees
and the legal minimum wage exceeds substantially the tax-free threshold, we have decided not to model
the threshold explicitly.
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of each. We therefore estimate both models to see which one fits the data better.
Finally, conditional on ysi > 0, log survey income y
s
i is modelled as a function of log
true earnings and individual characteristics xi, assuming ε
T
i and ε
s
i to be independent,
and including a separate dummy in the case true earnings are zero:
ln ysi = θ
s ln yTi · 1(yTi > 0) + θs0 · 1(yTi = 0) + xiβs + εsi (2.6)
where 1(·) is an indicator function and εsi ∼ N(0, σ2s).20 The probability density of survey
income, conditional on reporting employment in the survey, is
f(ysi |xi, yTi , ysi > 0) =
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yTi · 1(yTi > 0)− θs0 · 1(yTi = 0)− xiβs
σs
)
(2.7)
where 1/ysi is another Jacobian term. (Given our sample of interest, we omit the condition
ysi > 0 below.)
The overall probability density function (PDF) for a pair of observed earnings mea-
sures (yri , y
s
i ) for individual i can be written conditional on true earnings, with the latter
integrated out over its plausible range, i.e. any amount equal to or larger than declared
earnings:
f(yri , y
s
i |xi) = f(yTi = yri |xi)f(yri , ysi |xi, yTi = yri ) +
∫ ∞
yri
f(yT |xi)f(yri , ysi |xi, yT ) dyT (2.8)
Assuming that, conditional on true earnings and other covariates, the statements of reg-
ister and survey income are independent of each other, i.e. the error terms (εri , ε
s
i ) are
uncorrelated, this can be simplified further as
f(yri , y
s
i |xi) =f(yTi = yri |xi) Pr(yri = yTi |xi, yTi )f(ysi |xi, yTi = yri )
+
∫ ∞
yri
f(yT |xi)f(yri |xi, yT )f(ysi |xi, yT ) dyT (2.9)
20We also experimented with survey earnings in levels but the model fit to the data was much poorer.
The log form of earnings has been also commonly used in the measurement error literature, where the
focus is typically on the sample of people with positive earnings in both data sources.
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Among those with positive survey income, we can distinguish between two sets of obser-
vational outcomes, depending on whether register income is zero (A0s) or positive (Ars).
21
In the case of observations in set A0s, the PDF combines the possibility of true earnings
being zero and true earnings being positive and entirely undeclared. For observations in
set Ars, the PDF combines the possibility of all or part of earnings being declared, as
positive register income implies that true earnings are also positive given our assumption
of yri ≤ yTi :
f(yri , y
s
i |xi) =
 f(no earnings) + f(full evasion) if y
r
i = 0
f(compliance) + f(partial evasion) if yri > 0
(2.10)
The log likelihood function of the sample is
lnL =
∑
i∈A0s
ln f0s(y
r
i , y
s
i |xi) +
∑
i∈Ars
ln frs(y
r
i , y
s
i |xi) (2.11)
We estimate the parameters p, β-s, θ-s and σ-s with the maximum likelihood method
and use the Gauss-Hermite quadrature to evaluate the integrals numerically. Detailed
components of the likelihood function for the multiplicative and the additive model are
provided in Appendix 2.A.
Model identification is based on the assumption that public employees are constrained
in their choice to be compliant, hence determining a priori some of those who are fully
compliant (or actually non-employed). As true earnings are then directly observed for
public employees in the tax records, their sample drives the identification of parameters
in the true earnings equation and also in the survey earnings equation. The sample of
private sector employees, in turn, identifies parameters in the declared earnings equation.
Survey earnings are instrumental in establishing to what extent observed income dispar-
21There is also a small group of people who reported zero survey earnings and positive register income
(see Section 2.5). These cases point to a specific type of survey measurement error and appear to be
associated with very marginal employment, therefore, having less relevance for our purposes as we shall
be focusing on full-time employees. Furthermore, as employment characteristics on which we draw in
the analysis are only available in the survey data and cannot be established for this group, we have
excluded such observations from the analysis. This is common in survey-based empirical literature on
labour market behaviour in general, though typically the same choice is made implicitly there.
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ities between the constrained and unconstrained employees are due to non-compliance
rather than differences in their true earnings. Hence, a partial model omitting survey
earnings and covering only true earnings (yTi ) and register income (y
r
i ), is likely to re-
sult in downward biased estimates of the scale of non-compliance. Intuitively, on the
basis of register income alone, there would be weaker evidence to suggest that the actual
level of earnings among unconstrained employees may be above what is recorded in the
tax records and comparable to that for public employees or, possibly, even higher. As
long as part of private sector employees are fully compliant, some (indirect) evidence is
still present. At extreme, if all private sector employees unreported the same amount
of income or the same proportion of their true income, then it would not be possible
to separate it from differences in true earnings compared with public sector employees,
using a single observed measure of income. Estimating a system of equations with two
income measures, ensures that parameter estimates agree with both sets of observations.22
We illustrate the importance of having two income measures by estimating also a partial
model as part of the sensitivity analysis.
In principle, the model can be estimated with an identical set of covariates (xi) for
all three income equations (as shown later in the sensitivity analysis), but in order to
improve the identification we have made some exclusion restrictions. For example, inter-
view characteristics are only included in the survey earnings equation, while it excludes
job characteristics present in other two equations. The full list is given in Section 2.6.
In terms of identification, there are no substantial differences between the multiplicative
and the additive model.
22This is of course useful only if survey earnings are indeed strongly correlated with true earnings,
otherwise they would give misleading information. The latter would have wider implications as it would
call then into a question the reliability of income surveys in general.
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2.5 Data
2.5.1 Data sources and linkage
The analysis is based on the Estonian Social Survey 2008 (Eesti Sotsiaaluuring, ESU)
linked to administrative tax records. ESU is a household income survey, carried out
annually since 2004 by Statistics Estonia. It is based on a rotating panel where each
household is surveyed for four waves and one fourth of the sample is replaced in every wave.
(Only cross-sectional information is used in this essey.) Basic demographic information is
collected for all household members, while detailed person interviews are conducted with
those aged 16 or over. ESU is also used as the basis for the Estonian component in the
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) database.
Information from administrative tax records is based on individual tax declarations
(FID), if available, or (employer) tax withholding reports (TSD), hence covering all resi-
dents.23 Although individual and employer reports differ in their structure, this has little
importance in our case, not least because individual reports are pre-populated with the
information from employers. Both provide detailed income information, with the main
(yet minor) difference that the TSD forms exclude income earned abroad as reporting is
limited to resident firms. Where only information from TSD is available this means that
neither the joint reporting for married couples was used nor additional tax allowances
claimed (even if applicable). For each individual, income is provided separately by type
and provider, e.g. the employer or a government institution administrating a given bene-
fit. This is also the case for joint reporting affecting certain aggregates like total income,
total income tax, total allowances and total deductions, which are then summed for the
couple (and not needed in the analysis).
Individual records in the two data sources have been linked using a unique personal
identification number (PIN). This is officially assigned to each person and included in
the Population Registry which provides the sample frame. PIN is therefore known for
23This is different from studies on the US where non-filers are usually missing from administrative data
(hence referred to as ‘ghosts’). Erard and Ho (2001) is one of the very few exceptions.
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all sampled individuals, while asked for other household members during the interview in
return for excluding them from the sample frame while participating in the ESU panel,
so that they would not have to take part in other surveys conducted by Statistics Estonia
at the same time. Those who did not provide a PIN were matched with the Population
Register using their address and individual characteristics (as the Population Register does
not provide information about household composition).24 This resulted eventually in only
a very few people without a match and, hence, without an identified PIN. It is also possible
that the matching involved some error with incorrect PINs being assigned, although it
is likely to be negligible. All data linkage was carried out by Statistics Estonia without
a requirement to inform sample members or obtain their consent on the basis of the
legislation governing its activities.25 This characteristic is very important as consenting
could be systematically affected by factors which are of key interest in this context: for
example, income in general, or tax compliance behaviour in particular. The final dataset
used here is anonymised with people’s names, addresses etc removed.
The initial sample for ESU 2008 included 14,942 individuals of whom only 71 could
not be identified in the tax register (see Table 2.1). Omitting people younger than 16,
who are not subject to a person interview, reduces the sample size to 12,699 persons. Of
those, 1,910 did not respond to the survey (12.8% of the initial sample)26 and another
87 people had no person interview carried out. A further 465 cases are omitted due to
missing earnings information in ESU (mainly those who reported their earnings on an
interval scale), which leaves 10,237 people with known survey earnings (including zero
values).
[TABLE 2.1 HERE]
Essentially, we are interested in all individuals with (paid) employment in the in-
come reference period but focus on those with more substantial employment experience
24Seven out of 11 digits of the PIN are determined by person’s gender and the date of birth.
25In comparison, 24-89% consent rate was achieved in studies summarised in Sakshaug and Kreuter
(2012, Table 1) where respondents’ agreement for linkage was required.
26For newly-added sample members, the number of non-respondents refers to sampled people only
without other household members (as they remain unknown).
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to achieve greater sample homogeneity. For that purpose, we first exclude those who have
never had a regular job, that is any full- or part-time work which lasted for at least 6
months. We then limit our sample to those employed, i.e. with positive survey earnings
(5,500 people).27 Besides current labour market characteristics (at the time of the inter-
view), ESU also collects information about the main activity in any month of the income
reference period, which is the previous calendar year before the survey interview, i.e. 2007.
On this basis, we further select those who reported part- or full-time employment as the
main activity at least for one month in the income reference period (5,327 cases).
In the final step, we limit our sample to 4,121 individuals who worked full time for the
whole income reference period as a way to increase robustness with respect to potential
measurement error in the number of months worked information. (This will be relaxed
as part of sensitivity testing in Section 2.6.4, adjusting earnings with the number of
months in receipt.) We also distinguish between people working in the constrained and
in the unconstrained sector reflecting people’s opportunities to engage in tax evasion.
Following our key assumption, the constrained sector refers to people working in the
public sector, but excluding those with a second job or who have changed jobs to take
a more conservative approach. They account for about 29% of the final sample and
are primarily located in set Ars. Everyone else is assigned to the unconstrained sector,
including those with missing employer status. As part of robustness checks, we will also
test alternative definitions.
2.5.2 Earnings information
The version of ESU used here includes all the income variables from the standard release
as well as variables with original values before imputations by Statistics Estonia, i.e.
incomes as they were reported (either net or gross, monthly or annual), including missing
values. This allows us to avoid relying on the imputations in the standard release.
27There are also 343 cases where people (with regular job experience) have positive earnings in the tax
records but zero earnings in ESU. These appear to represent very marginal employment, as reflected in
the much lower average earnings compared to the main sample – see Table 2.2. Nearly 60% of these are
old age or disability pensioners according to their labour market status.
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Among 5,500 individuals who reported positive earnings in ESU (Table 2.1), 95%
stated earnings in monthly terms (rather than annual) and in 91% of cases net of (with-
held) employee social contributions and income tax.28 As derivation of gross values from
net (or vice versa) is also affected by tax evasion, we keep the extent of such imputations
for ESU data to a minimum by using the original net values in the subsequent analysis.
Imputations are then only needed to obtain net values for cases where gross values were
initially reported in the survey (about 10% of the sample). We carry out our own imputa-
tions drawing on the self-reported information about whether the employer (withheld and)
paid social insurance contributions and income tax and whether a person participates in
the funded pension scheme. Given the sensitivity of the question about withheld taxes,
this is likely to overestimate compliance but provides nevertheless a better approximation
compared to assuming full (or no) compliance. Among those who reported a gross income
figure, nearly 97% said that income tax was fully paid and under 3% that taxes were not
paid.29 As part of sensitivity analysis in Section 2.6.4, the model is also estimated on a
sample excluding all observations with imputed values.
The tax records indicate gross annual earnings together with withheld income tax
and contributions, therefore, it is possible to construct an equivalent measure of net
earnings. While there is only a single individual-level variable for wages and salaries in
ESU (separate from self-employment income), earnings in the tax records are known in
great detail, distinguishing payments by employer and type (as well as tax treatment).30
On the other hand, unlike in ESU the number of months paid is not available in our
28When asked about non-regular payments and bonuses, about 20% of people reported additional (net)
remuneration, which they had omitted from their earnings reported initially.
29The proportion of those reporting that employee SIC (i.e. unemployment insurance contribution)
had been fully paid was somewhat lower, about 90%. This is because less people are liable to pay this
(e.g. it excludes those who have reached the legal retirement age or are receiving an early retirement
pension) but also likely due to less awareness of that particular contribution (as it was introduced only
in 2002). The same proportions are slightly lower for those who reported a net income figure, 92% for
income tax and 87% for employee SIC, mainly due to higher prevalence of individuals who said they did
not know or did not answer the question.
30The following type of payments have been included in the constructed earnings measure to match
the content of the ESU earnings variable as closely as possible: salaries and wages, board member fees,
compensation for termination of employment or service, remuneration or service fees paid on the basis
of a contract for services (to¨o¨vo˜tuleping). Payments to compensate loss of earnings due to health-related
absence from work (by the Health Insurance Fund) or unemployment (by the Unemployment Insurance
Fund) have been excluded.
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dataset and we rely on corresponding information from ESU.
Table 2.2 shows mean log earnings in ESU and in the tax records (the annual net figure
is divided by 12), distinguishing between non-respondents and respondents in ESU and
in which of the two sources positive earnings were reported. There are several important
features. First, a comparison of the mean value of log earnings in the tax records for
ESU (unit) non-respondents (8.46) and respondents (8.33), see panel (a), shows that non-
respondents’ earnings are somewhat higher on average (the difference is non-zero with
p = 0.035) and suggests that those with higher (register) income may be less likely to
participate in the survey.31 This is not necessarily a concern for our model estimates,
as long as non-response patterns are the same for public and private sector employees.
Though we are unable to investigate non-response in much detail (due to the lack of
information on non-respondents), the distribution of register earnings – not shown here –
appears very similar for non-respondents and respondents.
[TABLE 2.2 HERE]
Second, there is a small group of people who reported zero earnings in ESU but had
positive earnings in the tax records. The average value of their log register income (6.28)
is much lower, see panel (b), which implies very marginal (formal) employment with a
particular recall error. We therefore conclude that this group is rather specific and its
omission (see previous sub-section) should not be problematic from the viewpoint of tax
compliance. In contrast, mean log survey earnings are much more similar among those
with no earnings in the tax records (8.54) and those with earnings in both sources (8.72).
Third, for those with positive earnings in both sources (Ars), the difference in the mean
log value of survey and register income is a modest 0.1. However, when distinguishing
between those in the constrained sector and those in the unconstrained sector, a very clear
31Toomse (2010) uses an earlier wave of the same data (ESU 2007), extended with additional infor-
mation from the sample frame, to analyse non-response in depth. She finds that, conditional on making
a contact, those living in the capital region and urban settlements, younger people and males were less
likely to take part in the survey, while income (salary quintile) was not relevant for the probability to
co-operate. However, income was significant for some particular modes of refusal and co-operation as
high salary earners were more likely to firmly refuse at the first contact and more likely to be respondents
requiring larger number of calls after the first contact.
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pattern emerges. Mean log earnings in the tax records (8.84) exceed mean log earnings in
ESU (8.77) in the constrained sector, which by our assumption means their true earnings
are on average underreported in the survey. But it is the opposite in the unconstrained
sector, where mean log earnings in the tax records (8.55) are lower than mean log survey
earnings (8.70). Assuming that survey earnings are similarly underreported by this group,
this indicates substantial underreporting of earnings to the tax authority. Note also
that the difference in mean log survey earnings between the two sectors is statistically
significant only at the 10% level (p = 0.068). The same pattern holds for the final
estimation sample, see panel (c). Similarly, Kapteyn and Ypma (2007, p. 524) report
that the mean difference between survey and administrative earnings (for Ars) in their
data is positive, while survey earnings are smaller than administrative earnings in most
cases. More generally, measurement error studies (based on linked data) have commonly
found very similar mean earnings in survey and administrative sources but significant
differences at the individual level, in either direction (see Bound et al., 2001). It appears
that no distinction has been made between private and public sector in this literature
though.
Figure 2.1 provides further details by showing the full distribution of each earnings
variable for the final sample (excluding zero register incomes and some very high incomes
for a better overview). While the overall shape of the distribution is similar for the
two earnings measures, earnings reported in the survey have a number of pikes at round
income levels (e.g. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15 thousand EEK), which is a sign of a particular type
of measurement error called heaping: a tendency to report rounded-off values. Earnings
reported in the tax records show a much smoother distribution. It has been shown that
heaping can cause notable problems in some applications, for example, for modelling the
dynamics of (self-reported) household consumption (Pudney, 2008). Pischke (1995) noted
the same feature in the US income survey (PSID 1983 and 1987) linked with employer
reports. He imposed similar rounding pattern to register incomes and found only little
correlation with the actual measurement error (defined as the difference between earnings
in the survey and the employer records), suggesting that this is perhaps not a critical issue
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in our context. As our econometric approach is already quite complicated, we therefore
chose not to model this feature explicitly.
[FIGURE 2.1 HERE]
As the final sample contains only people who (according to ESU) worked full time
during the whole income reference period, in principle, there should not be anyone below
the minimum wage level (denoted by the vertical lines in Figure 2.1). This does not hold
strictly, especially for register income. It could mean either that survey information on
work duration is not completely accurate and/or part of earnings have been unreported
to the tax authority. As the distribution of log earnings (not shown here) is close to
a normal distribution and there is no obvious spike at the minimum wage level as, for
example, demonstrated for Hungary by Elek et al. (2012), we do not model possible
censoring of true earnings at the level of minimum wage. This also means that (despite
of anecdotal evidence) there is little trace of a particular form of non-compliance, where
only a part of earnings equal to the minimum wage is reported to the tax authority and
taxes evaded on the rest of income. We therefore do not account explicitly for this case
of non-compliance, preferring instead a more generic model set out in Section 2.4.
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of the correspondence between two earnings measures at
the individual level, separately for the constrained and the unconstrained sector. (Again
for the final sample excluding those with zero register income and some very high incomes.)
The two groups of individuals reveal a similar pattern with most of the observations
appearing around the 45-degree line, though survey earnings tend to exceed earnings in
the tax records in cases where the latter have low values, and the opposite when the latter
have high values. This is also reflected by the slope of a linearly fitted line which is about
0.65 for both sectors. The same pattern has been also found in the studies on survey
measurement error (e.g. Bound and Krueger, 1991; Bound et al., 1994; Bollinger, 1998),
where this has been interpreted as a negative correlation between the measurement error in
the survey data and the true value of earnings – recall that these studies have commonly
assumed earnings in the administrative data to reflect true values – though Kapteyn
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and Ypma (2007) show that this pattern can also occur without ‘true’ mean reversion.
Additionally, there is visibly more variation in the unconstrained sector compared to the
constrained sector and a greater mass of observations in the upper left region as one
would expect in the presence of tax evasion (if earnings in the survey are disclosed more
truthfully). This is also illustrated by a locally weighted regression line which has a
U-shape at the low values of register earnings.
[FIGURE 2.2 HERE]
Finally, Table 2.3 shows (unweighted) sample means by sector for all the explanatory
variables used in subsequent regression models. These are mostly dummy and categorical
variables and provide information about socio-demographic and work characteristics as
well as interview related aspects. Note that some labour market variables contain a
few missing values and these observations are omitted at the estimation stage. The
age variable has been centered around its mean (and re-scaled) to avoid linear correlation
between the age and the age-squared variable. Furthermore, in several cases, the categories
have been joined to avoid having very few observations in any subgroup.32 There are some
differences in the composition of people working in two sectors. In comparison with the
unconstrained sector, there are less men in the constrained sector, they tend to be more
educated and work primarily in the field of education, health and public administration;
there is also a larger proportion of professionals but fewer craft workers and machine
operators.
[TABLE 2.3 HERE]
32Various groupings for the industry variable were tested and the final version chosen on the basis of
similar tax compliance behaviour based on the modelling results.
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2.6 Findings
2.6.1 Model estimates
The model is estimated both in the multiplicative and the additive form on the sample
described in Table 2.1. (The effective sample has about 120 observations less due to item
non-response.) The semi-infinite integrals (for true earnings) were solved numerically
using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with the nodes and the weights as calculated in Steen
et al. (1969). The log-likelihood functions (see Appendix 2.A) were programmed in Stata
12 and estimated using 15 quadrature points. In addition to the main results discussed
below, Section 2.6.4 provides an overview of results from a sensitivity analysis.
The following explanatory variables are included in all three earnings equations: age,
age squared, gender, nationality and education. Further demographic characteristics
(marital status, region, rural area, dummy for studying) and job characteristics (industry,
occupation, number of employees, hours in the main job, dummy for the second job, hours
in the second job) are included in the true earnings equation and in the declared earnings
equation but not in the survey earnings equation as they are expected to have a negligible
effect on the latter. Each equation also includes certain covariates which are excluded
from the other two equations to improve identification: health status in the true earnings
equation, a mortgage and a lease dummy in the declared earnings equation and inter-
view characteristics (month, people present, rating, response mode, wave) in the survey
earnings equation. Having a mortgage and/or a lease loan is assumed to be associated
with higher compliance (other things equal) as in order to successfully apply for either
of these, one needs to have earnings (in sufficient amount) deposited directly to a bank
account on a regular basis. As such this creates an incentive to have a higher proportion of
earnings declared if access to credit is desired (see also Section 2.3). Finally, our baseline
model specification allows certain parameters to differ between the unconstrained and the
constrained sector: the intercept and variance for the true earnings and survey earnings
equations as well as θs.
The results for all three equations (with robust standard errors) are presented in
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Table 2.4 for the multiplicative model and in Table 2.5 for the additive model. Most
covariates for log true earnings (ln yT ) are statistically significant at the 1% level and
with expected signs. Earnings are higher for males, Estonian nationals and more educated
people; they are higher in the northern (capital) region and notably lower in the north-
east region.33 Age has an inverted U-shape effect on the size of earnings, peaking at
40 years where the age premium is about 17% compared to people aged 20 and 60.
There is also a statistically significant positive relationship with health status, job skill
level (i.e. occupation), the size of firm and hours worked. Compared to employees in
education, health and public administration – reflecting largely public sector employment
– earnings are higher in construction, wholesale trade, transportation, professional services
and finance. It is somewhat surprising that the sector premium is highest in construction,
though the data refer to 2007 which marked the height of the boom in the real estate and
construction sector. Finally, while the dummy for the constrained sector is very close to
zero (and statistically non-significant), variance (σ2T ) estimates are clearly higher for the
unconstrained sector. Results with the additive model for the true earnings equation are
very similar except for slightly larger coefficients for nationality, education, firm size and
occupation.
[TABLE 2.4 AND 2.5 HERE]
In the case of declared earnings (yr), the raw coefficients show the effect of independent
variables on the latent dependent variable, while our key interest is the effect on the
censored dependent variable. For that purpose, raw estimates are useful only to the
extent of showing which covariates are statistically significant and the sign of the effect
on the censored variable. Marginal effects on the (censored) declared earnings are provided
in the next subsection.
Conditional on true earnings, declared earnings have a statistically significant positive
association with age, Estonian nationality, education, studying, the size of the firm and
whether the household has a mortgage or a lease loan. Having a mortgage has lower
33The gender earnings gap is very large at 39%, calculated as exp(βˆmale)− 1. Estonia has the highest
(unadjusted) gender earnings gap among the EU countries, see Eurostat indicator tsdsc340.
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statistical significance and one explanation for this is that people interested in mortgage
could be less constrained by lower declared earnings if they can compensate this by using
(accumulated) undeclared earnings to make a larger downpayment. People requiring a
lease loan are presumably less likely to have substantial savings of any form and, hence,
the size of declared earnings is more important.
Declared earnings are lower for men and for non-married, in particular those who
are separated, divorced or widowed. The north-east region, which has several specific
characteristics, also stands out for a negative coefficient. First, it has suffered from the
highest unemployment rate compared to other regions since the beginning of the 1990s
(following the collapse of heavy industry which was central to the local labour market),
at times even up to twice higher than in others. Second, with the highest share of non-
Estonians, the region is ethnically much less homogenous and this may affect the overall
level of trust in public institutions and tax morale. Across sectors, declared earnings are
lower in construction, transportation (combined with storage and courier services), hotels
and restaurants, and finance (combined with real estate and administrative support) in
comparison with education, health and public administration as well as manufacturing,
mining and utilities. Occupations associated with higher declared earnings are clerks as
well as service and sales workers, while skilled agricultural workers and blue-collar workers
have lower earnings. The results for declared earnings are well in line with findings in
Kriz et al. (2008) and Meriku¨ll and Staehr (2010) based on self-reported compliance for
Estonia, and also with the (few) general patterns found in the literature (e.g. gender and
age – see Section 2.2.2). The main exception concerns marital status as being married has
been found associated with more evasion in the previous audit-based US studies, though
Kleven et al. (2011) also find a link with less evasion like we do.
Again, in terms of statistical significance and the sign of coefficients, results for the
additive model are very similar. The values and units of coefficients naturally differ given
how declared earnings are specified, most notably for parameter θr, i.e. the coefficient of
true earnings in the declared earnings equation, which is negative with the multiplicative
model and positive with the additive model. But the interpretation of θr differs between
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the two models: unlike for the multiplicative model, it combines the effect of true earnings
on declared earnings in levels and relative terms in the additive model.
Finally, conditional on true earnings, survey earnings are higher for males, Estonian
nationals, and those more educated. The dummy for working in the constrained sector
is not statistically significant. There is also a positive link with the timing of interview34
and its rating, while the number of waves has a negative effect on earnings reported in
the survey. Survey earnings are higher when the interview was responded by another
household member, however, there is no statistically significant relationship with who
was present at the interview. The coefficient of true earnings (θs) is highly significant and
in the range of 0.6-0.7, being slightly higher for the unconstrained sector.
For the model as a whole, both the AIC and the BIC statistic favour the multiplicative
form.
2.6.2 Marginal effects on declared earnings
To give a quantitative interpretation for the effects of the independent variables in the
declared earnings equation (yr), we estimate their marginal effects on the probability of
compliance and the size of declared earnings, conditional on true earnings, as well as the
elasticity of declared earnings with respect to true earnings. The underlying formulae are
derived in Appendix 2.B.
Figure 2.3 shows marginal effects of age, gender, education, region, industry and firm
size on the probability of compliance, conditional on being truly employed.35 It focuses
on covariates for which estimated coefficients were statistically significant and relatively
large in absolute size. Marginal effects are estimated at the sample means and modes of,
respectively, continuous and discrete variables for a wide range of values of true earnings:
from near 0 up to 25 thousand EEK per month, roughly 3 times the average value of
earnings in the sample for the unconstrained sector.
34The interviews usually take place around the time when annual tax reports are due (i.e. the end of
March) to reduce recall errors.
35That is ∂ Pr(yri = y
T
i |xi, yTi )/∂xk in case xk is a continuous variable (∀yTi > 0). This equals
βrk
σr
φ
(
θryTi +xiβ
r−1
σr
)
with the multiplicative model and
βrk
σr
φ
(
xiβ
r−(1−θr)yTi
σr
)
with the additive model.
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[FIGURE 2.3 HERE]
Figure 2.3 shows that, based on the multiplicative model, the estimated probability
of full compliance is up to 5 percentage points higher for an additional 10 years of age,
increasing in true earnings. Depending on the level of true earnings, the probability of
compliance is up to 10-11 percentage points (pp) higher for females and people with ter-
tiary education relative to those with basic education (or less). Similarly, the probability
is up to 10 pp lower for the north-east region relative to the north, and as much as 24
pp lower for construction, relative to the pooled sectors of manufacturing, mining and
utilities, and 28 pp lower for firms with 1-10 employees relative to firms with 50 or more
employees.
In comparison, the additive model shows effects of similar magnitude with the ex-
ception of effects for region and firm size which are smaller. The plotted curves for the
additive model also exhibit more curvature, reflecting greater sensitivity to the level of
true earnings. Among else, the effects for industry and firm size are not monotonically
increasing in the covered range of true earnings – the highest effect is shown around the
level of 20 thousand EEK (per month).
The marginal effects on the probability of full and partial evasion are not shown as
the estimated probability of full evasion is low and varies rather little with true earnings.
Therefore, the effect on the probability of partial evasion basically mirrors that on the
probability of full compliance. The marginal effect on full evasion is most notable in the
case of construction and small firms where the probability is up to 6-7 pp higher.
Figure 2.4 shows the marginal effect on the expected value of declared earnings for
the same characteristics, conditional on true earnings. Overall, this gives a very similar
picture in terms of direction and relative magnitude of effects. The key difference is that
results for the multiplicative and additive model are now very similar, meaning that the
marginal effects on the expected value of declared earnings are much more robust to the
model specification than the marginal effects on the probabilities of full compliance.
[FIGURE 2.4 HERE]
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Finally, to understand how the level of true earnings itself affects compliance (holding
other characteristics constant), we consider the elasticity of the expected value of declared
earnings with respect to true earnings. The mean elasticity across all employees in the
unconstrained sector, calculated at predicted individual true earnings (conditional on
being truly employed)36, is 0.91-0.92 depending on the type of the model. This means
that on average a 1% increase in (predicted) true earnings would result in a 0.9% increase
in the expected value of declared earnings.
Figure 2.5 shows elasticity estimates for a person with sample mean/mode character-
istics, varying one characteristic at a time and across the same range of true earnings.
In all cases, elasticity estimates are below 1. Furthermore, elasticity estimates are lower
at higher levels of true earnings, indicating that there is a negative association between
compliance and true earnings (other things being equal).
[FIGURE 2.5 HERE]
Elasticity estimates for a person with sample mean/mode characteristics and true
earnings at average declared (net) earnings in the sample (8,000 EEK), is 0.97. At this
level of true earnings, estimates for the multiplicative and the additive model are basically
the same and remain in a narrow range of 0.96-0.98 when varying key characteristics like
age, gender, education and region. The estimates are slightly smaller (0.92-0.93) for
construction sector and small firms.
Elasticity estimates for true (net) earnings at their mean estimated value in the un-
constrained sector (10,000 EEK), are in the range of 0.94-0.97 for most cases in Figure
2.5. At higher levels of true earnings, the gap between two model estimates increases,
exceeding 10 percentage points at 25,000 EEK in the case of construction and small firms.
2.6.3 Extent of tax evasion
As a last indicator, we provide (aggregate) estimates for the extent of tax evasion. Each
individual is characterised by one of the four activities: S ∈ {no income, partial evasion,
36 That is E(yTi |xi, yTi > 0) = E[exp(xiβT + εTi )|xi, yTi > 0] = exp(xiβT ) exp(σ2T /2).
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full evasion, compliance}. Applying Bayes’s law on equation (2.10), the probability of
being engaged in activity s for an individual i (observed in set k) can be expressed as
Pr(si|yri , ysi , xi) = fk(si)/fk where si ∈ S (2.12)
The proportion of the sample with outcome s can be estimated as
1
N
[∑
i∈A0s
Pr(si|yri , ysi , xi) +
∑
i∈Ars
Pr(si|yri , ysi , xi)
]
where si ∈ S (2.13)
where N is the number of individuals in the sample. Additionally, we can estimate the
amount of undeclared earnings and their share in total earnings. The expected value of
undeclared earnings ei for individual i is
E[ei|yri , ysi , xi] =
 E[y
T
i − yri |yri , ysi , xi, yTi > yri ] · Pr(full evasion) if yri = 0
E[yTi − yri |yri , ysi , xi, yTi > yri ] · Pr(partial evasion) if yri > 0
(2.14)
which can be rewritten as
1
fk
∫ ∞
yri
(yT − yri )f(yT |xi, yTi > 0)f(yri |xi, yT )f(ysi |xi, yT ) dyT ∀i ∈ Ak (2.15)
The aggregate share of undeclared earnings in total earnings is then37
1
N
∑
iE[ei|yri , ysi , xi]∑
i(y
r
i + E[ei|yri , ysi , xi])
(2.16)
Estimated proportions are given in Table 2.6 (panel a). With both types of model, the
estimated share of people in the unconstrained sector with no income is less than 1% and
the share of people not reporting any earnings about 3%. The estimated share of people
declaring only part of their true earnings exceeds 20% and differs more between the mod-
els (28% with the multiplicative and 23% with the additive model), leaving about 70%
37More specifically, this is in terms of total net earnings. To obtain estimates in terms of total gross
earnings, taxes paid (as they appear in the tax records) have been added to the denominator.
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of private sector employees estimated to be fully compliant (68% with the multiplicative
and 73% with the additive model). On the other hand, the difference between the two
models is only marginal when comparing the estimates of non-compliance in monetary
terms: the aggregate share of undeclared earnings in total (gross) earnings is 15-16% in
both cases (panel b). The table also provides estimates for the whole sample as the extent
of non-compliance would be typically considered at the population level. Because employ-
ees in the constrained sector cannot evade taxes by assumption, the share of compliant
individuals in the whole sample is naturally higher than for the unconstrained sample
alone (75-80%), while the aggregate share of undeclared earnings is about 12%.
In comparison, a recent audit-based study by Johns and Slemrod (2010) for the US
estimated that only 1% of wages and salaries are unreported. Similarly, Kleven et al.
(2011) find from audited reports for Denmark that 1% of personal income (comprising
labor income, transfers and pensions) is unreported and attribute this to third-party
reporting. It is important to note though that unlike most other countries, Denmark has
very high effective income tax rates in combination with very low social contribution rates
for the employer, hence, the financial incentives implied by the statutory tax burden are
very different from that in Estonia.
[TABLE 2.6 HERE]
Finally, we consider the extent of non-compliance over the (true) income distribution.
Table 2.6 (panel b) shows undeclared earnings as a share of total (gross) earnings by
income decile groups and the pattern which emerges is similar for both types of model.
The share is higher for the bottom and the top decile group: 17-24% of total earnings in the
unconstrained sector and 13-18% for the whole sample are estimated to be undeclared,
yielding a gently sloping U-shape profile. For the multiplicative model, the share of
undeclared earnings for the bottom decile group exceeds that of the top decile group,
while the opposite is the case for the additive model. This is further illustrated in Figure
2.6, which also shows the scale of measurement error by decile group.
[FIGURE 2.6 HERE]
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The pattern of measurement error is clearly different from that of non-compliance
showing a very substantial overreporting of survey earnings for the bottom decile group
(20-40% of true earnings), a small overreporting for the second decile group and increasing
underreporting for higher decile groups, reaching 15-20% of true earnings in the top
decile group. Estimated misreporting of survey earnings in the unconstrained sector
follows closely what is found for the constrained sector (by assumption), with the main
exception of the bottom decile group where misreporting for the constrained sector is
notably larger. Our findings therefore support previous evidence on mean reverting survey
measurement error, which stemmed from studies assuming administrative data to be
error-free. Largely opposite patterns of non-compliance and measurement error may also
explain why differences in mean values of survey and administrative earnings have been
found to be rather muted in the measurement error literature.
2.6.4 Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity of the main estimates presented above has been tested by estimating the
multiplicative and the additive model (i) on alternative samples (models 1 to 3), (ii) with
alternative definitions for the constrained sector (models 4 and 5), (iii) with different
sets of covariates or parameter constraints (models 6 to 12), (iv) with modifications to
the model specifications (models 13 to 15), and (v) taking into account survey design
elements, i.e. weights and clustering (model 16).
Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 summarise the estimates of the key parameters and overall
model fit as measured by the AIC and BIC statistics. These show that results are fairly
robust to extending the sample with part-time employees (model 1), which was discussed
in Section 2.5.38 Increased sample heterogeneity mainly affects parameter estimates for
the constrained sector, resulting in a higher estimate of the variance of true earnings (σˆ2T )
and a smaller coefficient of true earnings in the survey earnings equation (θˆs). Estimates
are also similar when the sample includes everyone who reported survey earnings for 12
months, i.e. also those whose main activity was not paid employment (model 2), or when
38In this case, the earnings variables are adjusted with the number of months paid.
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applying more conservative sample restrictions, i.e. excluding those with self-employment
income or who reported earnings in ESU in gross terms (model 3). The latter finding helps
to confirm that the gross-to-net imputations, which were needed for a small sub-sample
(see Section 2.5), have no substantial impact on estimates.
More relaxed definitions for the constrained sector, such as assuming that everyone
working in large firms (model 4) or utilities, public administration, education and health
(model 5) are also constrained, result in poorer model fit, especially for model 4 where
the constrained sector becomes much more heterogeneous as a result (cf. σˆ2T and σˆ
2
s). Un-
fortunately, the categorical variable for firm size makes it impossible to test the relevance
of any other criteria for a large firm.
[TABLE 2.7 AND 2.8 HERE]
Next, we test alternative sets of covariates and parametric restrictions. Model fit and
the estimates of the key parameters are relatively robust to omitting covariates for the
declared earnings (yr) equation (model 6) or the survey earnings (ys) equation (model 7),
i.e. imposing all βr = 0 and βs = 0 (apart from the intercept), respectively. The same
applies to restricting the intercept βT0 and σ
2
T (model 8) or β
s
0, θ
s and σ2s (model 9) to be the
same for the constrained and the unconstrained sector, i.e. the parameters that are allowed
to differ between the two sectors in the baseline model. As the main difference between
the sectors concerns σˆ2T , which is nearly two times larger for the unconstrained sector, the
model fit is worse with model 8. Compared to the baseline, including additional covariates
(model 10 and 11) improves the model fit according to AIC, though BIC indicates the
opposite. Model 10 adds to the survey earnings equation (ys) demographic and job
characteristics, which were previously included only in the other two equations (marital
status, region, industry, occupation etc), while model 11 includes all covariates in all three
equations. In both cases, the key parameters change little.
Across models 1 to 11, the estimates of the coefficient of true earnings in the declared
earnings equation (θˆr) are rather stable with the multiplicative type of models (ranging
from -0.02 to -0.03) and always statistically highly significant. It varies more with the
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additive type of models (ranging from 0.05 to 0.6) and is not always statistically significant
(cf. model 4). This implies that θr for the additive type of model is more sensitive and
cannot be estimated so precisely. The estimates of another key parameter, the coefficient
of true earnings in the survey earnings equation (θˆs), are similar for the two types of
models ranging from 0.42 to 0.75 in these scenarios.
We also test alternative model specifications (besides the multiplicative and the ad-
ditive form for the yr equation). Most importantly, we assess the added value of having
income also reported in the survey and not only in the tax records by estimating a par-
tial model which contains the true earnings (yT ) equation and the declared earnings (yr)
equation and leaves the survey earnings (ys) equation aside (model 13). This is equiv-
alent to imposing θs = 0 and θs0 = 0 in the survey earnings equation (model 12) such
that any direct link between the true earnings and survey earnings is ignored. The latter
approach demonstrates how the overall model fit becomes much poorer with these restric-
tions and, hence, confirms the importance of combining two sets of income observations
for estimating true earnings (see also discussion in Section 2.4). It is notable how much
the estimates of θr for model 12 and 13 differ from other models. Second, we estimate a
(sub)model using only the sample of employees with both positive survey and declared
earnings (model 14) and here too we observe a sizeable effect on the estimate of θr. Third,
assuming that everyone has declared their earnings correctly to the tax authority (model
15), we estimate a model based only on simplified likelihood functions (see equations 2.A.3
and 2.A.4 in Appendix 2.A – in this case there is no difference between the multiplicative
and the additive form). Much poorer model fit confirms that this is clearly an unrealis-
tic assumption. Without the possibility of underreporting yr, estimated variance of true
earnings and survey earnings (σˆ2T , σˆ
2
s) increase greatly and the link between true earnings
and survey earnings becomes weaker (i.e. θˆs decreases).
Finally, estimations with survey weights, which account for the sample design and
non-response, and clustering at the household level (model 16), confirm their negligible
effect on parameter estimates.
The second part of the sensitivity analysis focuses on the estimates of the extent of non-
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compliance under various scenarios. These are summarised in Table 2.9, both in terms of
the proportion of sample and unreported earnings as a share of total earnings. The share
of compliant people is between 72-82% with the multiplicative type of models (leaving
aside model 15 where evasion is ruled out by assumption), while it is slightly more varying
with the additive type of models (69-85%). It is notable that the estimated share of full
evaders is highest when the sample includes part-time employees (model 1 and 2). Across
models 1-11, the estimated share of undeclared earnings is quite stable ranging between 9-
14% of total income for the multiplicative and the additive types, the latter often yielding
marginally higher estimates. Among these models, the share of undeclared earnings is
the lowest when the constrained sector is extended to include employees in large firms
(model 4) and the highest with the extended sample used for model 2. The proportion of
undeclared earnings is only 6% with the partial models (12 and 13), where true earnings
are estimated solely on the basis of declared earnings, ignoring survey earnings.
[TABLE 2.9 HERE]
Among models 1-11, non-compliance is higher in the bottom and the top decile group,
and to some extent in the 2nd and the 9th decile group, hence, providing further support
for the overall U-shape. The U-shape is especially pronounced for model 1 and model 2,
which are estimated on extended samples including also individuals with lower work inten-
sity (as employees). The estimates by decile groups are more robust for the multiplicative
models.
The partial models (12 and 13), however, exhibit a different profile: the share of
undeclared earnings is the highest for the bottom decile group(s) (14-25%), then decreases
smoothly across the estimated true income distribution and is only 1-2% for the top
decile group. This illustrates how on the basis of declared earnings alone and without
a secondary income measure, it is not possible to detect all undeclared earnings as the
estimates of true earnings, especially at higher income levels, remain too conservative.39 A
declining ratio of unreported wages and salaries across the true income distribution is also
39That is unless there are no earnings differences between the constrained and the unconstrained sector
at any income level which would be a very strong assumption.
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shown in Johns and Slemrod (2010) based on audited reports and, in the light of evidence
above, could therefore indicate limited success of audits to uncover non-compliance for
earnings at higher levels. The structure of multiplicative model 13 is similar to Feinstein
(1991) who modelled income underreporting and its partial detection by auditors using
also audit data. Without means to identify absolute detection rates, he interpreted his
estimates of non-compliance as if all auditors had the same detection rates as estimated
for the best performers and our findings essentially confirm his intuition. Our empirical
findings are also in line with recent work in the measurement error literature where Meijer
et al. (2012), generalising the Kapteyn and Ypma (2007) model, demonstrate that the best
predictors of true earnings are those combining survey and register income measures.40
Finally, as with the previous table, taking survey design into account (model 16) has
only a limited effect on the estimates – the biggest change occurs in the top decile group
where the estimated share of underreported earnings decreases by 2-4 percentage points.
2.7 Conclusions
The chapter uses income survey data linked with tax records at the individual level for
Estonia to estimate the determinants and extent of income tax compliance in a novel
way. We propose and estimate an econometric model with three simultaneous equations
for true income, register income and survey income. Unlike previous approaches in the
tax compliance and survey measurement error literature, our model allows income to
be misreported both in the survey and in the tax records. Focusing on employment
income (i.e. wages and salaries), we model register and survey earnings conditional on
true earnings and other personal characteristics. Our key identifying assumption is that
people working in the public sector are constrained in their choice and cannot evade
taxes, while there are essentially no systematic differences in true earnings and survey
measurement error between public and private sector employees (after controlling for
40In this case, the source of error in the administrative values is only due to mismatch in record linkage.
Interestingly, Meijer et al. (2012) highlight unreported earnings in the register data when discussing
potential reasons for the latter to perform relatively poorly.
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individual characteristics). This enables us to observe true earnings for part of the sample.
Besides proposing a novel econometric model and identification strategy, the chapter
extends the empirical tax evasion literature by providing new evidence of non-compliance
in a post-socialist country. High-quality data sources for studying tax compliance are
very rare, especially in other than major developed countries; the dataset used here is
also unique for not requiring respondents’ consent for linkage, which could result in a
serious sample selection bias. A long-term characteristic of Estonia is its flat income tax
due to which cross-sectional variation in effective marginal tax rates is very limited. Our
study is therefore unable to shed light on the effect of marginal tax rates on compliance,
but also avoids related endogeneity problems as progressive tax rates would be highly
correlated with declared income.
The main findings are the following. First, our estimates show that, conditional on true
earnings, earnings declared to the tax authority are positively associated with age, educa-
tion levels, Estonian nationality, studying, the size of the firm and having a mortgage or
a lease loan. Compliance is lower for men, non-married and for people living in the north-
east region. There are also notable sectoral and occupational differences and, importantly,
our results indicate a negative association between compliance and true earnings (other
things being equal). In general, our estimates appear to be in line with findings in the
previous literature. Second, we find substantial non-compliance with respect to wages and
salaries overall. While the share of fully non-compliant employees is marginal (2-3%), our
estimates show that more than 20% of employees underreport part of their earnings and
about 12% of total employment income (and 15-16% of total income in the unconstrained
sector) is not declared to the tax authority. Third, there are significant differences across
the estimated true income distribution with much lower compliance among the people in
the bottom and the top earnings decile group. Fourth, there are substantial measurement
errors in survey income. These exhibit a mean-reverting pattern with large over-reporting
at low values of true earnings and moderate under-reporting at medium and high values
of true earnings.
In times when researchers are increasingly gaining access to linked survey and admin-
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istrative data, our model represents a new improved method for studying prevalence and
determinants of tax compliance as well as survey measurement error. Our analysis also
highlights limitations for detecting non-compliance on the basis of audited tax reports
alone, even with partial detection methods (commonly used by the US tax authority), as
the resulting estimates are likely to be too conservative.
Our findings have also several important policy implications. Rather sizable under-
reporting of earnings, despite all such income being in principle subject to third-party
reporting and tax withholding, highlights the limitations of such procedures to avoid
non-compliance and confirms the (continuing) need for other measures as well to counter
evasion. It also raises questions about the common view in the literature that there is
very little evasion of taxes on wages and salaries in the first place and about the ability
of (randomised) audits, on which previous findings are mainly based, to capture non-
declared earnings. This suggests that more attention to employment income by the tax
authorities could be warranted. Finally, there are implications for the progressivity and
redistributive aspects of the tax system. The overall pattern of non-compliance across the
income distribution could induce more people to perceive that their effective tax burden
is higher compared to those who are better off and subsequently weaken their motives to
be compliant.
References
Abowd, J. M., and Stinson, M. H. (2013). “Estimating measurement error in annual job
earnings: A comparison of survey and administrative data.” Review of Economics and
Statistics, 95 (5), 1451–1467.
Alexander, C., and Feinstein, J. (1987). “A microeconometric analysis of income tax
evasion.”, unpublished manuscript.
Allingham, M. G., and Sandmo, A. (1972). “Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis.”
Journal of Public Economics, 1 (3-4), 323–338.
87
CHAPTER 2
Alm, J. (1991). “A perspective on the experimental analysis of taxpayer reporting.” The
Accounting Review, 66 (3), 577–593.
Alm, J. (1999). “Tax compliance and administration.” In W. B. Hildreth, and J. A.
Richardson (Eds.), Handbook on Taxation, 741–768, New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
Alm, J. (2012). “Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory,
experiments, and field studies.” International Tax and Public Finance, 19, 54–77.
Alm, J., and Jacobson, S. (2007). “Using laboratory experiments in public economics.”
National Tax Journal, 60 (1), 129–152.
Andersen, P. (1977). “Tax evasion and labor supply.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
79 (3), 375–383.
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., and Feinstein, J. (1998). “Tax compliance.” Journal of Economic
Literature, 36 (2), 818–860.
Antila, J., and Ylo¨stalo, P. (2003). “Working Life Barometer in the Baltic countries 2002.”
Labour Policy Studies 247, Ministry of Labour (Finland), Helsinki.
Baldini, M., Bosi, P., and Lalla, M. (2009). “Tax evasion and misreporting in income tax
returns and household income surveys.” Politica Economica, XXV (3), 333–348.
Baldry, J. C. (1986). “Tax evasion is not a gamble: A report on two experiments.” Eco-
nomics Letters, 22 (4), 333 – 335.
Baldry, J. C. (1987). “Income tax evasion and the tax schedules: some experimental
results.” Public Finance / Finances Publiques, 42 (3), 357–383.
Becker, W., Bu¨chner, H.-J., and Sleeking, S. (1987). “The impact of public transfer ex-
penditures on tax evasion: An experimental approach.” Journal of Public Economics,
34 (2), 243–252.
Benedek, D., and Lelkes, O. (2011). “The distributional implications of income under-
reporting in Hungary.” Fiscal Studies, 32 (4), 539–560.
88
TAX EVASION AND MEASUREMENT ERROR
Besim, M., and Jenkins, G. P. (2005). “Tax compliance: when do employees behave like
the self-employed?” Applied Economics, 37 (10), 1201–1208.
Bollinger, C. B. (1998). “Measurement error in the Current Population Survey: A non-
parametric look.” Journal of Labor Economics, 16 (3), 576–594.
Bound, J., Brown, C., Duncan, G. J., and Rodgers, W. L. (1994). “Evidence on the validity
of cross-sectional and longitudinal labor market data.” Journal of Labor Economics,
12 (3), 345–368.
Bound, J., Brown, C., and Mathiowetz, N. (2001). “Measurement error in survey data.”
In J. J. Heckman, and E. Leamer (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 5, chap. 59,
3705–3843, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Bound, J., and Krueger, A. B. (1991). “The extent of measurement error in longitudinal
earnings data: Do two wrongs make aright?” Journal of Labor Economics, 9 (1), 1–24.
Chen, X., Hong, H., and Nekipelov, D. (2011). “Nonlinear models of measurement errors.”
Journal of Economic Literature, 49 (4), 901–937.
Clotfelter, C. (1983). “Tax evasion and tax rates: An analysis of individual returns.” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 65 (3), 363–373.
Cowell, F. A. (1985). “Tax evasion with labour income.” Journal of Public Economics,
26 (1), 19–34.
Cowell, F. A. (1990). Cheating the government: the economics of evasion. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Dubin, J. A., and Wilde, L. L. (1988). “An empirical analysis of federal income tax
auditing and compliance.” National Tax Journal, 41 (1), 61–74.
Duncan, G. J., and Hill, D. H. (1985). “An investigation of the extent and consequences of
measurement error in labor-economic survey data.” Journal of Labor Economics, 3 (4),
508–532.
89
CHAPTER 2
Elek, P., Ko¨llo, J., Reizer, B., and Szabo´, P. A. (2012). “Detecting wage under-reporting
using a double-hurdle model.” In S. Polachek, and K. Tatsiramos (Eds.), Informal
Employment in Emerging and Transition Economies, Research in Labor Economics,
vol. 34, chap. 4, 135–166, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Elffers, H., Robben, H. S., and Hessing, D. J. (1991). “Under-reporting income: Who is
the best judge – tax-payer or tax inspector?” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.
Series A (Statistics in Society), 154 (1), 125–127.
Elffers, H., Weigel, R. H., and Hessing, D. J. (1987). “The consequences of different
strategies for measuring tax evasion behavior.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 8 (3),
311–337.
Engstro¨m, P., and Holmlund, B. (2009). “Tax evasion and self-employment in a high-tax
country: evidence from Sweden.” Applied Economics, 41 (19), 2419–2430.
Erard, B. (1993). “Taxation with representation: An analysis of the role of tax practi-
tioners in tax compliance.” Journal of Public Economics, 52 (2), 163–197.
Erard, B. (1997). “Self-selection with measurement errors. A microeconometric analysis
of the decision to seek tax assistance and its implications for tax compliance.” Journal
of Econometrics, 81 (2), 319–356.
Erard, B., and Feinstein, J. S. (1994). “Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game.”
The RAND Journal of Economics, 25 (1), 1–19.
Erard, B., and Ho, C.-C. (2001). “Searching for ghosts: who are the nonfilers and how
much tax do they owe?” Journal of Public Economics, 81 (1), 25–50.
European Commission (2014). Taxation trends in the European Union: Data for the EU
Member States, Iceland and Norway. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European
Union.
Feinstein, J. S. (1991). “An econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection.”
The RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (1), 14–35.
90
TAX EVASION AND MEASUREMENT ERROR
Feldman, N. E., and Slemrod, J. (2007). “Estimating tax noncompliance with evidence
from unaudited tax returns.” The Economic Journal, 117, 327–352.
Fiorio, C. V., and D’Amuri, F. (2005). “Workers’ tax evasion in Italy.” Giornale degli
Economisti e Annali di Economia, 64 (2/3), 241–264.
Forest, A., and Sheffrin, S. M. (2002). “Complexity and compliance: An empirical inves-
tigation.” National Tax Journal, 55 (1), 75–88.
Friedland, N., Maital, S., and Rutenberg, A. (1978). “A simulation study of income tax
evasion.” Journal of Public Economics, 10 (1), 107–116.
Gordon, J. P. (1989). “Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax
evasion.” European Economic Review, 33 (4), 797–805.
Graetz, M. J., and Wilde, L. L. (1985). “The economics of tax compliance: fact and
fantasy.” National Tax Journal, 38 (3), 355–363.
Hashimzade, N., Myles, G. D., and Tran-Nam, B. (2013). “Applications of behavioural
economics to tax evasion.” Journal of Economic Surveys, 27 (5), 941–977.
Hurst, E., Li, G., and Pugsley, B. (2014). “Are household surveys like tax forms: evidence
from income underreporting of the self-employed.” Review of Economics and Statistics,
96 (1), 19–33.
Jenkins, S. P., Cappellari, L., Lynn, P., Ja¨ckle, A., and Sala, E. (2006). “Patterns of
consent: Evidence from a general household survey.” Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society. Series A (Statistics in Society), 169 (4), 701–722.
Johns, A., and Slemrod, J. (2010). “The distribution of income tax noncompliance.”
National Tax Journal, 63 (3), 397–418.
Kapteyn, A., and Ypma, J. Y. (2007). “Measurement error and misclassification: A
comparison of survey and administrative data.” Journal of Labor Economics, 25 (3),
513–551.
91
CHAPTER 2
Kinsey, K. A. (1992). “Deterrence and alienation effects of IRS enforcement: an analy-
sis of survey data.” In J. Slemrod (Ed.), Why people pay taxes: tax compliance and
enforcement, 259–285, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S., and Saez, E. (2011). “Un-
willing or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark.” Econo-
metrica, 79 (3), 651–692.
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., and Saez, E. (2009). “Why can modern governments tax
so much? An agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries.” NBER Working Paper
15218.
Kriz, K., Meriku¨ll, J., Paulus, A., and Staehr, K. (2008). “Why do individuals evade
payroll and income taxation in Estonia?” In M. Pickhardt, and E. Shinnick (Eds.),
Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance, 240–264, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kukk, M., and Staehr, K. (2014). “Income underreporting by households with business
income: evidence from Estonia.” Post-Communist Economies, 26 (2), 257–276.
Lyssiotou, P., Pashardes, P., and Stengos, T. (2004). “Estimates of the black economy
based on consumer demand approaches.” The Economic Journal, 114 (497), 622–640.
Martinez-Vazquez, J., and Rider, M. (2005). “Multiple modes of tax evasion: Theory and
evidence.” National Tax Journal, 58 (1), 51–76.
Meijer, E., Rohwedder, S., and Wansbeek, T. (2012). “Measurement error in earnings
data: Using a mixture model approach to combine survey and register data.” Journal
of Business & Economic Statistics, 30 (2), 191–201.
Meriku¨ll, J., and Staehr, K. (2010). “Unreported employment and envelope wages in mid-
transition: Comparing developments and causes in the Baltic countries.” Comparative
Economic Studies, 52 (4), 637–670.
Mork, K. A. (1975). “Income tax evasion: some empirical evidence.” Public Finance /
Finances Publiques, 30 (1), 70–76.
92
TAX EVASION AND MEASUREMENT ERROR
Pencavel, J. H. (1979). “A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax
schedules.” Journal of Public Economics, 12 (1), 115–124.
Pickhardt, M., and Prinz, A. (2014). “Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – a survey.”
Journal of Economic Psychology, 40, 1–19.
Pischke, J.-S. (1995). “Measurement error and earnings dynamics: Some estimates from
the PSID validation study.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 13 (3), 305–314.
Pissarides, C. A., and Weber, G. (1989). “An expenditure-based estimate of Britain’s
black economy.” Journal of Public Economics, 39, 17–32.
Pudney, S. (2008). “Heaping and leaping: Survey response behaviour and the dynamics
of selfreported consumption expenditure.” ISER Working Paper 2008-09, University of
Essex, Colchester.
Pudney, S. E., Pyle, D. J., and Saruc, T. (2000). “Income tax evasion: an experimental
approach.” In Z. MacDonald, and D. J. Pyle (Eds.), Illicit activity: the economics of
crime, drugs and tax fraud, 267–283, Dartmouth: Ashgate.
Sakshaug, J. W., and Kreuter, F. (2012). “Assessing the magnitude of non-consent biases
in linked survey and administrative data.” Survey Research Methods, 6 (2), 113–122.
Sandmo, A. (2005). “The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view.” National Tax
Journal, LVII (4), 643–663.
Schepanski, A., and Kelsey, D. (1990). “Testing for framing effects in taxpayer compliance
decisions.” Journal of the American Taxation Association, 12 (1), 60–77.
Schuetze, H. J. (2002). “Profiles of tax non-compliance among the self-employed in
Canada: 1969 to 1992.” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, 28 (2), 219–
238.
Shaw, J., Slemrod, J., and Whiting, J. (2010). “Administration and compliance.” In
J. Mirrlees, S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. John-
93
CHAPTER 2
son, G. Myles, and J. Poterba (Eds.), Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review,
chap. 12, 1100–1162, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sheffrin, S. M., and Triest, R. K. (1992). “Can brute deterrence backfire? Perceptions
and attitudes in taxpayer compliance.” In J. Slemrod (Ed.), Why people pay taxes: tax
compliance and enforcement, 193–218, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Slemrod, J. (2007). “Cheating ourselves: The economics of tax evasion.” The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 21 (1), 25–48.
Slemrod, J., and Weber, C. (2012). “Evidence of the invisible: toward a credibility revo-
lution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy.” International
Tax and Public Finance, 19, 25–53.
Slemrod, J., and Yitzhaki, S. (2002). “Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration.”
In A. J. Auerbach, and M. Feldstein (Eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 3,
chap. 22, 1423–1470, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Spicer, M. W., and Becker, L. A. (1980). “Fiscal inequity and tax evasion: An experi-
mental approach.” National Tax Journal, 33 (2), 171–175.
Srinivasan, T. (1973). “Tax evasion: A model.” Journal of Public Economics, 2 (4), 339–
346.
Steen, N. M., Byrne, G. D., and Gelbard, E. M. (1969). “Gaussian quadratures for the
integrals
∫∞
0
exp(−x2)f(x)dx and ∫ b
0
exp(−x2)f(x)dx.” Mathematics of Computation,
23 (107), 661–671.
Toomse, M. (2010). “Looking for a middle class bias: Salary and co-operation in social
surveys.” ISER Working Paper 2010-03, University of Essex, Colchester.
Webley, P., and Halstead, S. (1986). “Tax evasion on the micro: significant simulations
or expedient experiments?” Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 1, 87–100.
94
TAX EVASION AND MEASUREMENT ERROR
Weigel, R. H., Hessing, D. J., and Elffers, H. (1987). “Tax evasion research: A critical
appraisal and theoretical model.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 8 (2), 215–235.
Witte, A. D., and Woodbury, D. F. (1985). “The effect of tax laws and tax administration
on tax compliance: The case of the U.S. individual income tax.” National Tax Journal,
38 (1), 1–13.
Yitzhaki, S. (1974). “A note on ‘Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis’.” Journal of
Public Economics, 3 (2), 201–202.
95
CHAPTER 2
Table 2.1: Evolution of the sample
Sample Number of persons Omitted at
Total A0s Ars each step
Initial sample of ESU 2008 14,942 - - -
Linked with tax records 14,871 - - 71
Aged 16 or oldera 12,699 - - 2,172
Respondent householdb 10,789 - - 1,910
Respondent individual 10,702 - - 87
Complete earnings information 10,237 - - 465
Ever had a regular job 8,587 - - 1,650
Employed (positive survey earnings) 5,500 294 5,206 3,087
Employment main activityc 5,327 249 5,078 173
Full time employmentd 4,121 138 3,983 1,206
- constrained sectore 921 12 909 -
- unconstrained sector 3,200 126 3,074 -
Notes: (a) subject to a personal interview in the survey; (b) for new sample members the number of non-
respondents includes only sampled persons without other household members; (c) part- or full-time em-
ployment reported as the main activity at least for one month in the income reference period; (d) full-time
employment reported as the main activity (and employment income received) for 12 months in the in-
come reference period; (e) constrained sector sub-sample includes public sector employees, except those who
changed jobs or have a second job.
Table 2.2: Mean log survey and register income
Sample ln ys ln yr Difference N
b se b se b se
(a) All (adults) with positive earnings in the tax records
ESU non-respondents - - 8.46 0.06 - - 1,114
ESU respondents - - 8.33 0.03 - - 6,698
(b) ESU respondents – intermediate sample
Positive earnings in the tax records (Ar0) - - 6.28 0.14 - - 343
Positive earnings in ESU (A0s) 8.54 0.09 - - - - 294
Positive earnings in both sources (Ars) 8.72 0.02 8.61 0.02 0.10 0.01 5,206
- constrained sector 8.77 0.03 8.84 0.03 -0.07 0.02 1,040
- unconstrained sector 8.70 0.02 8.55 0.02 0.16 0.02 4,166
(c) ESU respondents – final estimation sample
Positive earnings in ESU (A0s) 8.99 0.07 - - - - 138
Positive earnings in both sources (Ars) 8.92 0.01 8.84 0.02 0.08 0.01 3,983
- constrained sector 8.87 0.03 8.95 0.03 -0.08 0.02 909
- unconstrained sector 8.93 0.01 8.80 0.02 0.14 0.02 3,074
Notes: annual (net) earnings in EEK divided by 12, in log terms; estimates take into account design weights
and clustering at the household level; intermediate sample contains respondent individuals with complete
earnings information and who have had a regular job; final estimation sample contains full-time employed;
constrained sector sub-sample includes public sector employees, except those who changed jobs or have a
second job.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of survey and register income
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Notes: final estimation sample (i.e. full-time employed) excluding those with zero earnings or monthly
earnings above 40 thousand EEK (N=3,964); bandwith=0.5; vertical line shows the monthly minimum net
wage (3,175 EEK).
Figure 2.2: Survey and register income by sector
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Notes: annual (net) earnings divided by 12, in thousand EEK; final estimation sample (i.e. full-time em-
ployed) excluding those with zero earnings or monthly earnings above 40 thousand EEK (N = 3,964);
constrained sector sub-sample includes public sector employees, except those who changed jobs or have a
second job.
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Table 2.3: Sample means
Variable Uncon-
strained
Con-
strained
All N
Monthly (net) earnings in tax report, thousand EEK 8.09 8.76 8.24 4,121
Monthly (net) earnings in ESU, thousand EEK 8.94 7.85 8.69 4,121
Agea -0.10 0.33 -0.01 4,121
Agea squared 1.36 1.23 1.33 4,121
Gender=male 0.56 0.30 0.50 4,121
Nationality=Estonian 0.73 0.79 0.74 4,121
Education=basic or less 0.11 0.05 0.10 4,121
Education=secondary 0.63 0.45 0.59 4,121
Education=tertiary 0.25 0.50 0.31 4,121
Marital status=single 0.16 0.12 0.15 4,121
Marital status=married 0.54 0.56 0.54 4,121
Marital status=cohabiting 0.19 0.15 0.18 4,121
Marital status=divorced, widow or separated 0.11 0.17 0.12 4,121
Dummy for studying 0.03 0.05 0.04 4,121
Region=north 0.30 0.26 0.29 4,121
Region=central 0.14 0.12 0.14 4,121
Region=north-east 0.10 0.12 0.10 4,121
Region=west 0.17 0.17 0.17 4,121
Region=south 0.28 0.32 0.29 4,121
Area=rural 0.41 0.40 0.41 4,121
Occupation=senior managers, legislators 0.11 0.12 0.11 4,120
Occupation=professionals 0.09 0.36 0.15 4,120
Occupation=technicians, associate professionals 0.11 0.14 0.11 4,120
Occupation=clerks 0.05 0.06 0.05 4,120
Occupation=service and sales workers 0.10 0.13 0.11 4,120
Occupation=skilled agricultural workers 0.02 0.01 0.01 4,120
Occupation=craft and related trade workers 0.22 0.04 0.18 4,120
Occupation=plant and machine operators 0.22 0.05 0.19 4,120
Occupation=elementary occupations 0.08 0.10 0.09 4,120
Industry=agriculture, forestry 0.06 0.02 0.05 4,028
Industry=manufacturing, mining, utilities 0.32 0.05 0.26 4,028
Industry=construction 0.15 0.01 0.12 4,028
Industry=wholesale trade, motor vehicles 0.06 0.00 0.05 4,028
Industry=retail trade 0.09 0.00 0.07 4,028
Industry=transportation, storage, courier 0.09 0.07 0.08 4,028
Industry=hotels, restaurants 0.04 0.01 0.03 4,028
Industry=prof. services, information, communication 0.04 0.02 0.04 4,028
Industry=finance, real estate, admin/support 0.07 0.01 0.05 4,028
Industry=education, health, public admin. 0.08 0.80 0.25 4,028
Notes: unweighted means for the final estimation sample (i.e. full-time employed); (a) constructed as (age−
43)/10, where 43 is (unweighted) sample mean.
(Table continues on next page)
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Table 2.3 continues
Variable Uncon-
strained
Con-
strained
All N
Dummy for constrained sectorb 0.00 1.00 0.22 4,121
No of employees=1-10 0.20 0.14 0.19 4,019
No of employees=11-19 0.17 0.16 0.16 4,019
No of employees=20-49 0.22 0.26 0.23 4,019
No of employees=50 or more 0.37 0.42 0.38 4,019
No of employees=uncertain (more than 10) 0.04 0.03 0.04 4,019
Number of hours in main job (usual per week) 40.84 40.03 40.66 4,024
Dummy for second job 0.07 0.00 0.05 4,028
Number of hours in second job (usual per week) 0.86 0.00 0.67 4,028
Health=very good 0.08 0.07 0.08 4,120
Health=good 0.59 0.58 0.59 4,120
Health=neither good or bad 0.30 0.32 0.30 4,120
Health=poor or very poor 0.03 0.03 0.03 4,120
Dummy for health problems limiting work/study 0.15 0.14 0.15 4,121
Dummy for HH having a mortgage 0.25 0.20 0.24 4,110
Dummy for HH having a lease 0.25 0.23 0.25 4,121
Month of interview (since Feb) 1.65 1.53 1.62 4,121
Dummy for young child at interview 0.04 0.03 0.03 4,121
Dummy for older child at interview 0.09 0.12 0.09 4,121
Dummy for spouse at interview 0.29 0.28 0.29 4,121
Dummy for other relative at interview 0.10 0.07 0.09 4,121
Interview rating=very well 0.63 0.63 0.63 4,121
Interview rating=well 0.32 0.30 0.31 4,121
Interview rating=ok 0.06 0.06 0.06 4,121
Interview responded=alone 0.84 0.89 0.85 4,121
Interview responded=with someone’s help 0.03 0.02 0.03 4,121
Interview responded=by other HH member 0.13 0.09 0.13 4,121
Number of waves 2.14 2.19 2.15 4,121
Notes: (b) constrained sector sub-sample includes public sector employees, except those who changed jobs or
have a second job.
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Table 2.4: Estimates for the multiplicative model
Dependent variable
ln yT yr ln ys
coef. se coef. se coef. se
Agea -0.025*** 0.008 0.073*** 0.021 -0.027*** 0.004
Agea squared -0.039*** 0.005 0.021 0.015 -0.007** 0.003
Male 0.327*** 0.018 -0.181*** 0.055 0.089*** 0.014
Estonian nationality 0.166*** 0.024 0.230*** 0.055 0.044*** 0.011
Education (ref=basic or less)
- secondary 0.066** 0.026 0.168*** 0.056 0.051*** 0.016
- tertiary 0.223*** 0.030 0.331*** 0.079 0.136*** 0.019
Marital status (ref=married)
- single -0.042* 0.024 -0.128** 0.065
- cohabiting -0.011 0.020 -0.165*** 0.051
- divorced/widow/separated -0.021 0.022 -0.267*** 0.069
Region (ref=north)
- central -0.141*** 0.025 0.080 0.063
- north-east -0.228*** 0.027 -0.146** 0.066
- west -0.146*** 0.024 0.097 0.061
- south -0.172*** 0.022 0.025 0.053
Rural area -0.020 0.016 -0.043 0.044
Studying 0.006 0.036 0.418** 0.169
Industry (ref=edu/health/pub.adm)
- agriculture/forestry 0.008 0.043 -0.085 0.146
- manufacturing/mining/utilities 0.054* 0.030 -0.006 0.116
- construction 0.323*** 0.039 -0.364*** 0.116
- wholesale trade 0.199*** 0.044 0.002 0.131
- retail trade 0.054 0.034 -0.223 0.137
- transportation/storage/courier 0.235*** 0.036 -0.334*** 0.120
- hotels/restaurants 0.046 0.044 -0.386*** 0.139
- prof. services/inform./commun. 0.160*** 0.046 -0.104 0.139
- finance/real estate/admin-support 0.128*** 0.043 -0.437*** 0.129
Occupation (ref=clerks)
- senior managers 0.409*** 0.039 -0.127 0.134
- professionals 0.345*** 0.037 -0.207 0.148
- technicians/associate prof. 0.227*** 0.038 -0.163 0.134
- service/sales workers -0.065* 0.039 -0.104 0.156
- skilled agricultural workers 0.139* 0.082 -0.617*** 0.191
- craft/trade workers 0.119*** 0.041 -0.323** 0.129
- plant/machine operators 0.039 0.037 -0.318** 0.128
- elementary -0.205*** 0.038 -0.268* 0.142
Notes: (a) constructed as (age − 43)/10, where 43 is (unweighted) sample mean. Robust standard errors
shown. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(Table continues on next page)
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Table 2.4 continues
Dependent variable
ln yT yr ln ys
coef. se coef. se coef. se
Constrained sectorb 0.003 0.024 0.062 0.055
No of employees (ref=1 to 10)
- 11 to 19 0.107*** 0.025 0.110** 0.052
- 20 to 49 0.162*** 0.023 0.339*** 0.057
- 50 or more 0.273*** 0.022 0.416*** 0.055
- uncertain (more than 10) 0.246*** 0.051 0.159* 0.086
Hours in main job 0.013*** 0.002 -0.005 0.003
Second job 0.109* 0.057 -0.016 0.155
Hours in second job 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.007
Health status (ref=neutral)
- very good 0.183*** 0.031
- good 0.077*** 0.018
- poor/very poor -0.082* 0.046
Health affected work/studying -0.055*** 0.021
HH has a mortgage 0.077* 0.043
HH has a lease 0.154*** 0.041
Number of waves -0.020*** 0.004
Month of interview (since Feb) 0.008** 0.003
Interview rating (ref=very well)
- well -0.014 0.010
- ok -0.051** 0.023
Interview responded (ref=alone)
- with someone’s help -0.045 0.030
- by other HH member 0.037** 0.016
At interview: young child 0.030 0.028
At interview: older child -0.012 0.013
At interview: spouse 0.012 0.010
At interview: other relative 0.004 0.018
Intercept 0.934*** 0.095 1.646*** 0.240 0.479*** 0.039
p 0.993*** 0.002
θ (unconstrained sector) -0.024*** 0.004 0.689*** 0.018
θ (constrained sector) 0.642*** 0.025
θ0 1.113*** 0.084
σ (unconstrained sector) 0.474*** 0.015 0.583*** 0.035 0.247*** 0.008
σ (constrained sector) 0.354*** 0.014 0.233*** 0.012
Sample size 4,006
AIC 39,017
BIC 39,741
Notes: (b) constrained sector sub-sample includes public sector employees, except those who changed jobs or
have a second job. Robust standard errors shown. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.5: Estimates for the additive model
Dependent variable
ln yT yr ln ys
coef. se coef. se coef. se
Agea -0.024*** 0.009 1.180*** 0.319 -0.028*** 0.004
Agea squared -0.038*** 0.005 0.356* 0.215 -0.008** 0.003
Male 0.329*** 0.018 -2.911*** 0.820 0.095*** 0.014
Estonian nationality 0.182*** 0.025 2.740*** 0.898 0.041*** 0.011
Education (ref=basic or less)
- secondary 0.071*** 0.027 1.961** 0.773 0.049*** 0.016
- tertiary 0.232*** 0.032 4.531*** 1.311 0.133*** 0.019
Marital status (ref=married)
- single -0.045* 0.025 -1.528 0.962
- cohabiting -0.013 0.021 -2.446*** 0.845
- divorced/widow/separated -0.029 0.023 -3.525*** 1.022
Region (ref=north)
- central -0.145*** 0.025 0.942 0.964
- north-east -0.233*** 0.028 -1.428 0.975
- west -0.150*** 0.025 1.158 0.940
- south -0.178*** 0.023 0.546 0.833
Rural area -0.021 0.017 -0.367 0.661
Studying 0.007 0.036 4.940* 2.769
Industry (ref=edu/health/pub.adm)
- agriculture/forestry 0.008 0.044 -2.094 2.309
- manufacturing/mining/utilities 0.062** 0.031 -1.077 1.948
- construction 0.340*** 0.042 -6.985*** 2.014
- wholesale trade 0.203*** 0.047 -0.587 2.239
- retail trade 0.052 0.036 -4.713** 2.161
- transportation/storage/courier 0.249*** 0.038 -6.500*** 2.080
- hotels/restaurants 0.027 0.044 -6.009*** 2.322
- prof. services/inform./commun. 0.173*** 0.048 -3.275 2.360
- finance/real estate/admin-support 0.123*** 0.045 -7.685*** 2.206
Occupation (ref=clerks)
- senior managers 0.429*** 0.041 -2.589 2.000
- professionals 0.349*** 0.038 -3.647 2.276
- technicians/associate prof. 0.234*** 0.039 -3.198 1.989
- service/sales workers -0.065 0.040 -1.655 2.193
- skilled agricultural workers 0.110 0.083 -9.570*** 2.919
- craft/trade workers 0.108** 0.042 -5.282*** 1.941
- plant/machine operators 0.031 0.038 -4.815** 1.921
- elementary -0.208*** 0.039 -3.886* 2.078
Notes: (a) constructed as (age − 43)/10, where 43 is (unweighted) sample mean. Robust standard errors
shown. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(Table continues on next page)
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Table 2.5 continues
Dependent variable
ln yT yr ln ys
coef. se coef. se coef. se
Constrained sectorb 0.017 0.024 -0.021 0.057
No of employees (ref=1 to 10)
- 11 to 19 0.119*** 0.026 1.089 0.795
- 20 to 49 0.181*** 0.024 4.199*** 0.993
- 50 or more 0.295*** 0.023 5.191*** 1.054
- uncertain (more than 10) 0.263*** 0.053 0.843 1.355
Hours in main job 0.013*** 0.002 -0.124** 0.059
Second job 0.118* 0.061 -0.400 2.408
Hours in second job 0.005 0.004 -0.023 0.110
Health status (ref=neutral)
- very good 0.183*** 0.032
- good 0.077*** 0.019
- poor/very poor -0.085* 0.046
Health affected work/studying -0.053** 0.022
HH has a mortgage 0.750 0.650
HH has a lease 2.099*** 0.653
Number of waves -0.021*** 0.004
Month of interview (since Feb) 0.008** 0.003
Interview rating (ref=very well)
- well -0.015 0.010
- ok -0.046** 0.023
Interview responded (ref=alone)
- with someone’s help -0.050* 0.030
- by other HH member 0.043*** 0.016
At interview: young child 0.036 0.028
At interview: older child -0.007 0.014
At interview: spouse 0.011 0.010
At interview: other relative 0.004 0.018
Intercept 0.860*** 0.100 20.137*** 4.301 0.567*** 0.037
p 0.996*** 0.001
θ (unconstrained sector) 0.300** 0.108 0.653*** 0.018
θ (constrained sector) 0.642*** 0.026
θ0 1.129*** 0.099
σ (unconstrained sector) 0.478*** 0.019 8.553*** 0.944 0.254*** 0.008
σ (constrained sector) 0.354*** 0.014 0.233*** 0.012
Sample size 4,006
AIC 39,189
BIC 39,913
Notes: (b) constrained sector sub-sample includes public sector employees, except those who changed jobs or
have a second job. Robust standard errors shown. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Estimation of tax non-compliance
Unconstrained sector Whole sample
Multiplicative Additive Multiplicative Additive
(a) Proportion of sample, %
no income 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.4
full evaders 3.1 3.5 2.4 2.7
part evaders 28.2 22.9 21.8 17.7
compliant 68.2 73.4 75.1 79.2
(b) Undeclared earnings as a share of total gross true earnings, %
All 15.4 15.8 12.1 12.5
Decile 1 23.8 17.2 17.4 12.9
Decile 2 12.2 12.7 9.7 10.2
Decile 3 13.7 11.7 11.1 9.4
Decile 4 12.8 10.6 10.2 8.3
Decile 5 11.4 11.1 8.9 8.8
Decile 6 14.0 16.0 10.1 11.6
Decile 7 12.4 11.3 8.8 7.8
Decile 8 13.1 15.1 9.4 10.8
Decile 9 15.6 16.7 12.5 13.4
Decile 10 19.4 20.6 16.9 18.0
N = 3,093 N = 4,006
Notes: deciles are constructed on the basis of estimated gross true earnings using the whole estimation
sample.
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Figure 2.6: Tax evasion and measurement error by decile groups
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sample.
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Appendix 2.A Detailed presentation of the model
The likelihood function
The multiplicative model
Recall from Section 2.4 that Pr(yTi > 0) = p and Pr(y
r
i = 0|yTi = 0) = 1 by assumption.
For the unconstrained employees (U), probability density functions are the following:
fU0s = f
U
0s(y
r
i , y
s
i |xi) = fU0s(no earnings) + fU0s(full evasion)
= Pr(yTi = 0) Pr(y
r
i = 0|xi, yTi = 0)f(ysi |xi, yTi = 0)
+ Pr(yTi > 0)
∫ ∞
0
f(yT |xi, yTi > 0) Pr(yri = 0|xi, yT )f(ysi |xi, yT ) dyT
= (1− p)1 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs0 − xiβs
σs
)
+ p
∫ ∞
0
1
σTyT
φ
(
ln yT − xiβT
σT
)
Φ
(
−θ
ryT + xiβ
r
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yT − xiβs
σs
)
dyT (2.A.1)
fUrs = f
U
rs(y
r
i , y
s
i |xi) = fUrs(partial evasion) + fUrs(full compliance)
= Pr(yTi > 0)f(y
T
i = y
r
i |xi, yTi > 0) Pr(yri = yTi |xi, yTi )f(ysi |xi, yTi = yri )
+ Pr(yTi > 0)
∫ ∞
yri
f(yT |xi, yTi > 0)f(yri |xi, yT )f(ysi |xi, yT ) dyT
= p
1
σTyri
φ
(
ln yri − xiβT
σT
)[
1− Φ
(
1− θryri − xiβr
σr
)]
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yri − xiβs
σs
)
+ p
∫ ∞
yri
1
σTyT
φ
(
ln yT − xiβT
σT
)
1
σryT
φ
(
yri /y
T − θryT − xiβr
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yT − xiβs
σs
)
dyT (2.A.2)
In the case of constrained employees (C), Pr(yri = y
T
i ) = 1, and their probability density
functions simplify to:
fC0s = (1− p)
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs0 − xiβs
σs
)
(2.A.3)
fCrs = p
1
σTyri
φ
(
ln yri − xiβT
σT
)
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yri − xiβs
σs
)
(2.A.4)
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The additive model
For the unconstrained employees (U), probability density functions are the following.
First
fU0s = (1− p)1
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs0 − xiβs
σs
)
+ p
∫ ∞
0
1
σTyT
φ
(
ln yT − xiβT
σT
)
Φ
(
−θ
ryT + xiβ
r
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yT − xiβs
σs
)
dyT (2.A.5)
which is the same as for the multiplicative model (equation 2.A.1), and then
fUrs = p
1
σTyri
φ
(
ln yri − xiβT
σT
)[
1− Φ
(
(1− θr)yri − xiβr
σr
)]
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yri − xiβs
σs
)
+ p
∫ ∞
yri
1
σTyT
φ
(
ln yT − xiβT
σT
)
1
σr
φ
(
yri − θryT − xiβr
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yT − xiβs
σs
)
dyT (2.A.6)
For the constrained employees (C), both probability density functions are the same as
with the multiplicative model, see equation (2.A.3) and (2.A.4).
Log likelihood function with the application of Gauss-Hermite
quadrature
The multiplicative model
First, rewrite the integral for fU0s in equation (2.A.1) by making the substitution u =
ln yT√
2σT
,
implying yT = exp(
√
2σTu) and dy
T =
√
2σT exp(
√
2σTu) du:∫ ∞
0
1
σTyT
φ
(
ln yT − xiβT
σT
)
Φ
(
−θ
ryT + xiβ
r
σr
)
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yT − xiβs
σs
)
dyT
=
∫ ∞
0
1
σT exp(
√
2σTu)
1√
2pi
exp
[
− 1
2σ2T
(
√
2σTu− xiβT )2
]
Φ
(
−θ
r exp(
√
2σTu) + xiβ
r
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs
√
2σTu− xiβs
σs
)√
2σT exp(
√
2σTu) du
=
∫ ∞
0
1
σT
1√
2pi
exp
[
−u2 +
√
2u
σT
xiβ
T − 1
2σ2T
(xiβ
T )2
]
Φ(·) 1
σsysi
φ(·)
√
2σT du
=
1
σT
φ
(
xiβ
T
σT
)∫ ∞
0
exp(−u2) exp
(√
2u
σT
xiβ
T
)
Φ(·) 1
σsysi
φ(·)
√
2σT du (2.A.7)
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This semi-infinite integral can be approximated using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule∫ ∞
0
exp
(−u2) f(u) du ' n∑
j=1
ωjf(τj) (2.A.8)
as follows
n∑
j=1
ωj exp
(√
2τj
σT
xiβ
T
)
Φ
(
−θ
r exp(
√
2σT τj) + xiβ
r
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs
√
2σT τj − xiβs
σs
)√
2σT (2.A.9)
using the nodes τj and the weights ωj as calculated in Steen et al. (1969). Finally, the log
likelihood of observation i in set A0s is:
ln fU0s = ln
{
(1− p) 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs0 − xiβs
σs
)
+ p
1
σT
φ
(
xiβ
T
σT
) n∑
j=1
ωj exp
(√
2τj
σT
xiβ
T
)
·Φ
(
−θ
r exp(
√
2σT τj) + xiβ
r
σr
)
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs
√
2σT τj − xiβs
σs
)√
2σT
}
(2.A.10)
In analog the integral for fUrs in (2.A.2) is rewritten by making the substitution u =
ln yT−ln yr√
2σT
, implying yT = exp(
√
2σTu+ ln y
r) and dyT =
√
2σT exp(
√
2σTu+ ln y
r) du:
∫ ∞
yri
1
σTyT
φ
(
ln yT − xiβT
σT
)
1
σryT
φ
(
yri /y
T − θryT − xiβr
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yT − xiβs
σs
)
dyT
=
∫ ∞
0
1
σT
1√
2pi
exp
[
− 1
2σ2T
(
√
2σTu+ ln y
r − xiβT )2
]
φ(·)
σr exp(
√
2σTu+ ln yr)
φ(·)
σsysi
√
2σT du
=
1
σT
φ
(
ln yr − xiβT
σT
)∫ ∞
0
exp(−u2) exp
(
−
√
2u
σT
(ln yr − xiβT )
)
· φ(·)
σr exp(
√
2σTu+ ln yr)
φ(·)
σsysi
√
2σT du
' 1
σT
φ
(
ln yr − xiβT
σT
) n∑
j=1
ωj exp
(
−
√
2τj
σT
(ln yr − xiβT )
)
· φ(·)
σr exp(
√
2σT τj + ln yr)
φ(·)
σsysi
√
2σT (2.A.11)
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Unlike with ln fU0s, taking the logarithm of f
U
rs allows us to separate several terms:
ln fUrs = ln p− lnσT −
1
2
ln(2pi)− 1
2
(
ln yri − xiβT
σT
)2
+ ln
{
1
yri
[
1− Φ
(
1− θryri − xiβr
σr
)]
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yri − xiβs
σs
)
+
n∑
j=1
ωj exp
[
−
√
2τj
σT
(ln yri − xiβT )
]
1
σr exp(
√
2σT τj + ln yri )
· φ
(
yri / exp(
√
2σT τj + ln y
r
i )− θr exp(
√
2σT τj + ln y
r
i )− xiβr
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs(
√
2σT τj + ln y
r
i )− xiβs
σs
)√
2σT
}
(2.A.12)
The additive model
The log likelihood of an observation i in set A0s is identical to (2.A.10):
ln fU0s = ln
{
(1− p) 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs0 − xiβs
σs
)
+ p
1
σT
φ
(
xiβ
T
σT
) n∑
j=1
ωj exp
(√
2τj
σT
xiβ
T
)
·Φ
(
−θ
r exp(
√
2σT τj) + xiβ
r
σr
)
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs
√
2σT τj − xiβs
σs
)√
2σT
}
(2.A.13)
In analog the integral for fUrs in (2.A.6) is rewritten by making the substitution u =
ln yT−ln yr√
2σT
:
∫ ∞
yri
1
σTyT
φ
(
ln yT − xiβT
σT
)
1
σr
φ
(
yri − θryT − xiβr
σr
)
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yT − xiβs
σs
)
dyT
=
∫ ∞
0
1
σT
1√
2pi
exp
[
− 1
2σ2T
(
√
2σTu+ ln y
r − xiβT )2
]
1
σr
φ(·) 1
σsysi
φ(·)
√
2σT du
' 1
σT
φ
(
ln yri − xiβT
σT
) n∑
j=1
ωj exp
[
−
√
2τj
σT
(ln yri − xiβT )
]
1
σr
φ(·) 1
σsysi
φ(·)
√
2σT
(2.A.14)
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The log likelihood of an observation i in set Ars is:
ln fUrs = ln p− lnσT −
1
2
ln(2pi)− 1
2
(
ln yri − xiβT
σT
)2
+ ln
{
1
yri
[
1− Φ
(
(1− θr)yri − xiβr
σr
)]
1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs ln yri − xiβs
σs
)
+
n∑
j=1
ωj exp
[
−
√
2τj
σT
(ln yri − xiβT )
]
1
σr
φ
(
yri − θr exp(
√
2σT τj + ln y
r
i )− xiβr
σr
)
· 1
σsysi
φ
(
ln ysi − θs(
√
2σT τj + ln y
r
i )− xiβs
σs
)√
2σT
}
(2.A.15)
Appendix 2.B Model interpretation
The multiplicative model
Expected value of yr, conditional on true employment
Let us define a = −(θryT + xβr)/σr and b = (1− θryT − xβr)/σr, omitting the subscript
i. For any positive yT , the probability of full evasion is Φ(a), the probability of full
compliance [1− Φ(b)] and the probability of partial evasion [Φ(b)− Φ(a)]. The expected
value of the truncated reported earnings is (for any yT > 0):41
E
[
yr
∣∣0 < yr < yT , x, yT ] =E [r∗yT ∣∣0 < r∗ < 1, x, yT ]
=yT (θryT + xβr) + yTσrE
[
εr
σr
∣∣∣∣a < εrσr < b, x, yT
]
=yTσr(−a) + yTσr
∫ b
a
(
εr
σr
) f ( εr
σr
∣∣∣x, yT)
Pr
(
a < ε
r
σr
< b
∣∣∣x, yT) d ε
r
σr
=yTσr(−a) + yTσr
∫ b
a
(
εr
σr
) φ( εr
σr
)
Φ(b)− Φ(a) d
εr
σr
=yTσr(−a) + yTσr φ(a)− φ(b)
Φ(b)− Φ(a) (2.B.1)
41To solve the integral, note that dφ(x) = −xφ(x) dx.
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The expected value of the observed reported earnings (for any yT > 0):
E(yr|x, yT ) =0 · Pr(yr = 0|x, yT ) + yT · Pr(yr = yT |x, yT )
+ E
[
yr
∣∣0 < yr < yT , x, yT ] · Pr(0 < yr < yT |x, yT )
=yT [1− Φ(b)] +
[
yTσr(−a) + yTσr φ(a)− φ(b)
Φ(b)− Φ(a)
]
[Φ(b)− Φ(a)]
=yTΦ(−b) + yTσr(−a)[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + yTσr[φ(a)− φ(b)] (2.B.2)
Partial effects for E(yr)
If xk is a continuous variable then (for any y
T > 0):
∂E(yr|x, yT )
∂xk
= yTφ(−b)
(
βrk
σr
)
+ yTβrk[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + yTσr(−a) [φ(b)− φ(a)]
(
−β
r
k
σr
)
+ yTσr [φ(a)(−a)− φ(b)(−b)]
(
−β
r
k
σr
)
= yTβrk[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + yTφ(a)
(
−β
r
k
σr
)
[−σr(−a) + σr(−a)]
+ yTφ(b)
(
−β
r
k
σr
)
[−1 + σr(−a)− σr(−b)]
= yTβrk[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] (2.B.3)
If xk is a dichotomous variable (for any y
T > 0):
∆E(yr|x, yT )
∆xk
= E(yr|x, yT , xk = 1)− E(yr|x, yT , xk = 0) (2.B.4)
Finally, differentiate with respect to yT (for any yT > 0):
∂E(yr|x, yT )
∂yT
= Φ(−b) + yTφ(−b)
(
θr
σr
)
+ [σr(−a) + yT θr][Φ(b)− Φ(a)]
+ yTσr(−a) [φ(b)− φ(a)]
(
−θ
r
σr
)
+ σr[φ(a)− φ(b)]
+ yTσr [φ(a)(−a)− φ(b)(−b)]
(
−θ
r
σr
)
= Φ(−b) + [σr(−a) + θryT ][Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)]
+ φ(a)
(
−θ
r
σr
)[−yTσr(−a) + yTσr(−a)]
+ φ(b)
(
−θ
r
σr
)[−yT + yTσr(−a)− yTσr(−b)]
= Φ(−b) + [σr(−a) + θryT ][Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)] (2.B.5)
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Elasticity of E(yr)
Combining equation (2.B.2) and (2.B.5), the elasticity of E(yr) with respect to yT (for
any yT > 0):
∂E(yr|x, yT )/∂yT
E(yr|x, yT )/yT =
Φ(−b) + [σr(−a) + θryT ][Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)]
yTΦ(−b) + yTσr(−a)[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + yTσr[φ(a)− φ(b)] y
T
= 1 +
θryT [Φ(b)− Φ(a)]
Φ(−b) + σr(−a)[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)] (2.B.6)
The additive model
Expected value of yr, conditional on true employment
Define now a = −(θryT + xβr)/σr and b = (yT − θryT − xβr)/σr, omitting again the
subscript i. The expected value of the truncated reported earnings (for any yT > 0):
E
[
yr
∣∣0 < yr < yT , x, yT ] =E [y∗r∣∣0 < y∗r < yT , x, yT ]
=θryT + xβr + σrE
[
εr
σr
∣∣∣∣a < εrσr < b, x, yT
]
=σr(−a) + σr
∫ b
a
(
εr
σr
) f ( εr
σr
∣∣∣x, yT)
Pr
(
a < ε
r
σr
< b
∣∣∣x, yT) d ε
r
σr
=σr(−a) + σr
∫ b
a
(
εr
σr
) φ( εr
σr
)
Φ(b)− Φ(a) d
εr
σr
=σr(−a) + σr φ(a)− φ(b)
Φ(b)− Φ(a) (2.B.7)
The expected value of the observed reported earnings (for any yT > 0):
E(yr|x, yT ) =0 · Pr(yr = 0|x, yT ) + yT · Pr(yr = yT |x, yT )
+ E
[
yr
∣∣0 < yr < yT , x, yT ] · Pr(0 < yr < yT |x, yT )
=yT [1− Φ(b)] +
[
σr(−a) + σr φ(a)− φ(b)
Φ(b)− Φ(a)
]
[Φ(b)− Φ(a)]
=yTΦ(−b) + σr(−a)[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)] (2.B.8)
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Partial effects for E(yr)
If xk is a continuous variable then (for any y
T > 0):
∂E(yr|x, yT )
∂xk
= yTφ(−b)
(
βrk
σr
)
+ βrk[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr(−a) [φ(b)− φ(a)]
(
−β
r
k
σr
)
+ σr [φ(a)(−a)− φ(b)(−b)]
(
−β
r
k
σr
)
= βrk[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + φ(a)
(
−β
r
k
σr
)
[−σr(−a) + σr(−a)]
+ φ(b)
(
−β
r
k
σr
)[−yT + σr(−a)− σr(−b)]
= βrk[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] (2.B.9)
If xk is a dichotomous variable then (for any y
T > 0):
∆E(yr|x, yT )
∆xk
= E(yr|x, yT , xk = 1)− E(yr|x, yT , xk = 0) (2.B.10)
Finally, differentiation with respect to yT (for any yT > 0) yields:
∂E(yr|x, yT )
∂yT
= Φ(−b) + yTφ(−b)
(
−1− θ
r
σr
)
+ θr[Φ(b)− Φ(a)]
+ σr(−a)
[
φ(b)
(
1− θr
σr
)
− φ(a)
(
−θ
r
σr
)]
+ σr
[
φ(a)(−a)
(
−θ
r
σr
)
− φ(b)(−b)
(
1− θr
σr
)]
= Φ(−b) + θr[Φ(b)− Φ(a)]
+ φ(a)
(
−θ
r
σr
)
[−σr(−a) + σr(−a)] + φ(b)
(
1− θr
σr
)[−yT + σr(−a)− σr(−b)]
= Φ(−b) + θr[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] (2.B.11)
Elasticity of E(yr)
Combining equation (2.B.8) and (2.B.11), we can express the elasticity of E(yr) with
respect to yT (for any yT > 0):
∂E(yr|x, yT )/∂yT
E(yr|x, yT )/yT =
yTΦ(−b) + θryT [Φ(b)− Φ(a)]
yTΦ(−b) + σr(−a)[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)]
= 1− xβ
r[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)]
yTΦ(−b) + σr(−a)[Φ(b)− Φ(a)] + σr[φ(a)− φ(b)] (2.B.12)
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Income underreporting based on
income-expenditure gaps
CHAPTER 3
3.1 Introduction∗
Reliable empirical evidence on tax non-compliance is difficult to obtain due to the very
nature of the phenomenon. Apart from costly tax audits, various statistical methods have
been developed to estimate income underreporting using micro-data from diverse sources.
In this chapter, we estimate the extent of income underreporting for Estonia following
the approach in a well-known study by Pissarides and Weber (1989), PW for short. They
seek to detect unreported income on the basis of consumption propensities, contrasting a
particular population group with another for which incomes are assumed to be accurately
measured. More specifically, using survey data PW estimate the extent of income under-
reporting among the self-employed in the UK, taking employees as a reference group and
comparing their food expenditure. Their key assumptions are that both groups report
their food expenditure correctly in the survey, survey income corresponds to the income
reported to the tax authority, employees report their income accurately in the survey and
that the marginal propensity to consume with respect to (permanent) income does not
differ between the two groups (after controlling for household characteristics).
We improve on the Pissarides and Weber (1989) method in two ways. First, as demon-
strated in Chapter 2, a substantial part of salaries and wages can also be underreported,
and hence, the original PW approach should be interpreted as estimating underreporting
of income by the self-employed relative to employees, rather than in absolute terms. In-
stead of relying on all wage earners, as is commonly done in previous studies, we base our
reference group on public sector employees, allowing us to estimate income underreporting
not only for the self-employed but also for employees working in the private sector. Besim
and Jenkins (2005) were the first to try this for North Cyprus in a simplified approach
(with survey data), while we introduce this extension in the full PW framework. Second,
to interpret income underreporting in a survey more broadly as tax non-compliance, it
needs to be established that there is no systematic variation between different population
groups in the way their income in the survey compares to incomes in the tax reports. We
∗The chapter uses the 2007 and 2008 wave of the Estonian Social Survey linked with administrative
tax records and made available by Statistics Estonia.
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explore the validity of the latter assumption by estimating income underreporting both
with survey incomes and incomes declared to the tax authority (or register income), using
a dataset for Estonia which links these two sources for the same individuals. While the
PW method has been applied before to register incomes1, to the author’s knowledge, this
is the first analysis carried out with a dataset containing both types of income and, hence,
is able to offer a direct comparison of results.2 We further extend the empirical literature
on tax non-compliance geographically with evidence for an Eastern European country,
complementing a recent study by Kukk and Staehr (2014) who assess underreporting of
self-employment income using the Estonian Household Budget Survey. Whereas previous
studies have relied mainly on food expenditure, due to data limitations, we use instead
information on housing related consumption expenditure (mostly utilities). We believe
our results are not critically affected by this, for reasons discussed below.
Our results show large underreporting of earnings by the self-employed and also sub-
stantial underreporting of earnings by private sector employees on the basis of housing
expenditures and register income, while a much smaller scale of non-compliance is de-
tected for the self-employed and no underreporting for private employees using survey
incomes. This suggests that previous studies applying the PW methodology to survey
data may have underestimated the extent of non-compliance.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section explains the methodology, starting
with the Pissarides and Weber (1989) approach and modifications in later studies, before
presenting our approach. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the data sources, sample
selection, expenditure and income information, and descriptive statistics. Section 3.4
presents findings and Section 3.5 concludes.
1Feldman and Slemrod (2007) use only information from tax returns for the US. Johansson (2005)
and Engstro¨m and Holmlund (2009) use household surveys for Finland and Sweden, respectively, where
income information has been added from administrative sources.
2Linking survey data with tax records also helps to overcome a serious limitation of the latter arising
from generally very limited socio-demographic information.
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3.2 Methodology
We first provide a methodological overview, outlining the original approach by Pissarides
and Weber (1989) (Section 3.2.1) and discussing alternative specifications used in later
applications (Section 3.2.2). Different approaches have yielded similar or even identical
measures of income underreporting, but it is important to understand differences in their
underlying assumptions when comparing results. We base our approach (Section 3.2.3)
on the PW model, but estimate a slightly different measure of income underreporting
following Hurst et al. (2014). We show that this particular form (applied to the standard
PW model) is preferable to the one PW used as its estimation requires fewer assumptions.
We then explore some of the main assumptions in more detail (Section 3.2.4).
3.2.1 The Pissarides-Weber approach
The general idea behind the Pissarides and Weber (1989) method is to infer income un-
derreporting from contrasting expenditure and income patterns for different population
subgroups, assuming that marginal consumption propensities are identical and the refer-
ence group reports income correctly. Intuitively, one population group is used to estimate
an expenditure function, which is then inverted to predict incomes for another group
and compared with their reported incomes. PW studied income underreporting by the
self-employed in the UK using food expenditure.3
The starting point is an expenditure function (Engel curve), relating log consumption
expenditure on particular goods or services (ci) by household i to household log permanent
income (yPi ) and a vector of household characteristics (zi):
ln ci = ziα + β ln y
P
i + i (3.1)
where α is a vector of parameters, β the elasticity of consumption with respect to per-
3Similarly, (food) Engel curves have been used in other contexts, for example, to measure biases
in consumer price indices (Hamilton, 2001) and purchasing power parities (Alm˚as, 2012), impute total
expenditure into income surveys (Blundell et al., 2008) and estimate household material living standards
(Larsen, 2009).
124
INCOME-EXPENDITURE GAPS
manent income and i a random term with zero mean and constant variance. Household
current (true) income yTi fluctuates around the permanent income and is usually not
(directly) observed:
yTi = piy
P
i (3.2)
Instead, households report a measure of their current income (in the survey), which can
differ from its true value:
kiyi = y
T
i (3.3)
with ki denoting the adjustment (or scaling) factor needed to obtain the true income from
the reported income. It is further assumed that pi and ki are stochastic terms distributed
log-normally, that is
ln pi = µp + ui (3.4)
ln ki = µk + vi (3.5)
where µp and µk are mean log values, and ui and vi have zero means and constant variances
σ2u and σ
2
v . Combining equations (3.2) to (3.5), we obtain
ln yi = (µp − µk) + (ui − vi) + ln yPi (3.6)
Substituting this into (3.1) leads to
ln ci = ziα + β ln yi − β(µp − µk)− β(ui − vi) + i (3.7)
The identification strategy is based on the assumption that one can distinguish between
two population sub-groups: individuals in group A (e.g. employees) report all their income
truthfully, that is ki = 1 ∀i ∈ A (and hence µkA = 0 and σ2vA = 0), while individuals in
group B (e.g. self-employed) may underreport (or overreport) their income. It is also
assumed that parameters α and β in the expenditure function and the mean of pi (i.e.
p¯A = p¯B) are the same for two groups. Given the properties of the log-normal distribution,
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ln p¯ = µp +
1
2
σ2u, this yields
µpA − µpB =
1
2
(σ2uB − σ2uA) (3.8)
Note that we can expect the current income of the self-employed to be more volatile than
that of employees, that is σ2uB > σ
2
uA
. Using an indicator variable Di, which takes a value
of 1 for individuals in group B and 0 otherwise, these assumptions can be incorporated
in (3.7):
ln ci = ziα + β ln yi + β(µkA − µpA) + βDi [(µkB − µpB)− (µkA − µpA)] + ηPWi
= −βµpA + ziα + β ln yi + γPWDi + ηPWi (3.9)
where γPW = β
[
µkB +
1
2
(σ2uB − σ2uA)
]
and ηPWi = i − β(ui − vi). The error term ηPWi is
heteroskedastic due to the assumed differences in the variance of ui and vi between group
A and B. Furthermore, as ln yi and η
PW
i are correlated
4, income is instrumented with a
set of x (we discuss the choice of instruments in Section 3.4):
ln yi = ziδz + δdDi + xiδx + ξi (3.10)
It follows that the average adjustment factor for group B is
k¯PWB = exp
[
µkB +
1
2
σ2vB
]
= exp
[
γPW
β
+
1
2
(σ2vB + σ
2
uA
− σ2uB)
]
(3.11)
To obtain variance estimates in (3.11) note that ξi in (3.10) absorbs ui and vi as well
as any unexplained variation in yPi (cf. equation 3.6). By its nature, permanent income
is not correlated with shocks in current and reported income. Assuming also that the
unexplained variation in permanent income is the same for two groups of individuals, the
4 It follows from equation (3.6) that E[ln yiη
PW
i ] 6= 0.
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difference in residual variation (σ2ξ ) between the two groups can be expressed as
σ2ξB − σ2ξA = σ2uB + σ2vB − 2 Cov(uB, vB)− σ2uA (3.12)
While combining (3.11) with (3.12) is not sufficient to obtain an identifiable point estimate
of k¯PWB , PW discuss its plausible range by making the following arguments. Assuming
that u and v are uncorrelated, the lower bound is obtained with the lowest σvB value
(zero, i.e. everyone in group B misreport their income by the same proportion) and the
upper bound with the lowest σuB value (equal to σuA , i.e. current incomes in group B are
no more volatile than current incomes in group A). With these additional assumptions,
the range of k¯ can be expressed as
k¯PWB = exp
[
γPW
β
± 1
2
(
σ2ξB − σ2ξA
)]
(3.13)
PW further show that allowing for small positive correlation between u and v, does not
have a large effect on the estimated range of k¯ in the UK context.
3.2.2 Alternative specifications
The PW approach has been applied in its original form by Schuetze (2002) and Johansson
(2005). There have been also several attempts to obtain a point estimate instead of bounds
by utilising various proxies for permanent income or relying on different assumptions,
which we summarise in this section.
Kim, Gibson, and Chung (2009) use average log income over time for the same house-
hold, i.e. ln yit = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 ln yit, constructed from panel data. They argue that this
eliminates variation in pi, hence, yielding γ
KGC = βµkB in an equivalent expression to
(3.9). Taking into account that (3.12) is now reduced to σ2ξB − σ2ξA = σ2vB , the average
adjustment factor becomes
k¯KGCB = exp
[
γKGC
β
+
1
2
σ2vB
]
= exp
[
γKGC
β
+
1
2
(
σ2ξB − σ2ξA
)]
(3.14)
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This is numerically identical to the upper bound in the PW approach (cf. equation 3.13),
which involved slightly weaker assumptions of σ2uA = σ
2
uB
and Cov(uB, vB) = 0. The
approach by Kim et al. (2009) raises however a question whether such ‘between estimates’
should also balance out variation in the reported income (σ2v), which the authors do not
address.
Kukk and Staehr (2014) draw on data where people report both their current and
regular income, and use the latter as a direct measure of permanent income. This allows
them to rely explicitly on yPi = kiyi instead of (3.2) and (3.3) above, and leads to
ln ci = ziα + β ln yi + γ
KSDi + η
KS
i (3.15)
where γKS = βµkB and η
KS
i = i+βvi. As with Kim et al. (2009), the average adjustment
factor is
k¯KSB = exp
[
γKS
β
+
1
2
(σ2ξB − σ2ξA)
]
(3.16)
Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2014) assume instead of p¯A = p¯B that the transitory income
component is the same for the two groups after controlling for their characteristics, i.e.
ln pi = ziψ + νi. Unlike other studies, Hurst et al. (2014) focus on the proportion of
true income which is reported, κi = 1/ki, rather than ki, and assume it is constant for
group B (self-employed). Due to this assumption, κ and k are entirely equivalent in their
application. However, the choice between the two indicators does matter for the standard
PW approach as we will show in the next subsection.5 Noting that zi does not include
the group indicator Di, this leads to
ln ci = zi(α− βψ) + β ln yi + γHLPDi + ηHLPi (3.17)
5Hurst et al. (2014) do not elaborate on this and their study appears to be the only one, which
estimates the average proportion of reported income (κ¯) instead of average adjustment factor (k¯).
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where γHLP = −β lnκB and ηHLPi = i − βνi. Their equivalent to (3.11) is the average
proportion of income reported for group B, which is straightforward to estimate:
κ¯HLPB = exp
(
−γ
HLP
β
)
(3.18)
Compared to the other methods discussed so far, the Hurst et al. (2014) approach is
based on the set of strongest assumptions, effectively combining the assumptions behind
the PW lower and upper bound. To see this, substitute both σ2vB = 0 (lower bound) and
σ2uA = σ
2
uB
(upper bound) into (3.11), yielding an equivalent expression to (3.18).
Besim and Jenkins (2005) and Engstro¨m and Holmlund (2009) estimate k¯B = exp(γ/β),
which equals 1/κ¯HLPB in equation (3.18), but they only discuss reduced-form estimation
without elaborating on the underlying structural model. Similarly, Feldman and Slemrod
(2007) focus directly on current income rather than permanent income and assume that a
given income source is underreported by the same proportion.6 This simplifies the model
as in Hurst et al. (2014). But they also distinguish between multiple income sources,
allowing each to have a separate adjustment factor k, which results in a non-linear system
and is estimated with non-linear least squares.
Lyssiotou, Pashardes, and Stengos (2004) estimate a complete demand system instead
of a single expenditure function. They argue that this avoids mistaking preference het-
erogeneity for income effects and classifying households according to their main source
of income, which can be rather arbitrary. On the other hand, their demand system
makes simplifications in other dimensions as they also ignore the transitory component
of current income and assume that self-reported income is underreported by a constant
fraction. Furthermore, the demand system is potentially more sensitive to the measure-
ment error in consumption data and they additionally include income in quadratic terms.
They also provide a non-parametric (single equation) estimate, which seems to suggest
that a linear functional form for food expenditure may cause a downward bias. A non-
parametric method is also used in Tedds (2010) to avoid imposing the functional form a
6Using current income could make more sense in their case as they relate charitable contributions to
taxable income using income tax returns.
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priori. Her analysis for Canada suggests, however, that the reporting function is indeed
linear although it also includes a constant.
For further details on previous studies estimating income underreporting on the basis
of expenditure and income micro-data, see Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A. Besides sum-
marising methodological aspects, the table also covers key estimates obtained in these
studies. To offer a better comparison with earlier studies and demonstrate the sensitiv-
ity of results to the model specification, in the empirical part we estimate the Pissarides
and Weber (1989) and Hurst et al. (2014) type of measures alongside with our preferred
specification, which is explained next.
3.2.3 Current approach
Our approach follows the PW model but seeks to estimate the average proportion of true
income which is reported, κ¯, as in Hurst et al. (2014). It does not matter whether the
model is specified in terms of κi or ki, as one can be substituted with the other, but as we
see below calculating κ¯ requires fewer assumptions than k¯. While κi = 1/ki, in general,
k¯ 6= 1/κ¯. In the case of Hurst et al. (2014), k¯ = 1/κ¯ as they assume the fraction of
underreporting to be constant (i.e. σ2v = 0), which we do not impose here by following
the original PW framework.
Instead of (3.3), we now have yi = κiy
T
i and if ki is log-normally distributed, so is κi.
For convenience, we re-define equation (3.5) as
lnκi = µκ + vi (3.19)
Equation (3.6) and (3.7) then become
ln yi = (µp + µκ) + (ui + vi) + ln y
P
i (3.20)
ln ci = ziα + β ln yi − β(µp + µκ)− β(ui + vi) + i (3.21)
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Substituting (3.8) into (3.21) and using again the indicator Di, we obtain
ln ci = −βµpA + ziα + β ln yi + γDi + ηi (3.22)
where γ = −β [µκB + 12(σ2uA − σ2uB)] and ηi = i− β(ui + vi). We can express the average
proportion of true income reported by group B as
κ¯B = exp
[
µκB +
1
2
σ2vB
]
= exp
[
−γ
β
+
1
2
(σ2vB + σ
2
uB
− σ2uA)
]
(3.23)
where the σ2u terms appear with opposite signs compared to (3.11). Combining (3.23)
with (3.12), which remains the same (apart from the sign for the covariation term), and
assuming as PW that uB and vB are uncorrelated, allows us to write κ¯B in a form, which
can be estimated without further assumptions:
κ¯B = exp
[
−γ
β
+
1
2
(σ2ξB − σ2ξA)
]
(3.24)
The lower bound for the adjustment factor in equation (3.13) is numerically equal to 1/κ¯B
in (3.24), but unlike κ¯B it is obtained with a strong assumption that everyone in group B
misreports their income in the same proportion (σ2vB = 0). We expect κ¯B < 1, meaning
that individuals in group B on average underreport their income.
One of the central aims of the chapter is to establish whether income differences
between population subgroups in the survey indeed correspond to how they declare their
incomes to the tax authority. It is not obvious that the PW assumption about survey
reporting is correct and to assess this, we estimate equation (3.22) in turn with the survey
income (yi = y
s
i ) and the register income (yi = y
r
i ), available for each individual in the
dataset. If people from type B households report consistently to the tax authority and
in the survey, i.e. κBi (y
r
i ) ' κBi (ysi ), then we would expect to find a similar extent of
underreporting with either income concept. If people are (more) truthful in the survey,
i.e. κBi (y
s
i ) ' 1, then estimation with the survey income should yield no substantial
underreporting even if the estimation with the register income does.
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Another extension relevant in our context concerns the composition of the reference
group, which typically comprises all employees. Depending on opportunities for employees
to collude with their employers to circumvent the third party reporting requirements, there
can also be underreporting of wages and salaries. Therefore, it makes sense to distinguish
between public sector and private sector employees as, in principle, there should be little
(if any) possibility for the former to engage successfully in tax evasion activities due to the
lack of incentives on the side of employers in the public sector. This requires extending
the model as follows.
Starting from equation (3.21), define three subgroups: group A (public sector em-
ployees), group B (private sector employees) and group C (self-employed). As before, we
assume that group A reports correctly (κi = 1 ∀i ∈ A) and the expected current income,
conditional on permanent income, is the same for all groups (i.e. p¯A = p¯B = p¯C). Hence,
we can rewrite equation (3.8) as
µpA − µpj =
1
2
(σ2uj − σ2uA) where j = B,C (3.25)
and equation (3.22) becomes
ln ci = −βµpA + ziα + β ln yi +
∑
j=B,C
γjDji + ηi (3.26)
where γj = −β
[
µκj +
1
2
(σ2uA − σ2uj)
]
and ηi = i−β(ui + vi). Given the differences in the
variance of the residual term ξi between the groups (if u and v are uncorrelated):
σ2ξj − σ2ξA = σ2uj + σ2vj − σ2uA (3.27)
the average proportion of true income reported by group j is now
κ¯j = exp
[
µκj +
1
2
σ2vj
]
= exp
[
−γ
j
β
+
1
2
(σ2vj + σ
2
uj
− σ2uA)
]
= exp
[
−γ
j
β
+
1
2
(σ2ξj − σ2ξA)
]
where j = B,C (3.28)
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Following the same logic, the framework can be easily extended to N type of households,
for example, allowing for different types of private employees and self-employed. In the
empirical part, we additionally estimate equation (3.26), both with survey and register
income, to see how much such a breakdown affects results.
3.2.4 Main assumptions
Having laid out the PW framework and various modifications, we now consider the main
(parametric) assumptions in more detail and discuss their implications.
First, what happens if the assumption about the reference group (i.e. employees)
reporting correctly is not valid? The original PW framework has been extended to such
a case by Martinez-Lopez (2013), showing that this affects primarily the interpretation of
estimates, which then indicate the scale of underreporting relative to the reference group.
We demonstrate it for our main specification. The term µκA is now retained in (3.22)
with γ = −β [(µκB − µκA) + 12(σ2uA − σ2uB)] and equation (3.23) becomes:
κ¯B = exp
[
−γ
β
+
1
2
(σ2vB + σ
2
uB
− σ2uA) + µκA
]
(3.29)
Equation (3.12) includes additional terms as well:
σ2ξB − σ2ξA = σ2uB + σ2vB + 2 Cov(uB, vB)−
[
σ2uA + σ
2
vA
+ 2 Cov(uA, vA)
]
(3.30)
which combined with (3.29) (and assuming zero covariance terms) yields:
κ¯B = exp
[
−γ
β
+
1
2
(σ2ξB − σ2ξA) + µκA +
1
2
σ2vA
]
= exp
[
−γ
β
+
1
2
(σ2ξB − σ2ξA)
]
κ¯A (3.31)
This corresponds to equation (3.24) adjusted with the average proportion of reported
income for group A. In other words, if equation (3.24) is estimated when group A also
misreports on average (κ¯A 6= 1) then the result for group B cannot be interpreted in
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absolute terms but relative to the level of misreporting by group A (and vice versa). It is
not possible in this case to estimate misreporting for any group in absolute terms. This
underlines the need to find a reference group characterised by minimal misreporting and
ideally with κ¯ ' 1, which we hope to have achieved by focusing on public employees.
Second, PW and most of later studies have relied on the traditional demand function
relating log expenditure to log income (see eq. 3.1). This functional form implies quite
restrictive assumptions on consumer preferences (see e.g. Blundell, 1988): it links substi-
tution effects strictly to income effects and demand is characterised by constant income
elasticities. More flexible forms with a budget share as the dependent variable have been
used instead by Lyssiotou et al. (2004) and Kim et al. (2009) in the same framework.
On the other hand, the Working-Leser/AIDS type of functional form does not restrict
the budget share to increase monotonically in overall budget and hence it may not be
possible to invert the Engel curve for all values (see e.g. Tedds, 2010). We are not able
to construct budget shares in our case as the dataset at our disposal does not contain
information on total expenditure (more in Section 3.3). In some instances, if savings can
be ignored, one might use total income as a proxy for total expenditure to derive bud-
get shares but this would appear highly problematic in our context, where incomes are
thought to be misreported (and expenditure not). In fact, this seems to be an overlooked
aspect in Lyssiotou et al. (2004) when they set up a household expenditure function with
the dependent variable (budget share) defined in terms of total expenditure, while using
true income as the budget constraint on the right hand side.7 This potential inconsistency
is avoided with the usual log-log specification of expenditure function, which we consider
as a sufficient approximation for modelling demand.
Another assumption concerns the variable pi, which determines how current income is
related to permanent income. This is modelled independently of household characteristics
7Starting from a household cost function, Lyssiotou et al. (2004, p. 625) derive a household expenditure
function where the dependent variable, wi(p, U), is the share of total expenditure allocated for good i (p
and U denote prices and utility). When they subsequently substitute U for the indirect utility function V
and use true income as the budget constraint, they keep budget shares as they are. This would be strictly
correct only if true income equals total expenditure (which they observe in their dataset), in which case
it would be very straightforward to calculate misreported income.
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(equation 3.4), while there could be for example age-related patterns with permanent
income exceeding current income for young people (pi < 1) and the opposite for the
middle-aged group. The approach is less restrictive, however, than it initially appears.
Hurst et al. (2014) allow log pi to explicitly depend on household characteristics (ziψ) but
consequently the additional parameters are absorbed in the general vector of household
characteristics, zi(α− βψ); see equation (3.17). What matters is the potential difference
in the intercept for the two groups, which is captured in the original version by allowing
µp to differ between the groups.
The assumption that all α-s and β-s are the same for the two groups could be more
restrictive. Lyssiotou et al. (2004) point out that one of the key advantages of their
complete demand system approach over the PW single-equation method is that it avoids
confusing preference heterogeneity with income underreporting. They show that not ac-
counting for preference heterogeneity can bias the estimate of underreporting downwards.
While data constraints allow us only to estimate a single demand equation, we limit our
sample to more homogenous households (couples with the head working full-time) similar
to other studies. As part of the sensitivity analysis, we also test some additional sample
restrictions.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data sources and linkage
We use the Estonian Social Survey (Eesti Sotsiaaluuring, ESU), linked with individual
tax records. ESU is an annual household income survey, which also provides the Estonian
component in the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
database. It has a rotating sample design where households are followed in four consec-
utive waves and a quarter of the sample is replaced in every wave. The survey collects
basic demographic information for all household members and detailed information for
persons aged 16 or over, with a particular focus on their incomes. Interviews are carried
135
CHAPTER 3
out in the first half of year and the overlap with the end period for submitting annual tax
reports (i.e. end of March) is thought to reduce recall errors.8
ESU has been linked with individual tax records allowing us to apply the method
presented in the previous section both on survey and register income data for the same
sample. The data linkage is based on the unique personal identification code, which
is assigned to every person9, and was legally carried out by Statistics Estonia without
being required to inform sample members and obtain their consent. This is an important
feature as it avoids the potential problem where those who are less compliant might be
more likely to refuse data linkage, therefore, leading to a biased sample. Tax records
refer either to a personal tax declaration or an (employer) tax withholding report, if
the former was not submitted, and match the income reference period in ESU (i.e. the
previous calendar year). Note that registered self-employed people are required to file a
tax report.10 Despite the different structure of personal and employer declarations, the
informational content is broadly similar, and the tax withholding reports are also used
to pre-populate individual tax reports. Both types of report show income by type and
provider – employer or government institution administrating a given benefit. While tax
records exclude not taxable income sources (such as private transfers between households,
the child benefit and the subsistence benefit), the share of such income components in
aggregate disposable income is very small (about 2% according to ESU) and we are anyway
mainly focusing on household earnings, which are not affected by this.11
We use the pooled 2007 and 2008 waves to increase the number of observations and
8For detailed information, see the national quality reports for the Estonian SILC at
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/quality/national-quality-reports (or
starting from Eurostat’s main page, follow Topic: Population and social conditions – Income, Social
Inclusion and Living Conditions – Quality – National quality reports).
9The personal identification code is known for all sampled individuals from the Population Register
and asked for other household members during the interview. The remaining individuals were matched
with the Population Register using their characteristics (e.g. gender and the date of birth determine
seven numbers of 11-digit personal identification code) and the address. Nearly all people were matched
and while the matching may have involved some error, this is likely to be insignificant. The final dataset
used here is anonymised, without names, addresses etc.
10A personal tax declaration is also required to claim additional tax allowances, if applicable, and to
benefit from optional joint assessment for married couples.
11On the other hand, benefit receipt tends to be generally underreported in survey datasets (Bound
et al., 2001; Meyer et al., 2009).
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reduce sensitivity to outliers in a given year.12 The combined waves contain nearly 10,000
household observations (see Table 3.1). 98.6% of these had all household members iden-
tified in the tax register (no matter whether they had taxable income or not). Excluding
households with zero housing expenditure (see the next subsection) has also a negligible
effect on the sample size, while excluding households with no earnings (employment and
self-employment income13) leaves about 7,400 households. We further focus on households
whose head has positive earnings (95% of all households with positive earnings) so that
we can include head characteristics as covariates in the regression analysis. We select the
head of household among the persons who state to be responsible for accommodation (or
their partners), prioritising the one with the highest earnings14, as the income position of
that person is likely to have the largest influence on total housing related expenses.
[TABLE 3.1 HERE]
Among household heads with earnings we distinguish between public employees, pri-
vate employees and the self-employed. All household heads reporting (either full-time or
part-time) self-employment as their main activity in any month of the income reference
period (previous year) or working specifically as a (registered) sole proprietor15 are consid-
ered as the self-employed in the main analysis. In the sensitivity analysis we also consider
alternative definitions for the self-employed where household-level information or earnings
related to activities as a sole proprietor are additionally taken into account.16 There are
643 households whose head is self-employed and reported positive earnings in ESU and 568
12For example, Kim et al. (2009) demonstrate substantial year-to-year variation in their estimate of
income underreporting for Korea in 2000-2005.
13Throughout we exclude net losses from (registered) self-employment from our survey income measure
to be consistent with income information in the tax reports. The number of affected households is less
than 50 in each wave.
14To ensure a unique match, additional criteria include being the oldest and, finally, being male. By
default, the head of household is defined as the person with the highest income in ESU.
15Respectively, ESU variables g35* and h22.
16Sole proprietors (FIE) pay both employer contributions and personal taxes, but can deduct related
business expenses from their taxable income. (Employer contributions are further deducted from their
tax base for the income tax purposes.) People not registered as sole proprietors but engaged in individual
work activities (e.g. private consultancy) are liable to declare and pay taxes on such income similar to
salaries and wages. ESU further distinguishes earnings related to non-FIE self-employment, which we
consider for total earnings but not for determining the self-employment status to be consistent with the
tax records.
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households whose head is self-employed and reported positive earnings in the tax records.
Other household heads with earnings are classified as employees, distinguishing further
between heads employed in the public sector and in the private sector. In ESU, people
are asked about the proprietor of the enterprise where they work (state/municipality vs
private individual/entity). As this refers to their current status rather than the income
reference period, we consider those household heads who have changed jobs (after the
income reference period and before the survey interview) or have multiple jobs (or un-
specified affiliation) as private employees. On the other hand, tax records allow us to
distinguish between earnings received from private and public entities. Here, we consider
those household heads as public employees who have received payments only from public
entities, non-profit organisations or foundations. Household heads classified as private
employees account for 73% of all heads with positive earnings, public employees 19-20%
and self-employed 7-8% (the share varying only slightly depending on whether ESU or
MTA information is used). These proportions are also very similar across the two waves.
There is no sufficiently detailed information on work intensity to account for its impact
on the variation in households’ earnings. ESU indicates people’s main activity in every
month of the income reference period, distinguishing between working full-time and part-
time but not in greater detail (weeks, hours), and the tax records do not contain any
information about work intensity. We therefore limit our sample further to the household
heads who have indicated in ESU working the whole year full-time as an employee or
a self-employed. While the resulting sample is not representative of the whole working
population, it still accounts for about 80% of all households with earnings. We relax this
criterion as part of the sensitivity analysis.
Finally, as consumption patterns are strongly influenced by household structure, we
focus on couples (both with and without children) who account for about 60% of the
remaining sample. This is a similar approach to most previous studies (see Table 3.A.1
in Appendix 3.A). Another selection criterion commonly used is to limit the sample to
working age people, which we test as part of the sensitivity analysis. The final effective
sample contains just over 3,400 households.
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3.3.2 Expenditure and income information
The main disadvantage of ESU for this analysis is very limited expenditure data. While
previous studies applying the PW method have relied primarily on food expenditure, this
is not available in our dataset. Instead, this chapter uses household costs of running the
home. Our measure of housing related costs includes heating and power consumption
(central heating, electricity, gas, other fuels); water, sewerage and other services; home
insurance; housing maintenance and regular repairs – all collected separately in ESU.
We exclude payments for housing per se in the main analysis as this is observed in the
form of rent and mortgage interest payments for relatively few households: only 10%
of households rent their accommodation and just 19% of homeowners report mortgage
interest payments. (See Table 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A for descriptive statistics for all non-
monetary variables used.) Most households own their house and have no mortgage, in
which case the cost of housing is implicit and can only be estimated indirectly (see e.g.
Frick et al., 2010). The high proportion of owner-occupation is largely a result of housing
privatisation in the early 1990s (see e.g. Pichler-Milanovich, 2001). In the sensitivity
analysis, we also consider our measure of ‘housing costs’ with rent and mortgage interests
payments.17
It is not clear without a direct comparison, how modelling based on housing costs (util-
ities) rather than food expenditure might affect results. Importantly, both consumption
items are necessities and represent a substantial part of the total household budget. For
example, Blundell et al. (1993, 1998) provide evidence for the UK on food and domestic
fuel having similar relationship with household total expenditure. While food expendi-
ture might offer more variability and hence potentially better identification, housing costs
could have a more stable relationship with permanent income. Expenditures on utilities
depend largely on the choice of dwelling, which is made for a longer period ahead – typi-
cally for a year at least – compared with choices related to food consumption and therefore
should better reflect income potential in the medium term. Blundell et al. (1998) provide
17In comparison, the COICOP category for housing expenditure includes electricity, gas and other
fuels; water, sewage and other services; maintenance and repairs as well as actual and imputed rent but
not housing-related insurance and mortgage interest payments.
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also evidence for domestic fuel being less sensitive to household composition than food
and hence our approach could be more robust to potential specification errors.
There is also no particular reason for information on housing expenditure to be more
problematic in terms of potential measurement errors. Housing costs may even have
smaller recall errors due to involving less transactions (in a given reference period) and
transactions being made on a more regular basis. The survey is also carried out when
heating costs – the key component of our housing cost variable – are seasonally high
and therefore amounts spent are likely to gain more attention by households.18 While
systematic measurement errors in expenditure would bias the coefficient for permanent
income (for example, tendency to underreport expenditure would result in a downward
bias), what would be more critical for our estimation strategy are differences in systematic
measurement errors in expenditure between employees and the self-employed. It is not
obvious why this should be the case. A potential scenario could involve the self-employed
reporting some of housing costs under business expenses rather than personal consump-
tion. Fortunately, ESU collects information on non-cash income from self-employment
and the share of self-employed who report that their business expenses include utilities is
very marginal (about 2%).19 What is perhaps the most reassuring evidence supporting
our expenditure measure is that Hurst et al. (2014) obtain very similar results of income
underreporting by the self-employed in the US both with food and utilities.
Table 3.2 provides the first look at how household expenditure and income compare
across different types of households. It shows the (unconditional) mean of log expenditure
(housing related costs) and earnings, separately for the 2007 and 2008 wave. As part of the
sensitivity analysis, we also use net total household income and housing related expenses
together with rent and mortgage interests.
[TABLE 3.2 HERE]
18For example, recommendations made by Browning et al. (2003) for improving the measurement of
total household expenditure in general purpose surveys include asking specifically questions about food
and utilities, followed by housing costs (rent and interest payments).
19In comparison, the most common items (motor fuel and mobile phone services) were reported by
about 10-15% of the self-employed.
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We can see that mean (log) consumption is highest for the self-employed in both waves
and the differences with other two groups are statistically significant. Mean consumption
is also somewhat higher for private employees compared to public employees but not
significantly so at the 95% level. The same ranking emerges for survey earnings (ys) in
the 2008 wave (with a very marginal difference between private employees and the self-
employed), while the 2007 wave exhibits a different pattern: mean (log) survey earnings
of private employees still exceed that of public employees, but it is the self-employed
who have the lowest mean earnings. However, earnings in the tax records (yr) show
exactly the opposite ranking to consumption levels, with mean income being the highest
for public employees and the lowest for the self-employed – consistently across two waves
(the differences between public and private employees are again not statistically significant
though).20
As a consequence, the ratio of mean consumption to mean income (reflected in the
difference in mean logs, ∆) varies across household types, being notably higher for self-
employed household heads. This is robust to both waves and data sources, though the
difference with other household types is larger with earnings in the tax records. The
latter also indicate a higher consumption-to-income ratio for private employees compared
to public employees, while it is the opposite with survey earnings. As such it provides
preliminary evidence for income underreporting by the self-employed and possibly by
private employees.
3.4 Estimation and results
We now proceed with the econometric analysis. For a comparison with previous stud-
ies, we first estimate equation (3.22), distinguishing between wage earners and the self-
employed. In the second stage, we distinguish also between public and private employees,
20We use gross earnings from the tax records and survey earnings in net terms, which is how most
survey respondents have stated them. This is to minimise the share of sample for which we have to rely
on incomes derived from corresponding gross or net values. We do not expect it to have much impact on
our comparison of income underreporting in the survey and in the tax records due to the flat income tax
with a constant marginal rate above a relatively low income threshold, resulting in a fairly proportional
tax system in Estonia.
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estimating equation (3.26) with three groups of households.
It follows from the structural model that current observed income (ln yi) is endoge-
nous and needs exclusion restrictions (i.e. instruments) to be properly identified in the
consumption equation. Suitable instruments in this context are variables relevant for the
income generation process but with no direct effect on housing expenditure, with various
proxies for human capital or work effort being natural candidates.21 We use dummies for
the education level, occupation and industry of the household head as instruments in our
case, on the basis that these are strong income predictors and there is no obvious reason
why these should affect our measure of housing related costs except through income. With
a single endogenous regressor and multiple instruments, the model is over-identified. In
the sensitivity analysis, we also test a reduced set of instruments containing only infor-
mation on the head’s education, which is the variable most often used in earlier studies.
Other covariates (zi), used in both consumption and income equation, include household
head characteristics (gender, age, age squared, nationality, marital status), household
characteristics (number of children and other adults, region, rural area, survey wave) and
housing characteristics (type, year of construction, number of rooms, size in m2, type of
ownership).
Model estimates are obtained with the maximum likelihood method using survey
weights and robust standard errors with clustering at the household level.22 On this
basis we calculate the average proportion of reported income κ¯ (equation 3.24), which
is our main measure of income misreporting. In addition, we calculate κ¯ according to
Hurst et al. (2014) (equation 3.18) as well as the lower and the upper bound for the
average adjustment factor k¯ according to Pissarides and Weber (1989) (equation 3.13).
This allows us to assess the sensitivity of results to additional assumptions underlying
21Instrumental variables used in the previous studies vary markedly. For example, Pissarides and
Weber (1989), Schuetze (2002), Lyssiotou et al. (2004) and Johansson (2005) use a rather extensive set of
instruments including head’s education and/or work intensity for one or both spouses, physical assets and
interactions of the self-employment status with other characteristics. Kukk and Staehr (2014) employ
education level, gender and nationality of the household head as well as regional dummies. On the other
hand, Engstro¨m and Holmlund (2009) rely only on income from capital and property taxes and Hurst
et al. (2014) on dummies for educational attainment.
22Using sem command in Stata 12 and restricting coefficients in both equations to be the same for
different groups, apart from intercepts, variances and covariances which are allowed to differ.
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these approaches (see Section 3.2.2) and compare our results with previous estimates in
the literature. In all cases, we present results in terms of the proportion of underreported
income for an easier comparison.23 The standard errors for all statistics are calculated
using the delta method. We also include estimates of the income elasticity (β), dummies
for self-employed and private employees (γ), and variances of the first stage error terms
(σ2ξ ).
3.4.1 Employees vs self-employed
Table 3.3 shows the estimated results for misreporting among the self-employed compared
to employees. As explained in Section 3.2.4, the results should be interpreted relative to
the level of reporting by employees (which could be also incomplete). Consider first results
with the survey income (first two columns). The instrumental variable (IV) estimate of
0.308 for the income elasticity of housing expenditure (β) (column 2) is statistically highly
significant and notably higher than the estimate without instrumenting income (0.121,
column 1), showing the extent of bias when income endogeneity is ignored. Our estimate
is also consistent with those in the previous studies cited here which are mostly in the
range of 0.2-0.4.24
The residual variance from the (reduced-form) income regression (σ2ξ ) is also sub-
stantially higher for the self-employed as expected, and the shift parameter for the self-
employed households (γ) is positive and highly significant. The estimate of income un-
derreporting (1 − κ¯B) suggests that, on average, 20% of household (net) earnings are
underreported by households whose head is self-employed. Our estimate of the standard
PW range is 20-44% and overlaps with those obtained in the earlier studies, shown in
terms of the average proportion of underreported income in Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A.
There is substantial variation, however, among earlier studies and about half of them
23That is 1− κ¯ and 1− 1/k¯, bearing in mind that generally k¯ 6= 1/κ¯.
24The exceptions are Besim and Jenkins (2005), Feldman and Slemrod (2007) and Kukk and Staehr
(2014) whose estimate of β is higher, about 0.5-0.6. Besim and Jenkins (2005) do not use instrumental
variables and have the smallest sample, among else. Feldman and Slemrod (2007) use very different
income and expenditure data (declared incomes and charitable contributions in the tax records). Kukk
and Staehr (2014) use a measure of regular income, arguably less affected by transitory movements in
income.
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do not provide a measure of statistical precision for their estimates of income underre-
porting. The point estimate of 62% underreporting for the self-employed by Kukk and
Staehr (2014), using the Estonian Household Budget Survey, is the main exception which
is difficult to reconcile not only with our estimates but also with other studies. Their
approach is unique for relying on a self-reported measure of regular income as a proxy
for permanent income, though without a direct comparison with estimates based on the
usual measure of current income it is not possible to ascertain whether this is indeed the
primary source of differences.
[TABLE 3.3 HERE]
The last two columns in Table 3.3 report equivalent estimates using register income.
Not only are all estimates highly statistically significant but they also reveal much larger
income underreporting on average. Our main estimate (κ¯B) indicates that 48% of house-
hold (gross) earnings are underreported by households with a self-employed head, the
PW upper bound 71% and the HLP measure 61% (column 4). This is due to the esti-
mate of income elasticity (β) being smaller and the estimated shift parameter (γ) being
larger compared to the IV estimates with survey income (column 2), though this is partly
counterbalanced by larger differences in variance estimates between the two groups (cf.
equation 3.24). The variance estimates themselves are almost twice as large compared
to estimates from survey income. The fact that register data allow us to detect substan-
tially larger income underreporting suggests that the self-employed are more truthful in
reporting their income in the survey compared to the tax declarations.
The bottom section of Table 3.3 shows typical diagnostic tests for our instruments.25
For both data sources, the endogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis that household
earnings are exogenous.26 Furthermore, partial R2 and the F-test of excluded instruments
confirm that instruments are reasonably strong in all models. Finally, the Hansen J-
25These are estimated with the help of ivreg2 package in Stata. While this also supports (limited-
information) maximum likelihood estimation method with cluster-robust variance estimates, it does not
allow specifying the model structure in the same detail as sem (e.g. different σ2ξ by subgroups). Never-
theless, we consider these test diagnostics to represent our main model sufficiently accurately.
26The test statistic is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics.
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statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis that these are valid instruments in the case
of survey incomes, while it raises some doubt for register incomes. It appears to be of
limited importance though as in subsequent specifications, the test is passed for both
income sources. We also get very similar estimates for β and γ when using only dummies
for educational attainment as instruments, in which case the p-value for the Hansen
statistic is about 0.4. Hence, without instrumenting earnings, we would obtain biased
estimates of income underreporting, indicating much larger income underreporting than
is actually the case.
3.4.2 Public employees vs private employees and self-employed
Until now we have estimated income underreporting among the self-employed using (all)
employees as the reference group as in previous studies using the same method, apart from
Besim and Jenkins (2005), but, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, there can be substantial
non-compliance also among employees. In the next step, we further distinguish between
households whose head works in the public sector and the private sector, and assume that
only the latter have opportunities to underreport their income. The results are shown in
Table 3.4.
[TABLE 3.4 HERE]
Similar to Table 3.3, estimates with survey income (column 2) detect income under-
reporting for households with self-employed heads, now to a slightly larger extent (25%).
The estimates also show a modest underreporting for households whose head is a private
sector employee (7%), though these are not statistically significant and hence do not sug-
gest substantial differences between public and private sector employees when it comes
to income reporting. Estimates from register income (column 4) on the other hand, yield
strong evidence for substantial income underreporting among households with privately
employed heads (23%), while the estimate for households with self-employed heads is now
56%. The PW upper bound implies average underreporting of 34% and 78% among the
two groups. There are also notable differences between estimates from survey income and
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register income for the residual income variance of households whose head is a private
employee: while survey data do not suggest much difference with households whose head
is a public employee, estimates with register data show a much higher variance for pri-
vate employees which exceeds that of public employees by almost two-fold.27 The income
elasticity (β) estimates are essentially not affected by distinguishing between the three
groups of households rather than two, and the model fit (according to the AIC and BIC
statistics) improves for estimates from either data source. As before, the IV estimation
leads to lower underreporting compared to estimation without instruments. The results
and conclusions of diagnostic tests for instrumental variables in Table 3.4 are also very
similar to those discussed above for Table 3.3.
The estimate of underreporting for private sector employees from register income (23%)
is of similar magnitude to the one estimated in Chapter 2 (16%), noting that the first
estimate is the average scale of underreporting while the other is the share of undeclared
earnings in total earnings (i.e. the aggregate scale). Besides this, the two approaches also
differ for the overall method, the unit of analysis (household vs individual) and sample
(households of couples whose head is working full-time vs employees working full-time).
On the other hand, our estimates differ substantially from Besim and Jenkins (2005)
which is the only other PW-type of study that distinguishes between public sector and
private sector employees as well as self-employed. Their estimates of underreporting for
the self-employed (10-11%) are the lowest among all the studies considered here and,
surprisingly, even slightly lower than that for private employees (13%). Taken together
with unusually high β estimates, their results warrant extra caution. There are several
different methodological choices, which could limit the comparability of their results with
other studies. First, they estimate the extent of underreporting at the average income level
(rather than the average rate of misreporting). Second, they employ the OLS estimation.
Third, they have the smallest sample among such studies and impose very few sample
restrictions. For example, studies relying on food expenditure typically exclude households
27As another sensitivity check, we excluded all households with self-employed heads and estimated the
model for employees only. The results with both survey and register income changed only marginally for
the private sector employees (relative to the public sector employees). See Table 3.A.3 in Appendix 3.A.
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engaged in agricultural production as their food purchases might be strongly affected.
Based on our own sensitivity analysis (see the next subsection), there can be also variation
in consumption patterns due to differences in household structure (e.g. singles vs couples)
and a very heterogenous sample might render the estimates of income underreporting
unstable.
3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative sample and variable definitions.
Table 3.A.4 in Appendix 3.A summarises estimates of β, γ and our principal measure
of income underreporting, along with diagnostic indicators, for the base scenario (col-
umn 1) and for alternative configurations: an alternative set of instruments (column 2),
expanded samples (columns 3-5); narrower samples (columns 6-9); alternative expendi-
ture and income measures (columns 10-11); and alternative self-employment definitions
(columns 12-13).
Model (2) shows that very similar results to the baseline are obtained when the set
of instrumental variables is limited to the dummies for the head’s education (though
inevitably this reduces the explanatory power of instruments). Model (3) expands the
sample to include those households whose head worked part-time or part-year (about
an 8% increase) and the results are also affected very little. Models (4) and (5) are
based on samples combining couples with single households and other type of households,
respectively. Here, we see slightly more variation in results with some estimates becoming
less precise, and more so when single households are included (model 4), though the
estimates remain broadly similar.
Models (6) and (7) focus on more homogenous samples by restricting the age range
of the household head to 25-55 years, and excluding those with earnings reported only in
one data source, respectively. The sample for model (6) is about 80% of the main sample
and, while estimates of underreporting with survey income change very little, estimates
with register income become significantly larger: 33% and 64% on average for households
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whose head is, respectively, a private employee and a self-employed. The sample for
model (7) is only slightly smaller compared to the main sample, indicating that the latter
contains relatively few people with positive earnings in one data source and not in the
other, and results are just marginally different from the baseline. Models (8) and (9)
provide estimates for the 2007 and 2008 wave separately. Splitting the sample obviously
increases standard errors (which is the very reason for using pooled waves in the main
analysis) though point estimates are generally quite similar, apart from the dummy for
self-employed heads (γC) for survey income and the dummy for head in the private sector
(γB) for register income.
Model (10) employs a measure of housing costs, which includes rent and mortgage
interest payments and model (11) uses a broader income measure (total household income)
instead of earnings.28 The alternative expenditure measure is limited, however, to actual
expenses only and does not consider implicit rent for homeowners. In both cases, the
estimate of the income elasticity of housing expenditure (β) is higher than in the baseline,
which is expected as rent and mortgage interests ought to be more elastic than utilities,
and total income potentially more relevant for household expenses than earnings alone.
However, the model fit to the data (based on AIC and BIC) becomes poorer with model
(10) for both survey and register income, and κ¯B becomes even higher than one, implying
that households whose heads are private employees overreport their income on average,
though this estimate is not statistically significant. Estimates of income underreporting
with model (11) are slightly lower compared to the baseline, which is expected as reporting
accuracy for other income components, which are now included (e.g. public pensions and
other social transfers), should not be affected by the type of household.29 However, the
estimates of underreporting do not decrease much as earnings are the dominant source
of income for this sample of households. Although the model fit is improved when using
total household income, the reason for not choosing model (11) as the baseline is because
28The total income in the tax records is limited to taxable incomes only. See Section 3.3.
29In the case of survey data, other income sources (even if non-taxable) are still likely to be measured
imperfectly due to, for example, recall errors, social stigmas related to the receipt of welfare benefits etc,
but it is not obvious why this should vary systematically between public employees, private employees
and the self-employed.
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of our explicit focus on underreporting of earnings.
Finally, models (12) and (13) test alternative definitions for self-employed households,
the former considers a household self-employed if any of its members is working as a
self-employed (not specifically the head of household) and the latter extends the number
of self-employed households by including heads who have not indicated self-employment
status (in ESU) but reported income related to registered self-employment income. This
expands their numbers when using register income as the reported self-employment status
and income are already aligned for survey income based sample. The estimates for model
(12) and (13) with survey income differ only marginally from the baseline; the same
applies to model (13) with register income, while model (12) estimates of underreporting
are slightly smaller.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we extended the method of Pissarides and Weber (1989) for estimating
income underreporting and apply this to a household income survey linked with individual
tax records for Estonia. This allows us to explore the validity of the two main assumptions
underlying this method: that employees are fully compliant and patterns of survey income
reporting correspond to the way incomes are declared to the tax authority (i.e. the actual
tax compliance behaviour). As a further methodological contribution, we identify a way
to obtain a point estimate of underreporting with fewer assumptions. We also review
other studies applying this kind of method to provide an overview of their methodological
differences. Similar to Besim and Jenkins (2005), but in a more rigourous framework, we
distinguish between public sector and private sector employees, relaxing the assumption
of full income reporting by the latter.
Our key findings are the following. We detect large underreporting of earnings by cou-
ples whose head is a self-employed (56% on average) and also substantial underreporting
of earnings by households whose head is a private sector employee (23%) on the basis
of (housing related) expenditures and incomes in the tax records. However, the scale
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of underreporting by the self-employed and private employees is estimated to be much
smaller with survey incomes (respectively, 25% and 7%) and the latter estimate is also
not statistically significant. Importantly, this suggests that people are more truthful in
the surveys than often assumed and previous studies using this method may have under-
estimated the extent of non-compliance by a substantial margin. Moreover, an obvious
advantage of using tax records is that this allows us to attribute income underreporting to
non-compliance with much greater certainty compared to survey data where misreporting
may also occur due to recall errors, stigma effects etc.
There are several possible policy implications. Higher reporting of wages and salaries
compared to self-employment income is an indication that third-party reporting reduces
non-compliance substantially. However, what is equally important to emphasise is that it
does not rule out tax evasion altogether as the employee and the employer can still collude.
Furthermore, in absolute terms, much more tax revenue is lost through the underreporting
of employment income compared to the underreporting of self-employment income as the
latter accounts for only a marginal share of total earnings (less than 2-4% according to
ESU, without corrections for underreporting). Hence, the underreporting of wages and
salaries by a small proportion can in monetary terms easily exceed underreported self-
employment income even if the latter was entirely concealed.
Despite utilising a rich and novel data source in the field of tax compliance and among
the PW-type of studies in particular, Chapter 3 was limited to a cross-sectional analysis
and to a single type of expenditure. More waves and larger samples are required to take
the analysis further by utilising the panel data element and studying specific subgroups
in more detail. Richer consumption data would also allow us to estimate more complex
demand systems.
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Table 3.1: Sample size
Number of households
Total Public Private Self-empl.
All survey respondents 9,890
Matched with tax records 9,754
Household with non-zero consumption 9,728
Household with positive earnings
in the survey 7,457
in the tax records 7,426
Head with positive earnings
in the survey 7,064 1,289 5,132 643
in the tax records 7,038 1,449 5,021 568
Head worked full-time (for whole year)
in the survey 5,954 1,175 4,251 528
in the tax records 5,789 1,101 4,219 469
Couples (with or without children)
in the survey 3,498 595 2,549 354
in the tax records 3,413 598 2,502 313
Notes: ESU 2007 and 2008 waves pooled; public/private = household head is employed in the pub-
lic/private sector and not considered a self-employed; (employees in ESU who have multiple jobs or
unspecified affiliation or switched jobs are included among private employees, public employees in the tax
records include those with earnings only from a public entity, an NGO or a foundation); self-employed =
household head worked as a self-employed in the income reference period (based on ESU).
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Table 3.2: Mean household expenditure and income
Survey income Register income
ln c ln ys ∆ ln c ln yr ∆
2007 wave
Public 7.074 9.295 -2.221 7.082 9.527 -2.444
(0.026) (0.042) (0.040) (0.027) (0.049) (0.047)
324 324 317 317
Private 7.121 9.426 -2.305 7.122 9.475 -2.352
(0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027) (0.026)
1,307 1,307 1,280 1,280
Self-employed 7.228 9.223 -1.996 7.232 8.995 -1.763
(0.039) (0.083) (0.082) (0.042) (0.098) (0.093)
178 178 160 160
N total 1,809 1,757
2008 wave
Public 7.257 9.472 -2.215 7.208 9.750 -2.543
(0.024) (0.045) (0.046) (0.029) (0.046) (0.052)
271 271 281 281
Private 7.307 9.586 -2.279 7.324 9.690 -2.366
(0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.026) (0.025)
1,242 1,242 1,222 1,222
Self-employed 7.440 9.594 -2.154 7.440 9.357 -1.917
(0.039) (0.077) (0.077) (0.042) (0.113) (0.106)
176 176 153 153
N total 1,689 1,656
Notes: estimated using survey weights on a sample of couple households whose head has positive earnings
and worked full-time (2007-08 waves pooled); standard errors (shown in parantheses) are clustered at the
household level; c = hh monthly housing costs (excl. rent and mortgage interests) in EEK; ys = hh net
earnings in the survey in EEK (annual amount divided by 12); yr = hh gross earnings in the tax records in
EEK (annual amount divided by 12); ∆ = difference in mean log values; public/private = household head
is employed in the public/private sector and not considered a self-employed; self-employed = household
head worked as a self-employed in the income reference period (based on ESU).
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the model with employees (A) and self-employed (B)
Survey income Register income
(1) ML (2) ML-IV (3) ML (4) ML-IV
β 0.121*** 0.308*** 0.078*** 0.187***
(0.018) (0.054) (0.014) (0.036)
γB 0.087*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.177***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040)
σ2ξA 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.326*** 0.326***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.024) (0.024)
σ2ξB 0.536*** 0.536*** 0.904*** 0.908***
(0.168) (0.169) (0.183) (0.184)
1− κ¯B 0.421** 0.202** 0.717*** 0.481***
(0.182) (0.101) (0.142) (0.113)
1− 1/k¯PWlB 0.421** 0.202** 0.717*** 0.481***
(0.182) (0.101) (0.142) (0.113)
1− 1/k¯PWuB 0.590*** 0.436*** 0.841*** 0.710***
(0.127) (0.095) (0.083) (0.073)
1− κ¯HLPB 0.513*** 0.329*** 0.788*** 0.612***
(0.146) (0.082) (0.107) (0.084)
# of employees (A) 3,017 3,017 2,975 2,975
# of self-employed (B) 345 345 306 306
Total obs 3,362 3,362 3,281 3,281
AIC 13,840,023 13,836,263 13,666,398 13,663,828
BIC 13,840,439 13,836,692 13,666,813 13,664,255
Partial R2 0.1323 0.1572
F-test for excluded instr.-s 19.14 26.35
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0004
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.4467 0.0459
Notes: estimated using survey weights on a sample of couple households whose head has positive earn-
ings and worked full-time (2007-08 waves pooled); standard errors (shown in parantheses) are clustered
at the household level; dependent variable = ln housing costs; income = ln earnings; instruments =
head education level, occupation and industry; covariates = head gender, age (centered), age squared,
nationality, marital status; no of children and (other) adults in the hh, region, rural area, wave and
housing characteristics (type, year of construction, no of rooms, size in m2, ownership); self-employed =
household head worked as a self-employed in the income reference period (based on ESU); * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.4: Estimates of the model with public employees (A), private employees (B) and
self-employed (C)
Survey income Register income
(1) ML (2) ML-IV (3) ML (4) ML-IV
β 0.121*** 0.302*** 0.080*** 0.215***
(0.020) (0.054) (0.012) (0.034)
γB 0.018 0.023 0.049** 0.073***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
γC 0.102*** 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.253***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.046)
σ2ξA 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.200*** 0.199***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
σ2ξB 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.354*** 0.355***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017)
σ2ξC 0.535*** 0.536*** 0.906*** 0.909***
(0.168) (0.169) (0.184) (0.184)
1− κ¯B 0.132 0.068 0.414** 0.232***
(0.161) (0.069) (0.177) (0.088)
1− 1/k¯PWlB 0.132 0.068 0.414** 0.232***
(0.161) (0.069) (0.177) (0.088)
1− 1/k¯PWuB 0.141 0.078 0.498*** 0.343***
(0.160) (0.069) (0.152) (0.076)
1− κ¯HLPB 0.137 0.073 0.458*** 0.290***
(0.160) (0.068) (0.164) (0.081)
1− κ¯C 0.485*** 0.250** 0.812*** 0.561***
(0.186) (0.110) (0.106) (0.095)
1− 1/k¯PWlC 0.485*** 0.250** 0.812*** 0.561***
(0.186) (0.110) (0.106) (0.095)
1− 1/k¯PWuC 0.638*** 0.474*** 0.907*** 0.784***
(0.130) (0.097) (0.054) (0.054)
1− κ¯HLPC 0.568*** 0.372*** 0.868*** 0.692***
(0.151) (0.090) (0.075) (0.066)
# of public employees (A) 580 580 579 579
# of private employees (B) 2,437 2,437 2,396 2,396
# of self-employed (C) 345 345 306 306
Total obs 3,362 3,362 3,281 3,281
AIC 13,241,775 13,238,113 12,662,605 12,658,765
BIC 13,242,216 13,238,572 12,663,044 12,659,222
Partial R2 0.1325 0.1502
F-test for excluded instr.-s 19.33 23.71
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.5083 0.1582
Notes: estimated using survey weights on a sample of couple households whose head has positive earnings
and worked full-time (2007-08 waves pooled); standard errors (shown in parantheses) are clustered at the
household level; dependent variable = ln housing costs; income = ln earnings; instruments = head edu-
cation level, occupation and industry; covariates = head gender, age (centered), age squared, nationality,
marital status; no of children and (other) adults in the hh, region, rural area, wave and housing charac-
teristics (type, year of construction, no of rooms, size in m2, ownership); public/private = household head
is employed in the public/private sector and not considered a self-employed; self-employed = household
head worked as a self-employed in the income reference period (based on ESU); * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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CHAPTER 3
Table 3.A.2: Descriptive statistics for non-monetary variables
mean st.dev. N
Education=basic or less 0.07 0.26 4,014
Education=secondary 0.56 0.50 4,014
Education=tertiary 0.37 0.48 4,014
Occupation=senior managers, legislators 0.20 0.40 3,983
Occupation=professionals 0.15 0.35 3,983
Occupation=technicians, associate professionals 0.11 0.32 3,983
Occupation=service/sales workers 0.07 0.25 3,983
Occupation=craft/related trade workers 0.20 0.40 3,983
Occupation=clerks, plant/machine operators 0.20 0.40 3,983
Occupation=agricultural workers, elementary occupations 0.06 0.24 3,983
Industry=agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.05 0.21 3,938
Industry=manufacturing, mining, electricity, gas, water supply 0.25 0.43 3,938
Industry=construction 0.15 0.36 3,938
Industry=trade, hotels, restaurants, transport, communication 0.26 0.44 3,938
Industry=finance, real estate, renting, business activities 0.10 0.29 3,938
Industry=public admin, education, health; own production 0.20 0.40 3,938
Age (centered) -0.00 1.13 4,014
Age (centered) squared 1.28 1.50 4,014
Gender=male 0.72 0.45 4,014
Nationality=Estonian 0.71 0.45 4,014
Marital status=married 0.73 0.44 4,014
Region=north 0.40 0.49 4,014
Region=central 0.11 0.31 4,014
Region=north-east 0.11 0.32 4,014
Region=west 0.13 0.33 4,014
Region=south 0.24 0.43 4,014
Area=rural 0.29 0.45 4,014
No of persons aged 15+ in the hh (other than couple) 0.45 0.75 4,014
No of children aged 14 or younger in the hh 0.69 0.88 4,014
Housing type=house 0.33 0.47 4,013
Housing type=flat 0.67 0.47 4,013
Construction period=before 1946 0.14 0.35 3,957
Construction period=1946-1960 0.09 0.28 3,957
Construction period=1961-1970 0.17 0.38 3,957
Construction period=1971-1980 0.25 0.43 3,957
Construction period=1981-1990 0.22 0.41 3,957
Construction period=1991-1999 0.05 0.23 3,957
Construction period=2000 or later 0.08 0.27 3,957
Housing size (m2, capped at 450) 75.45 42.57 3,988
Housing ownership=owned 0.90 0.30 4,014
Housing ownership=rented 0.10 0.30 4,014
No of rooms (capped at 6) 3.10 1.18 4,014
2008 wave 0.51 0.50 4,014
Notes: ESU 2007 and 2008 waves pooled; estimated using survey weights on a sample of couple households
whose head has positive earnings (in either data source) and worked full-time; person characteristics refer
to the head of household; age variable is centered at sample mean (and divided by 10).
INCOME-EXPENDITURE GAPS
Table 3.A.3: Estimates of the model with public employees (A) and private employees
(B)
Survey income Register income
(1) ML (2) ML-IV (3) ML (4) ML-IV
β 0.132*** 0.306*** 0.081*** 0.214***
(0.018) (0.058) (0.015) (0.038)
γB 0.017 0.022 0.050** 0.074***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
σ2ξA 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.199*** 0.198***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
σ2ξB 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.354*** 0.355***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
1− κ¯B 0.119 0.064 0.417** 0.234***
(0.139) (0.064) (0.173) (0.085)
1− 1/k¯PWlB 0.119 0.064 0.417** 0.234***
(0.139) (0.064) (0.173) (0.085)
1− 1/k¯PWuB 0.128 0.074 0.501*** 0.345***
(0.138) (0.064) (0.148) (0.074)
1− κ¯HLPB 0.123 0.069 0.461*** 0.292***
(0.138) (0.064) (0.160) (0.079)
# of public employees (A) 580 580 579 579
# of private employees (B) 2,437 2,437 2,396 2,396
Total obs 3,017 3,017 2,975 2,975
AIC 11,935,962 11,933,260 11,519,963 11,516,532
BIC 11,936,371 11,933,681 11,520,371 11,516,951
Partial R2 0.1319 0.1563
F-test for excluded instr.-s 18.53 21.13
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0001
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.6236 0.1744
Notes: estimated using survey weights on a sample of couple households whose head has positive earn-
ings and worked full-time (2007-08 waves pooled); standard errors (shown in parantheses) are clustered
at the household level; dependent variable = ln housing costs; income = ln earnings; instruments =
head education level, occupation and industry; covariates = head gender, age (centered), age squared,
nationality, marital status; no of children and (other) adults in the hh, region, rural area, wave and
housing characteristics (type, year of construction, no of rooms, size in m2, ownership); public/private =
household head is employed in the public/private sector and not considered a self-employed; * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Summary and further research
The thesis focuses on various aspects of household income taxation, using economic mod-
elling to investigate policy relevant issues. Chapter 1 studied the scope for flat income
taxes in Western European countries with an emphasis on the distributional implications.
With Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I estimated the prevalence and determinants of income
underreporting for tax purposes in Estonia. The econometric analysis in Chapter 2 also
accounts for measurement errors in survey income and the distinct feature of Chapter 3
is its broader scope, which includes not only employed workers but also self-employed.
Using microsimulation techniques and the EU tax-benefit model EUROMOD, Chapter
1 sought to assess systematically how interdependent dimensions – the flat tax design,
the underlying income distribution and the institutional context – relate to the outcomes
of flat tax reforms. We do this by estimating the distributional and work incentive effects
of a range of hypothetical revenue-neutral flat tax reforms in several Western European
countries, varying the level of flat tax rates and tax-free allowance with guidance from
the theoretical framework of Davies and Hoy (2002).
Our findings confirm the general pattern that lower flat tax parameters strengthen
work incentives but tend to benefit high income households at the expense of low and
middle income households and, therefore, lead to a less equal income distribution. Higher
flat tax parameters, on the other hand, can maintain the observed levels of inequality but
usually exhibit substantial disincentive effects. The results are in line with earlier single-
country empirical studies while our broader scope offers more generic insights as well as
helps to identify a few exceptions. A common and consistent modelling framework further
allows us to note some cross-country patterns along the welfare state typology of Esping-
Andersen (1990) and Ferrera (1996). In particular, the Mediterranean (or Southern)
welfare regimes show some scope for flat tax reforms with little tradeoff between equity
and efficiency considerations. In other words, this shows that the effective tax burden
resulting from their existing income tax systems is less different from that of a pure flat
tax schedule than in other countries.
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There are several possibilities for extending the research in Chapter 1. First of all,
cross-country variability could be summarised with alternative scenarios. One particular
option – which we are already pursuing in a separate paper – is to consider ‘double neutral’
flat tax parameters in the sense of achieving not only revenue neutrality but also keeping
the level of inequality constant. Such a combination of parameters would be unique for
a given measure of inequality and therefore could provide a useful step towards a better
understanding of the characteristics of a tax-benefit system determining the intensity of
equity-efficiency trade-off.
Second, the analysis in Chapter 1 abstracts from wider effects on the economy and
focuses on the first-order effects alone, even though these are likely to be decisive for the
political feasibility of a flat tax reform. Changes in work incentive indicators can be seen
at best as an approximation to potential labour supply effects. A step forward would be
to use large-scale comparative estimates of labour supply elasticities (e.g. Bargain et al.,
2014) or to model labour market behaviour explicitly. Discrete labour supply models with
static tax-benefit models embedded (see Creedy and Kalb, 2005) are well established and
widely used to assess the behavioural reactions to changes in the tax-benefit system,
though linking these with labour demand models remains a key challenge. There have
been also attempts to link computable general equilibrium (CGE) models with microsim-
ulation models to combine their advantages. While the resulting micro-macro frameworks
can be very complex, it is less of a conceptual or a computational problem than an is-
sue of calibrating such models, given the increasing number of parametric combinations
(Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013).
Third, there is clearly scope to complement ex ante analysis based on simulation
methods with ex post evaluations of flat tax reforms given their wide implementation
in Europe and the first reversals in recent years (e.g. in the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic). Among such reforms, the one in Russia in 2001 has attracted the most
attention so far (see Ivanova et al., 2005; Gorodnichenko et al., 2009; Duncan, 2014) while
others largely remain to be studied. In several cases, though, the limited progress can be
explained by the lack of suitable micro-data or the specifics and context of the reform,
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making it difficult to come up with credible identification strategies.
The aim of Chapter 2 was to uncover the extent and patterns of income tax evasion
on the basis of income survey data combined with information from administrative tax
records at the individual level – a novel and promising data source in the context of tax
compliance literature. I propose a multi-equation econometric model to capture income
reporting decisions of employees for tax and survey purposes conditional on (latent) true
earnings. To identify such a model, my key assumption is that public sector employees are
constrained in their choice to evade taxes and their earnings are correctly reported to the
tax authority, while there are no systematic differences (after controlling for individual
characteristics) between them and private sector employees regarding income reporting
in the survey.
I use the Estonian Social Survey (i.e. the Estonian component of the EU-SILC),
which has been linked with official tax records using individual ID-s and, remarkably,
without the requirement to seek the respondents’ explicit consent. The unique properties
of linkage ensure its high quality and achieve matches for virtually everyone. Compared to
previous empirical studies relying on (audited) tax records only, I have a much richer set
of explanatory variables and having a pair of income observations provides better means
to estimate true earnings. Compared to studies based on survey data alone, I do not need
to make strong (implicit) assumptions about reporting in the survey corresponding to
income reporting for the tax purposes and can account for potential measurement error
in the survey data.
My results indicate a number of socio-economic and demographic characteristics, which
strongly influence tax compliance behaviour, in line with (limited) previous evidence and
general expectations. The model allows me to quantify their marginal effects on reported
earnings and, therefore, reveal their economic impact as well. I show a negative association
between income reporting and the level of true earnings, ceteris paribus, with the mean
elasticity among unconstrained employees around 0.9. Overall, I estimate that more than
20% of all employees underreport their earnings – most of them partially – and about
12% of total employment income is not declared in the tax reports. This is a substantial
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proportion and challenges the common view in the literature that the underreporting of
wages and salaries is very low because of third party reporting. I also show variation in
reporting patterns across the estimated true income distribution with lower compliance at
the bottom and the top range of incomes, and substantial measurement errors in survey
income of a mean-reverting nature: large over-reporting at low values of true earnings
and moderate under-reporting at medium and high values of true earnings. My findings
are robust to a range of sensitivity tests, illustrating the importance of combining register
and survey information even if survey incomes are measured with errors.
Chapter 2 is the first attempt to model tax evasion and measurement error jointly
and as such there is scope for further improvements and extensions. For example, it
might be desirable to introduce additional elements into the modelling framework to
reflect the reporting process more flexibly: allow different factors to affect the decision
to underreport income and the extent of underreporting, allow for correlation between
unobserved factors affecting income reporting in the two cases (i.e. error terms) and
distinguish between intentional and unintentional misreporting.
It would be also useful to test the new method on other countries to check its robustness
and whether it can confirm in a systemic way a larger scale of underreporting of wages
and salaries than previously thought. A particular extension could be for countries with
progressive tax schedules, giving explicit attention to the role of marginal effective tax
rates which vary very little cross-sectionally in the case of Estonia. As the marginal
effective tax rate depends on income reported to the tax authority, it is an endogenous
factor in the reporting process and would require careful handling.
Finally, one could seek possibilities to model interactions between employees and em-
ployers leading to compliance decisions. While there is no doubt about the nature of
the process being non-trivial and modelling involving great challenges, not least because
of additional data requirements, such a feature would represent another important step
closer to the reality and better understanding of the key determinants of income tax
evasion.
Similar to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 deals with income underreporting and utilises the same
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dataset. It differs however in two important aspects. First, it uses a different method, fol-
lowing a well-known approach by Pissarides and Weber (1989), which contrasts household
income and expenditure to recover underreported income. Second, it extends the analysis
to the self-employed. As with the model developed in Chapter 2, the Pissarides-Weber
method relies on having a group of people who are assumed to report their incomes cor-
rectly. Typically, these have been taken to be (all) employees and the method has been
applied to survey data on income and food expenditure to study income underreporting
among the self-employed. The results of Chapter 2 offer insights for improving on their
approach as well. Specifically, in Chapter 3, I limit the assumption of compliant people
to public employees only and estimate income underreporting simultaneously for private
employees and the self-employed. I also apply their method separately to survey incomes
and register incomes to show the implications of their underlying assumption that income
reporting in the survey corresponds to reporting for tax purposes. Even though informa-
tion on expenditures in the SILC is limited and does not cover food, it includes housing
related expenses (essentially utilities) which I use instead.
Applying the method in a standard way – using all employees as the reference group
and relying on survey income information – leads to the detection of sizeable income
underreporting by the self-employed (20-25% on average). My key findings, however, in-
dicate that the extent of underreporting is much higher with register income (48-56%)
and also substantial among private employees (23%). Despite different methods (and
samples), the latter estimate is of similar magnitude compared to that from Chapter 2
where it was estimated that private employees underreport 15-16% of their total employ-
ment income. In other words, my findings indicate that people are much more truthful in
the survey and the results based on survey data alone do not reveal the full scale of tax
non-compliance.
Further research could test assumptions about functional specifications with non-
parametric methods (see Tedds, 2010) and seek comprehensive expenditure data (linked
with register incomes) to estimate a more complete demand system (cf. Lyssiotou et al.,
2004). The size of the sample, which was already boosted by pooling two waves, limits
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the analysis here to the main types of workers while larger samples would allow relevant
characteristics for income underreporting to be explored in more detail. Moving from
the cross-sectional setting to panel data could offer even greater advantages by providing
explicit information on income variation.
Although we cautioned against treating the estimates of income underreporting based
on survey data alone as an indicator of tax evasion, such approach can still enhance income
measurement in surveys where one group of respondents is systematically underreporting
(or overreporting) income. For the EU-SILC, which is a multi-country survey, this could
represent a way to enhance cross-national comparability as reporting behaviour for the
same type of people may vary substantially across countries. There is also an increasing
number of countries, which by relying on administrative records to provide information
on certain income components in the EU-SILC, can offer further research possibilities.
Overall, the potential of linked survey and administrative data sources is increasingly
recognised and is likely to lead to better availability of information from the combined
data sources such as those used in the thesis.
Building on work done in all chapters, my further ambition is to introduce tax compli-
ance into empirical models of labour supply. This would extend current approaches with
an important additional channel through which taxes can affect people’s labour market
behaviour. As I showed in Chapter 2 most tax non-compliance takes place in the form
of partial rather than complete evasion and points to people combining declared and un-
declared work instead of entirely switching between formal and informal labour markets.
From society’s perspective, the fact that some people (among those with similar charac-
teristics) are not fully compliant with the tax laws represents a failure of the horizontal
equity principle and we need more insights into how the design of tax system influences
labour market decisions in the world without full compliance. A choice between flat taxes
and graduated rate taxes is one relevant aspect for consideration here.
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